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Chapter 1
General Introduction and Thesis Outline
“As a policy maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited
help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned
by conventional tools.”
— Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, 18 November 2010
As pointed out by Jean-Claude Trichet, the ﬁnancial crisis from the years 2007-2009 re-
vealed imperfections in existing economic modeling techniques. The standard Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, widely used by central bankers and policy makers
around the world, proved not to capture the intriguing complexity of the global ﬁnancial sector
nor could they have reproduced the boom and bust scenarios which are observed in the real
world (Buiter, 2009). In fact, paraphrasing Charles Goodhart from the Bank of England, the
standard central banking “excludes everything that [we shall be] interested in”.
The failure of these models might be largely attributed to several simplifying assumptions
which they are built upon. To the most widely criticized belong the Rational Expectations Hy-
pothesis (REH) and representative agent structure (Frydman and Goldberg, 2007), linear depen-
dencies (Hommes, 2013) and the absence of the well-characterized ﬁnancial sector (Bernanke
et al., 1999; Tovar, 2008). Those shortcomings used to be neglected for many years as the
global economy was growing steadily with little ﬂuctuations, making the DSGE models pow-
erful tools which provide a coherent framework for policy discussion and analysis. The beauty
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of their simplicity turned, however, into their biggest nightmare as the recent ﬁnancial crisis
erupted. Their forecasting accuracy, highlighted on pre-crisis samples (see e.g. Christoffel
et al. (2010)), in terms of Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), proved to be no better than naive
forecasts (Edge and Gu¨rkaynak, 2010).
As pointed out by Tovar (2008) “[d]espite the rapid progress made in recent years, at their
current stage of development, these [DSGE] models are not fully ready to accomplish all what
is being asked from them”. The goal of this thesis is therefore threefold. Firstly, it contributes
to the ongoing debate on economic modeling by investigating economic dynamics under het-
erogeneous market structures. Secondly, it proposes econometric concepts of assessing the
inﬂuence of nonlinear proﬁles in economic relationships. Thirdly, it studies the role of the net-
work structures in the shock propagation mechanisms of the global economy. Because of their
extraordinary relevance in the real world, a lot of attention is being paid to banking and ﬁnancial
markets.
The role of expectations
The general equilibrium models, like the Real Business Cycle (RBC), developed by Kydland
and Prescott (1982), or the new Keynesian framework, pioneered by Clarida et al. (1999)
and Woodford (2003), assume at the micro level the utility-maximizing consumers, proﬁt-
maximizing companies and market clearing for all goods at all dates in all markets (Hommes,
2013). A subtle assumption of rational expectations helps to solve the models analytically and
derive the macro behavior directly from the micro founded principles.
REH has a long history in economics, ranging back to the seminal papers of Muth (1961)
and Lucas (1972). It states that on average economic agents act as if they could predict future
outcomes perfectly. That means that the incorrect expectations cancel out with each other or are
being eliminated by natural selection (Friedman, 1953) and at the aggregate level one observes
perfectly accurate foresight. In mathematical terms this is parallel to equalizing a variable today
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to its expected value in the market clearing equilibrium tomorrow (Garcia, 2011). Exploiting
the mathematical courtesy of REH, studying the macro behavior is as easy as looking at the one
representative (or average) agent and associating it with the aggregate decision making process,
as in equilibrium everybody shall have the same model consistent expectations without any
systematic errors.
Nevertheless, REH oversees the possibility that the incorrect expectations might be self-
enforcing instead of being self-mitigating. Indeed, if bad decisions today lead to even worse
decisions tomorrow this feedback mechanism might be of great importance for the aggregate
economic dynamics (Frydman and Goldberg, 2007), driving the system further away from the
fundamentals and creating possible bubbles. This type of feedback structure has been already
recognized in the literature; for instance Soros (2003) refers to it as vicious cycles and Brun-
nermeier (2009) calls it by simply spirals. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) highlight that REH is
very susceptible to this type of expectational dynamics.
Although, in the literature there is no consensus on how to represent economic expectations,
their role and especially the inﬂuence of their interactions are an extremely important aspect of
modern economic modeling (Stanislawska and Tomczyk, 2010; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001;
Hommes, 2013). Recently, however, one has observed a paradigm shift from REH to the ideas
of bounded rationality and heterogeneous expectations (see e.g. Conlisk (1996); Brock and
Hommes (1997); Branch (2004); Branch and McGough (2009)). The reasoning behind bound-
edly rational agents is attributed to Simon (1955, 1957). Simon points out that because of the
lack of information or limited cognitive and computing capacities, individuals might not be
perfect forecasters nor optimizers but rather they tend to use simple heuristics in their decision
making process when acting under uncertainty. This view has been widely conﬁrmed in lab-
oratory experiments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), proving that in reality these simple rules
of thumb might lead to signiﬁcant biases so that the incorrect expectations do not necessarily
cancel out as suggested by REH.
This in fact puts in conﬂict the idea of a representative agent structure, widely present in
3
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DSGE models. In a situation where the agents are boundedly rational they do not have to share
the same information set nor use the same heuristics in forming their expectations. The ex
ante individual prediction might thereof not coincide with the ex post aggregate realizations
but certainly they affect them. As a consequence, the beliefs of some agents might indirectly
inﬂuence the beliefs of others so that the economy becomes an expectational feedback system
(Hommes, 2013). Heterogeneous expectations have been conﬁrmed both in laboratory exper-
iments (Hommes, 2011, 2013) and in the survey studies (Carroll, 2003; Mankiw et al., 2003)
and tend to be an intriguing and thought-provoking phenomenon for economic modeling.
Heterogeneous expectations, together with boundedly rational agents, proved to generate
complex structures and interesting nonlinear economic dynamics in the DSGE framework (see
e.g. Branch and McGough (2010) or Massaro (2013)). Therefore, they might be an alternative
to the standard model assumptions, pointing out a direction for future developments. In this
thesis, Chapter 2 is fully devoted to these intriguing phenomena in the DSGE new Keynesian
framework with an active banking sector.
Nonlinear dynamics
The standard linear framework ﬁts nicely in globally stable systems which are close to equilib-
rium. It performed tremendously well from the mid-1980s till 2006, a period often referred to as
the Great Moderation, when the global economy was at a stable growth path. In the absence of
large shocks, the system was settling down to its local equilibrium and the concerns arising from
possible threats and risks were underestimated by both ﬁnancial markets and macroprudential
authorities (Blinder, 2013).
As it is known in the mathematical sciences, the dynamics around a steady state might
be approximated by log-linearization. However, moving further away from that point, log-
linearization produces less accurate approximations. Consequently, the linear economic models
could misperceive the risks which are further away from a given equilibrium point. In fact this
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was clearly visible when the US housing bubble collapsed in years 2006/2007 materializing all
the risk which the world economy had been accumulating during the Great Moderation (Blinder,
2013). Nobody had expected such a big shock nor the continuing recession in the majority of
advanced economies.
Linear models offer attractive mathematical properties, making them relatively easy to solve
analytically. These simpliﬁcations, however, might have not kept up with the changes in the
globalized and heavily digitalized economy. As pointed out by Alan Blinder, the former Vice
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in the years before the cri-
sis “the complexity went amok” (Blinder, 2013). Because of their design, purely linear models
cannot capture the sophisticated and complex nature of the modern ﬁnancial system. The need
for new (nonlinear) analytical methods has been therefore widely signalized by professionals
(Buiter, 2009).
The role of the ﬁnancial sector and monetary policy
The importance of the ﬁnancial sector (often referred to as simply banking) in economic mod-
eling has already been recognized and included in more sophisticated models. Nevertheless, the
standard RBC and the new Keynesian models are built around the Efﬁcient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), in which no ﬁnancial disequilibrium is possible (Krugman, 2009). The commonly used
view among practitioners highlights the inevitable link between the real economy and its ﬁnan-
cial side, especially when the presence of the latter provokes frictions and market imperfections
(Bernanke et al., 1999), or may even cause signiﬁcant real disturbances (Blinder, 2013).
The topic of ﬁnancial frictions has attracted a lot of attention recently (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Nevertheless, the recent developments in ﬁnancial engineering and accounting, like emergence
of Structured Investment Vehicles (Tabe, 2010), heavy leverage (Blinder, 2013), novel ﬁnan-
cial products (Datz, 2013) and global exposures and imbalances (International Monetary Fund,
2013), made it more complex in nature not only for regulators and ﬁnancial authorities but also
5
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for ﬁnancial markets themselves (Datz, 2013).
As a consequence, in order to stabilize the markets and to bridle the ﬁnancial complex-
ity in the aftermath of the crisis 2007-2009, a huge mandate was given to central banks in
advanced economies, like Federal Reserve, European Central Bank or Bank of Japan (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2013). The role of standard monetary policy, i.e. stabilization of inﬂation
dynamics (or in the US also the production level) by controlling the nominal short-term interest
rates (Woodford, 2003), has evolved into something often referred to as modern monetary pol-
icy. Under the latter, central banks are allowed to manipulate long-term interest rates and bail-
out troubled markets, or more generally as Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, famously
pledged “[to do] whatever it takes”. The implications put central bankers and the modern mon-
etary policy into an urgent need for better tools, designed to capture the complex dynamics of
the global economy. This is why the ideas presented in this thesis are assessed through a prism
of monetary policy and banking.
Thesis outline
The methods developed and applied in this thesis aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion on
the fascinating, rapidly changing and primo loco highly nonlinear proﬁle of the ﬁnancial world,
being a potentially attractive standpoint for policy makers and practitioners. Chapter 2 studies
the implications of a presence of boundedly rational agents in a monetary policy framework
with an active banking sector. Chapters 3 and 4 develop econometric tests of studying nonlinear
Granger (1969) causal relations in two different settings. Chapter 5 is a result of my stay at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Summer of 2013 and presents an application of the
network modeling to the global banking sector and sovereign bond market and explores the role
of safe havens in shock propagation mechanism. Chapters 2-4 are published as working papers
at the National Bank of Poland and Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Econo-
metrics (CeNDEF) at the University of Amsterdam; Wolski (2013b) is based on Chapter 2, Diks
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and Wolski (2013) is based on Chapter 3 and Wolski (2013a) is based on Chapter 4. Chapter 5,
co-authored by Franziska Ohnsorge and Y. Sophia Zhang, is forthcoming as an IMF working
paper. The ideas contained in this thesis aim at encouraging a thought-provoking discussion
on the nature of nonlinear structures in economic dynamics and econometrics and shall not be
associated with views of any of the aforementioned institutions nor their policies.
Chapter 2 investigates the phenomenon of heterogeneous expectations, analyzing their role
in monetary policy conduct with an active banking sector. In addition to fundamentalists, we
assume a constant fraction of boundedly rational agents who use simple heuristics to form
their expectations. We focus on two types of heuristics which are most commonly referred to
throughout the literature (Hommes, 2013), i.e. adaptive and extrapolative expectations. Both
assume that future realizations depend on the past performance of particular variables, however,
the former assumes that the inﬂuence of past realizations decreases over time whereas the latter
manifests the opposite. The impact of those biased beliefs is studied in the aggregate economy
framework with an active banking sector, originally developed by Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007). We ﬁrst show that the presence of the banking sector changes the determinacy structure
of the system and, depending on the heuristics used, the presence of boundedly rational agents
might have either stabilizing or destabilizing effect. In particular, when boundedly rational
agents have extrapolative expectations, the range of the stable (determinate) monetary policy
instruments is narrowed.
In Chapter 3 we propose an extension of the nonlinear Granger causality test, originally
introduced by Diks and Panchenko (2006). We show that the basic test statistic lacks consis-
tency in the multivariate setting. The problem is the result of the kernel density estimator bias,
which does not converge to zero at a sufﬁciently fast rate when the number of conditioning
variables is larger than one. In order to overcome this difﬁculty we apply the data-sharpening
method for bias reduction (Hall and Minnotte, 2002). We then derive the asymptotic properties
of the sharpened test statistic and we investigate its performance numerically. We conclude with
an empirical application to the US grain market, as it creates an ideal environment to test our
7
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methodology. Chapter 3 does not exploit the ﬁnancial markets explicitly and might be treated
as a general introduction to the topics covered in the Chapter 4. Nevertheless, nonparametric
Granger causality tests have been widely applied to ﬁnancial time series (for instance to ex-
change rates in Bekiros and Diks (2008a) and to crude oil prices in Bekiros and Diks (2008b))
so that one may easily extend our reasoning to a different ﬁnancial setting. In fact, Chapter 4
is closely related to Chapter 3 and raises the discussion on nonparametric Granger causality
testing to the ﬁnancial environment.
More speciﬁcally, Chapter 4 proposes a newmethodology of assessing the effects of individ-
ual institution’s risk on the others and on the system as a whole. We build upon the Conditional
Value-at-Risk approach. However, we introduce explicit Granger causal linkages and we ac-
count for possible nonlinearities in ﬁnancial time series. Conditional Value-at-Risk-Nonlinear
Granger Causality, or NCoVaR as we call it for simplicity, has regular asymptotic properties
which makes it particularly appealing for practical applications. We test our approach empir-
ically and assess the contribution of the euro area ﬁnancial companies to the overall systemic
risk. We ﬁnd that only a few ﬁnancial institutions pose a serious ex ante threat to systemic
stability risk, whereas, given that the system is already in trouble, there are more institutions
which hamper its recovery. Moreover, we discover non-negligible nonlinear structures in the
systemic risk proﬁle of the euro zone.
In Chapter 5 we create a network of bilateral correlations of changes in sovereign bond
yields and individual bank equity price changes. We study the nature and the evolution of this
network in the years 2000-2013. We show that, in this context, safe havens have an intuitive
representation as countries in which changes in sovereign bond yields and bank equity prices are
positively correlated. Safe havens, however, have one additional feature, i.e. their asset prices
are highly correlated with those of other countries making them hubs for capital ﬂows. We
investigate how these two properties of safe havens have affected the propagation of bank and
sovereign shocks in our asset price network since 2000, in a simple shock propagation frame-
work. On balance, we ﬁnd that the presence of safe havens has ampliﬁed shock propagation.
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Chapter 6 concludes and offers some ideas for future research on nonlinear dynamics in
economics and econometrics.
Each chapter is a self-contained manuscript, with separate introduction, summary and ap-
pendices, and might be read independently from other chapters. For the reader’s convenience,
the common bibliography is collected at the end of the thesis. A digital copy of these pages
can be found in the online libraries of the Universiteit van Amsterdam (www.uba.uva.nl) and
Universita¨t Bielefeld (www.ub.uni-bielefeld.de).
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy, Banking and
Heterogeneous Agents
2.1 Introduction
The need for a framework which would incorporate ﬁnancial frictions in DSGE models was
stressed long before the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997). The body of literature in this topic has grown substantially thereafter, bringing
signiﬁcant changes to monetary policy conduct (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Woodford,
2003). It is surprising, as argued by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Casares, Miguel
and Poutineau (2010), that the role of the banking sector was left unexplored in the monetary
policy analysis until recently.
The framework used in this study clariﬁes this oversight. Firstly, by introducing proﬁt-
maximizing bankers at the micro level, one may explicitly study the impact of their individual
behavior on the macro aggregates. Secondly, the differentiation of the capital market allows to
investigate the relationship between various types of interest rates (Goodfriend, 2005). Thirdly,
by having government bonds which serve for collateral purposes, one observes the direct inﬂu-
ence of public policy on the monetary aggregates.
11
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Most noticeably, however, a banking sector per se is an important, if not the most important
part of each economy (Levine, 1997). Since it is a general source of liquidity, its problems
may easily spread over the other sectors, bringing them down eventually. Especially, the recent
history proves that banking sector disturbances might result in sovereign crises, as recently
took place in the euro zone (Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012). Therefore, a detailed study
of the banking sector’s role in the monetary framework is required in order to (i) understand its
transmission mechanism and (ii) endow the monetary authorities with the sufﬁcient preventive
tools.
The goal of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we assess the determinacy properties of differ-
ent monetary policies in the DSGE model with a banking sector of Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007). The model is built within the standard new Keynesian framework where the aggregate
dynamics is a direct consequence of individual utility maximizing behavior of forward-looking
agents. Secondly, we relax the assumption of agents’ homogeneity and investigate how the
presence of the backward-looking (or boundedly rational after Hommes (2013)) agents inﬂu-
ences the determinacy of the equilibrium. We introduce agents’ heterogeneity at the micro level,
which means that each agent is solving the individual optimization problem simultaneously. It
is an important distinction from a variety of models which neglect this aspect and allow for
agents’ heterogeneity at the macro level only. Clearly, such a concept violates the Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) theory and in our view is inappropriate. Instead, we follow the classical
approach where the macro behavior is a direct consequence of agents’ micro optimal plans.
The latter part of this study is motivated by a growing body of research which shows ex-
plicitly that agents differ in forming expectations. This phenomenon was conﬁrmed by both
survey data analysis (Carroll, 2003; Mankiw et al., 2003; Branch, 2004) as well as laboratory
experiments with human subjects (Hommes et al., 2005; Assenza et al., 2011; Hommes, 2011;
Pfajfar and Zakelj, 2011). The heterogeneity among agents was proved to have important im-
plications on the determinacy properties in the new Keynesian models (Branch and McGough,
2009; Massaro, 2013). We follow this approach and assess its implication within the framework
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with a banking sector.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the workhorse model and dis-
cusses the implications of the banking sector on monetary policy conduct. In Section 2.3
we relax the assumption of a representative agent structure and introduce boundedly rational
backward-looking agents. Section 2.4 presents the numerical results and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
In this section we develop the workhorse version of the model. Since the complete derivation,
with the ﬁrst order conditions and aggregation, is described in detail in the original paper of
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), we skip it in the main part of this text. However, for the
reader’s convenience, the complete derivation is given in Appendix 2.A.
The model space consists of a continuum of farmers who provide labor supply to the pro-
duction and banking sectors at the same time t (nt and mt, respectively). Additionally, each
farmer manufactures a differentiated product and sells it in the monopolistically competitive
environment. As in the standard new Keynesian framework, it is assumed that only a fraction
(1− ω) of all farmers can adjust their prices fully ﬂexibly. The remaining part takes the prices
from the previous period (Calvo, 1983). Given these conditions, the goal of each farmer is to
maximize her expected utility, which is a linear combination of consumption and leisure, over
the inﬁnite horizon.
In the utility maximization problem, each farmer has to take into account three constraints:
(i) the budget constraint, (ii) the production constraint and (iii) the banking constraint. The
ﬁrst of these is the standard intertemporal budget constraint which ensures that the net income
and bond/money holdings in one period are being transmitted to the next period. The sec-
ond constraint is a direct consequence of the production technology, which in this case is of
the Cobb-Douglas type. Assuming market clearing, the production (Yt) in each period is the
consequence of the amount of capital (Kt) and labor (ndt ) involved, corrected for their output
13
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elasticities: η and (1 − η), respectively. The banking constraint assumes that the level of con-
sumption (Ct) has to be rigidly related to the level of deposits held at a bank. One may view
this as if all the transactions were being facilitated through the banking sector and each agent
may consume a part V of her wealth only. A bank is then allowed to use (1− rr) fraction of the
deposits to produce loans using the Cobb-Douglas production function with collateral (colt) and
labor (mdt ) as production factors and α and (1− α) being the output elasticities. The collateral
consists of two parts, i.e. the discounted level of real bond holdings Bt+1/(PAt (1 + r
B
t )), with
PAt being the aggregate price level and r
B
t the interest rate on bonds, and real level of capital
qtKt+1, corrected for the inferiority of capital to bonds for collateral purposes, υ. The last term
results from the fact that bonds, contrary to capital goods, do not require substantial monitoring
effort in order to verify their market value (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007).
Such a banking sector setting captures several important aspects of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Firstly, it enters the consumer utility maximization problem at the micro level. Secondly, it
builds a clear link between households and a production sector. Thirdly, because of its depen-
dence on governmental securities, it comprises the monetary policy transmission mechanism
(through the repo market).
There are two main simpliﬁcations of the original model. Firstly, we abstract from the
capital shocks in the loan production function. We assume that the capital level is at its steady
state level and the productivity shocks are transmitted through the labor channels only. This
simpliﬁcation does not affect the ﬁnal results as in the determinacy analysis the stochastic terms
do not play a role (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Secondly, we assume a zero tax rate. Eventually,
the role of government is narrowed to issuing bonds in each period at some exogenously given
level, and paying the interest.
Given the speciﬁcation above, we may now turn to derivation of three model equations: the
Investment-Savings (IS) curve, the Phillips curve and the banking curve. The ﬁrst two of these
build the standard new Keynesian model. The last one is the direct consequence of the presence
of the banking sector and describes its role in the aggregate dynamics explicitly.
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2.2.1 The IS curve
The model implies the presence of two Lagrange multipliers: λt for the budget constraint and
ξt for the production constraint. They represent the shadow values, or the utility gains, of unit
values of consumption and production respectively (Casares, Miguel and Poutineau, 2010). In
particular, from the banking labor demand optimality condition we know that
λit =
ξit
ϕit
=
φ
Cit
1 +
(
1−rr
V
)
χit
, (2.1)
where ϕit is the individual marginal production cost, φ is the utility weight on consumption and
we explored the fact that the χit might be viewed as the individual marginal loan management
cost, or simply the marginal banking cost (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; Casares, Miguel
and Poutineau, 2010)1. To put it more formally, imagine the cost minimization problem of
a representative bank in a situation without collateral cost. The total cost function may be
rewritten as TCt = mdtwt, where wt is the real wage. The minimization problem includes
the loan production constraint with a Lagrangian multiplier (here perceived as a marginal cost
(Walsh, 2010)), denoted by χt. The ﬁrst order condition implies that χt = V wtmdt /((1 −
rr)(1 − α)Ct). In fact, χit is parallel to the individual marginal production cost that is being
often referred to in the standard new Keynesian framework (Walsh, 2010). One may view that
as a general variable describing the situation in the banking sector, i.e. the higher it is the less
effective the loan management is. As it is shown later, this variable is of crucial importance as
it becomes a link between a standard new Keynesian model and the banking system.
Eq. (2.1) gives the ﬁrst overview of the model behavior. Firstly, the shadow value of pro-
duction equals the shadow value of consumption corrected for the marginal production cost. In
other words, additional consumption has to turn up in either increased production or decreased
production costs. Secondly, λt is the marginal utility of consumption corrected for the marginal
banking cost. Put differently, each additional unit of consumption requires more deposits, which
1We include superscript i to underline the individual level of the relationship which is explored in detail later.
In the representative agent structure it may be omitted as every agent behaves the same.
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may be raised at the cost χt. It is straightforward to notice that the lower the marginal banking
cost, the relatively cheaper the additional consumption. On the other hand, a highly inefﬁcient
banking sector limits the incentives to increase consumption.
Substituting Eq. (2.1) into the bond optimality condition, we ﬁnally arrive at the familiar
Euler equation
βEit
⎛⎝ φCit+1
1 +
(
1−rr
V
)
χit+1
⎞⎠ = φCit
1 +
(
1−rr
V
)
χit
(1 + Eitπt+1)
(
1− 1−rr
V
χitΩ
i
t
1 + rBt
)
, (2.2)
where (1 + Eitπt+1) = P
A
t+1/P
A
t is the inﬂation rate and Ω
i
t = αC
i
t/col
i
t.
Following Goodfriend (2005), let us introduce a one-period default-free security with the
nominal rate denoted by rTt . Since we additionally assume that it cannot serve for collateral pur-
poses, rTt represents a pure intertemporal rate of interest and serves as a benchmark for other in-
terest rates. From the agent optimization problem, we know that 1+ri,Tt = Eitλ
i
tP
i
t+1/(βλ
i
t+1P
i
t )
so that it includes the discounted difference between expected changes in shadow prices and ac-
tual prices. An important distinction is that the pricing of this ﬁctitious security is done at the
individual level which is not strange given its completely artiﬁcial and agent-dependent nature.
Eventually, the last term of Eq. (2.2) might be rewritten as the reciprocal of (1 + ri,Tt ).
At the same time, let us assume that each bank can obtain funds from the interbank market
at the common rate rIBt . It can then loan them to agents at the rate r
i,T
t . The proﬁt maximization
of a bank implies that the marginal costs of obtaining funds has to be equal their marginal proﬁt
so that
(1 + rIBt )(1 + χ
i
t) = (1 + r
i,T
t ). (2.3)
Inserting Eq. (2.3) into Eq. (2.2) and taking the log approximation around the steady state
we have
Yˆ it = E
i
t Yˆ
i
t+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
Eitχ˜
i
t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜it −
(
rˆIBt − Eitπt+1
)
, (2.4)
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where tildes and hats denote deviations and percentage deviations from the steady state, respec-
tively, and we explored the market clearing condition2.
As in the standard new Keynesian framework, we deﬁne the potential output as the output
under completely ﬂexible prices and wages (Walsh, 2010). We additionally assume that in
such a situation there is a ﬁxed proportion between employment in the production and banking
sector, ndt ∝ mdt . Following Walsh (2010), price ﬂexibility implies that all agents can adjust
their prices immediately, which gives that the marginal cost of production ϕt is equal (θ− 1)/θ
across all individuals, where θ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods.
The labor optimality condition implies that the real wage has to be equal the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption, corrected for the presence of the banking sector.
Combining the above-mentioned points with Eq. (2.1) and the production constraint, we ﬁnally
get that under ﬂexible prices and wages, the supply of labor of each individual is ﬁxed so that if
the capital stock is in the steady state (as we assume throughout the model) the log deviations
of the potential product depend only on exogenous disturbances, Yˆ ft = (1 − η)(A1t − A¯1).
Subtracting them from both sides of Eq. (2.3) and omitting the i superscript, we ﬁnally arrive at
the aggregate IS curve corrected for the presence of a banking sector
xt = Etxt+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
Etχ˜t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜t −
[
rˆIBt − Etπt+1
]
+ ut, (2.5)
where xt = Yˆt − Yˆ ft is the output gap measure and ut is the disturbance term that depends only
on exogenous productivity shocks.
It is straightforward to notice that when skipping the banking sector variables from Eq. (2.5)
we obtain the standard new Keynesian IS curve. What is important, is that the aggregate dynam-
ics is affected not only by the current, but also expected future values of the banking variables.
In other words, the way the agents form their expectations about future banking sector condi-
tions seems to play a role in determining current production. The impact of the banking sector
is limited by (i) the reserve requirement, rr, and (ii) the proportion of consumption that has to
2Following literature, we take the zero inﬂation steady state.
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be covered by deposits, V . Clearly, the lower the minimum reserve requirement, the larger the
loan production so that the importance of the banking sector increases, ceteris paribus. At the
same time, if the consumption-to-deposits coverage ratio is large, relative size of the banking
sector is smaller so that its impact decreases.
2.2.2 The Phillips curve
The model allows us also to derive the explicit formula for the Phillips (or Aggregate Supply)
curve. We know that all the farmers share the same production technology and face the same
constant demand elasticities. We know from the Calvo lottery that a fraction ω of agents cannot
adjust their prices in a given period t. Proﬁts of some future date t + k are affected only if an
agent did not receive a chance to adjust prices between t and t + k. Therefore, the probability
of having lower expected proﬁts in period k is ωk. Having pointed that out, the price optimality
condition has to be corrected for the nominal price rigidities in the long run and by iterating
forward it might be viewed as
Eit
∞∑
k=0
βkωk
[
(1− θ)
(
P it
PAt+k
)
+ θ
(
ξit+k
λit+k
)](
1
P it
)(
P it
PAt+k
)
CAt+k = 0. (2.6)
Solving for optimal price setting, we arrive at
P it
PAt
=
Eit
∑∞
k=0 β
kωkCAt+kϕ
i
t+k
(
PAt+k
PAt
)θ
Eit
∑∞
k=0 β
kωkCAt+k
(
PAt+k
PAt
)θ−1 , (2.7)
where ϕit = ξ
i
t/λ
i
t is the individual marginal production cost (Goodfriend andMcCallum, 2007).
Skipping the i superscript and taking a log approximation, after some algebra we obtain3
πt = βEtπt+1 + κϕˆt, (2.8)
3For a detailed derivation see the appendix of Chapter 8 from Walsh (2010).
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where κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)
ω
. We further explore the fact that given the Cobb-Douglas production
function, the steady state log deviations of the marginal production cost might be viewed as an
output gap measure (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). Finally, we arrive at the standard new
Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt. (2.9)
What is important is that the situation in the banking sector does not affect the inﬂation
level directly but only through the consumption channel. The absence of the banking variables
in Eq. (2.9) is a consequence of the banking sector speciﬁcation. The level of consumption
is rigidly related to the amount of deposits in the banking sector. Therefore, changes in the
banking sector would result in a different deposit level, which would shake the consumption
eventually. However, there is no direct link to the inﬂation in the meantime.
2.2.3 The banking sector curve
Since the presence of the banking sector affects the aggregate evolution of the IS and (indirectly)
Phillips curves, it is also necessary to describe its dynamics. Observing that ϕt = qtKt/(ηCt),
the capital optimality condition implies
1− υ(1− rr)
V
Ωitχ
i
t = β(2− δ)Eit
[(
1 +
(
1−rr
V
)
χit
)
ϕit+1(
1 +
(
1−rr
V
)
χit+1
)
ϕit
]
. (2.10)
Observe that the LHS of Eq. (2.10) is almost identical with the numerator of the last term
in Eq. (2.2). The only difference comes from the inferiority of capital to bonds for collateral
purposes, υ. Applying the same interest rate reasoning to the log approximation of the LHS of
Eq. (2.10), we see that −υ(1− rr)Ωitχit/V = −υ(rIBt − rBt + χit). Since the interbank rate rIBt
and the government bond rate rBt are both short-term rates, they should be close to each other
around the equilibrium (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). Additionally, given the fact that υ is
relatively small, we neglect the inﬂuence of υ(rIBt −rBt ). Eventually, after taking the deviations
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from the steady state of Eq. (2.10), iterating forward and skipping the i superscript, we get
(
υ +
1− rr
V
)
χ˜t =
1− rr
V
Etχ˜t+1 − (Etxt+1 − xt) . (2.11)
Given Eq. (2.11) it is clear that the marginal cost of banking depends on (i) expectations
about the banking situation in the future and (ii) the current and expected future production.
In particular, the expectations about higher next period marginal banking costs work as a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy, increasing also today’s cost. This positive feedback structure reﬂects, to at
least some degree, ﬁnancial market sentiment and herding behavior. When investors see that the
banking sector is going to face difﬁculties the next day, they will adjust their today’s positions
accordingly. On the other hand, given the link between the banking sector and consumption,
high expectations about next period output gap decrease today’s marginal banking cost (negative
feedback). Imagine that people expect that there will be a decrease in production in the next
period. Since the banking sector is a source of funding, there will be gradually less effort
involved in the loan production, bringing today’s marginal cost down.
The effects on the current banking situation are proportional to the size of the banking sector,
expressed by (1− rr)/V , being more prominent for smaller banking sectors. Smaller banking
sectors are more vulnerable to changes in the production sector as the relatively higher part of
the banking capital is involved. On the other side, a bigger banking sector might be viewed as
being more stable in the sense that the production sector affects it to the lower extent. It should
be kept in mind, however, that the model does not say that big banks are ultimately stable as a
high drop in today’s production can cause the marginal banking cost to skyrocket. Eq. (2.11)
predicts only that this effect will be more prominent in the environment with a smaller banking
sector.
At the same time, the inferiority of capital to bonds for collateral purposes, υ, also plays a
role in determining the current marginal banking cost. In particular, let us consider the extreme
case when capital cannot serve as a collateral, i.e. υ = 0. Banks do not have access to capital
then so that the only link between them and the production sector is through loans. If there
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is a production shock, it affects the bond holdings and labor in the banking sector, making
it more severe. In this sense, using capital as collateral serves as a hedge against production
sector disturbances. When banks can access capital, in the presence of a production shock, its
magnitude is being partially absorbed by the capital part.
2.3 The inﬂuence of heterogeneity
So far, we assumed that all the agents are the same and each of them faces the same optimization
problem. Before turning to the numerical results, let us ﬁrst consider what happens in the envi-
ronment with heterogeneous agents. Contrary to the standard representative agent framework,
we allow a part (1−γ) of agents to be boundedly rational in forming their expectations4. In other
words, we assume that a constant proportion of agents is uniformed or unable to form rational
expectations. This implies that we may divide our continuum of farmers into two groups: those
with rational expectations (ERE) producing good j ∈ [0, γ] and those with boundedly rational
expectations (EBRE) producing good j ∈ [γ, 1]. By rational agents we mean forward-looking
fundamentalists who try to analyze the economy and form their expectations accordingly. Both
groups of agents behave as if everybody in the economy was of their type.
To be able to aggregate the results over both groups, we follow the methodology proposed
by Branch and McGough (2009) and we impose similar seven axioms on expectation operators:
1. expectations operators ﬁx observables,
2. if z is a forecasted variable and has a steady state, then ERE z¯ = EBRE z¯ = z¯,
3. expectations operators are linear,
4. if for all k ≥ 0, zt+k and
∑∞
k=0 β
t+kzt+k are forecasted variables then
Eτt
(∑∞
k=0 β
t+kzt+k
)
=
∑∞
k=0 β
t+kEτt zt+k for τ ∈ {RE,BRE},
4Throughout this chapter we use the term ‘rational’ to refer to forward-looking whereas ‘boundedly rational’
to express backward-looking expectations.
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5. expectation operators satisfy the law of iterative expectations,
6. if z is a forecasted variable at time t and time t+k thenEτt E
τ ′
t+kzt+k = E
τ
t zt+k for τ = τ ′,
7. all agents have common expectations on expected differences in limiting wealth and
marginal banking cost.
Our contribution to the original methodology comprises axiom 7, which describes the lim-
iting behavior of the expectation operators. Since we add the banking sector to the model, we
have to include it also in the expectation formation. Branch and McGough (2009) assume that
both types of agents have common expectation on their limiting wealth. It allows to represent
the aggregate expectations operator as a weighted average of group expectations. Otherwise,
there is an extra term on the limiting behavior of expectations that complicates the dynamics
(see Eq. (2.41) from Appendix 2.B). A similar pattern might be observed when aggregating
the banking sector (Eq. (2.49) from Appendix 2.B). The aggregate dynamics of the system is
therefore inﬂuenced by how agents predict the banking sector behaves over the inﬁnite horizon.
Axiom 7 might be viewed as an agreement among all agents that in the far future their
banking sectors will be equivalent or will at least generate the same marginal costs. From the
macroeconomic perspective, one may think of it as if both groups of agents were trying to reach
the banking sector technological frontier. Since there is a common technology, both types of
agents should be heading towards the same frontier eventually, satisfying axiom 7.
Proposition 2.3.1. In the presence of fraction (1 − γ) of boundedly rational agents, if agents’
expectations satisfy axioms 1-7 then the model from Eq. (2.5), (2.9) and (2.11) can be rewritten
as
xt = E¯txt+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
E¯tχ˜t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜t −
[
rˆIBt − E¯tπt+1
]
+ ut, (2.12)
πt = βE¯tπt+1 + κxt, (2.13)(
υ +
1− rr
V
)
χ˜t =
1− rr
V
E¯tχ˜t+1 −
(
E¯txt+1 − xt
)
, (2.14)
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where E¯t = γEREt + (1− γ)EBREt .
The proof of Proposition 2.3.1 can be found in Appendix 2.B.
2.4 Numerical analysis
As opposed to the standard framework, the central bank policy instrument is the interbank
interest rate, rˆIBt (not the bond rate). In fact, this is the monetary policy tool used in practice
(Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). As argued by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), to close the
model we use the forward-looking Taylor rule of the form
rˆIBt = ρxE
RE
t xt+1 + ρπE
RE
t πt+1, (2.15)
where ρx and ρπ are constant weights on output and inﬂation variability, respectively. We
follow a common approach and assume that the central bank does not target the situation in the
banking sector directly. Including a banking sector variable in the monetary rule would extend
the monetary policy analysis to a three-dimensional problem so that the interpretation of the
results would not be straightforward anymore. Instead, the purpose of this study is to observe
how the standard monetary policy rule behaves in the environment with a present banking sector.
2.4.1 Formation of expectations
Throughout the model, we assume that the economy consists of two types of agents that are
homogeneous within each group. The ﬁrst type of agents, i = RE, are those who form rational
expectations. We abstract here from the standard understanding of rationality, where agents
have full knowledge and capacities to perfectly predict the future. Instead, we rather view them
as being forward-looking fundamentalists, who collect information and form their expectations
accordingly. They are not aware of the presence of the other type of agents so that they form
their expectations as if everybody in the economy was rational in forming the expectations
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(Branch and McGough, 2009).
The second type of agents is not able to form rational expectations and use simple backward-
looking heuristics instead to predict the future. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) we
assume them to have adaptive expectations of the form
EBREt zt+1 = μ
2zt−1, (2.16)
where z is either x, π or χ˜. Parameter μ > 0 describes the magnitude and the direction of
the expectations. If μ > 1, the inﬂuence of the past is being extrapolated to the future so
that we would call those expectations extrapolative. On the other hand, when μ < 1, this
inﬂuence disappears over time and we would call those expectations adaptive5. When μ = 1,
the boundedly rational agents form naive expectations (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
Given the expectation operators for both groups of agents, we may rewrite the aggregate
expectations as
E¯tzt+1 = γE
RE
t zt+1 + (1− γ)μ2zt−1, (2.17)
with z being either x, π or χ˜.
2.4.2 Calibration and numerical results
DSGE models often exhibit indeterminacy, i.e. there is no unique path guiding the equilibrium.
In such a situation, the quantities and prices might not be even locally determinate, making the
monetary policy conduct more unstable (Woodford, 1994). Therefore, it is important to make
sure that the monetary tools provide a determinate structure of the economy.
5In the literature, adaptive expectations are being recognized as the whole group of operators of the form similar
to Eq. (2.16). However, for clarity purposes, we distinguish here between extrapolative and adaptive expectations
when μ > 1 and μ < 1, respectively.
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Table 2.1: Calibration values for the model parameters.
Parameter V rr υ κ β
Value 0.31 0.005 0.2 0.05 0.99
Let us write the complete model in the matrix form
⎛⎜⎝ B 0
0 I3
⎞⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝ yt+1
yt
⎞⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎝ F −C
I3 0
⎞⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝ yt
yt−1
⎞⎟⎠+
⎛⎜⎝ εt
0
⎞⎟⎠ , (2.18)
where y = (x, π, χ˜)′, ε = (u, 0, 0) is a vector of exogenous shocks and B, F and C are the
coefﬁcient matrices described in detail in Appendix 2.C.
To study the determinacy properties, we apply the methodology developed by Blanchard
and Kahn (1980). Since it does not depend on the exogenous disturbances, we omit ε in our
further analysis. The determinacy is a result of the properties of the solution matrix M , where
M =
⎛⎜⎝ B−1F −B−1C
I3 0
⎞⎟⎠ . (2.19)
The equilibrium of the system is determinate only if the number of eigenvalues that are
outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables (or the forward-
looking variables (Walsh, 2010)), which is 3 in this case. Having more eigenvalues outside
the unit circle implies explosiveness and fewer of them implies indeterminacy. The degree
of indeterminacy is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables less the number of
eigenvalues outside the unit circle (Evans and McGough, 2005).
We calibrate our model accordingly to Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). The detailed
values are presented in Table 2.1.
The determinacy properties are studied for extrapolative and adaptive expectations sepa-
rately. For the former, the μ parameter is set to 1.1 and for the latter to 0.9 (Branch and
McGough, 2009). The ranges for policy parameters ρx and ρπ are set from 0 to 5 and 10,
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respectively, in order to show the complete behavior of the system. The results are presented in
Figs 2.1 and 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Determinacy properties (μ = 0.9). Green color describes determinacy, blue order 1
indeterminacy and red order 2 indeterminacy.
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Firstly, the results conﬁrm the ’rotating’ behavior of the system from Branch and McGough
(2009). With adaptive expectations the system rotates counterclockwise so that the determinacy
area increases. With extrapolative expectations the system rotates clockwise decreasing the
determinacy area.
Secondly, the location of the indeterminacy of order one and two is in line with the ﬁgures
presented in Branch and McGough (2009). In fact, the only difference lies in the size of the
those areas, comparing with the original paper. This, however, is the consequence of the banking
calibration parameters and the different speciﬁcation of the utility function. In fact, if we allow
for extra parameter describing the intertemporal subsitution elasticity of consumption in the
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Figure 2.2: Determinacy properties (μ = 1.1). Green color describes determinacy, blue order 1
indeterminacy and red order 2 indeterminacy.
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utility function, σ, the determinacy area is narrowed from the top, being more similar to the
results from Branch and McGough (2009) and Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Thirdly, the presence of the banking sector has one important impact on determinacy proper-
ties. When agents form extrapolative expectations (μ = 1.1), a new region of indeterminacy of
order 2 arises for too lenient inﬂation targeting. In the case with adaptive expectations (μ = 0.9)
there is no similar effect.
2.5 Conclusions and discussion
The goal of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, we derived a workhorse model for monetary
policy analysis with the present banking sector. Secondly, we relaxed the assumption of the
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representative agent structure and investigated the effects of the presence of boundedly rational
agents.
The results suggest that the presence of a banking sector changes the determinacy structure
of the equilibrium. Given that agents form adaptive expectations, the determinacy structure
rotates counterclockwise, so that more lenient output gap and inﬂation targeting still guarantees
determinacy.
The problem arises when backward-looking agents extrapolate the past performance over
their future forecasts. The presence of the banking sector brings additional indeterminacy area
for lower inﬂation targeting parameter. In other words, in the environment with a fraction of
extrapolative agents, if the monetary policy does not ﬁght inﬂation sufﬁciently well, it may not
reach the equilibrium in the long run.
In fact this pattern might have signiﬁcant consequences for the actual monetary policy con-
duct. Pfajfar and Zakelj (2011) suggest that the fraction of extrapolative agents might be as high
as 30%, even larger than in our analysis. Given the fact that the estimated Taylor rule parameters
vary usually in the region of (0,1) for the output gap weight and of (1,2) for the inﬂation weight
(Taylor, 1999; Woodford, 2003), this may suggest that the system is very close to indeterminacy,
if not indeterminate already, which arises as a consequence of the banking sector. Therefore, it
seems vital for the monetary policy to address the issue of agents’ heterogeneity and investigate
in detail how they form their forecasts. There could be many solutions to the problem raised
above, however, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss them in detail. Assuming
that the inﬂation and output weights are set to satisfy the goals of the monetary policy, there
seem to be still ways out of the problem. For instance, one may think of increasing the clarity
and ﬂexibility of capital, somehow reducing its inferiority for collateral purposes. This would
make current marginal banking cost more robust with respect to the future disturbances and
thereof could decrease the inﬂuence of destabilizing extrapolative expectations. Another solu-
tion would be smaller minimum capital requirement, however, this could translate into higher
banking sector leverage and eventually may cause more problems than it originally aimed to
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solve.
It is clear that households’ expectations play an important role in determining the monetary
policy, especially when a banking sector is present. However, this research shows just the top of
an iceberg and more study is required in order to fully understand the phenomenon of banking
in the modern economy. In particular, a straightforward extension of this study is to endogenize
the fraction of rational agents, making it dependent on other systemic variables.
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Appendix 2.A Baseline derivation
The utility of a farmer is deﬁned as a weighted average of her consumption and leisure and
takes the form
U i(C it , n
i
t,m
i
t) = φlog(C
i
t) + (1− φ)log(1− nit −mit), (2.20)
where φ is the relative preference weight on consumption and t is the time subscript. C it repre-
sents a composite consumption good and is of the standard Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) form, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
C it =
(∫ 1
0
cjt
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, (2.21)
with θ being the elasticity of substitution.
The farmer’s decision problem is to maximize her discounted expected utility subject to the
budget and technology constraints. Assuming a cashless limit (Woodford, 2003; Branch and
McGough, 2009), we may deﬁne the former in real terms as
wt(n
i
t+m
i
t)+qt (1− δ)Kit+
Y it P
i
t
PAt
+
Bit
PAt
= wt(n
i,d
t +m
i,d
t )+C
i
t+qtK
i
t+1+
Bt+1
PAt (1 + r
B
t )
, (2.22)
where Kit is capital level with qt being its real price and δ the depreciation rate, wt is the real
wage and Bit are the nominal bond holdings with the nominal interest equal r
B
t . Y
i
t is the
production level, P i is the price of the individual good and PAt is the aggregate price level, as in
the Dixit-Stiglitz setup. Superscript d denotes the amount of labor demanded by a given farmer.
Superscript i and subscript t relate to the agent and time dimensions, respectively.
Contrary to the standard new Keynesian framework, there is a capital market in the model.
Its role is twofold. Firstly, capital serves as a production factor in the farmers’ technology.
Secondly, it is used as a collateral in the banking sector to produce loans. For simplicity, it
is assumed that the aggregate capital stock is on a steady state growth path (Goodfriend and
McCallum, 2007). What is important is that farmers are allowed to trade it so that its market
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price qt may ﬂuctuate.
The production constraint requires that
Y it = K
i
t
η
(
eA1tni,dt
)1−η
, (2.23)
where A1t is an aggregate productivity disturbance and η is the capital elasticity measure.
A novelty in the model is the presence of the banking sector. Its main role is to facilitate
transactions between production and consumption sides of the economy. Since the medium of
exchange is the crucial role of the monetary policy analysis, the model does not distinguish
between transaction balances and time deposits at the banks. In this simple form, it implies that
the farmer’s consumption in each period has to be rigidly related to the deposits held at a bank
(Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). In other words, in each period, the level of consumption
(C it) has to be covered by some constant fraction of the real deposits (V D
i
t/P
A
t ). Since each
bank has to hold a given level of reserves at the central bank (rr), the nominal amount of loans
it may produce from deposits held by farmer i is constrained by Lit = (1− rr)Dit. At the same
time, the real loan production depends on the collateral and loan monitoring, and is assumed to
be of a Cobb-Douglas form
Lit
PAt
= F
(
Bit+1
PAt (1 + r
B
t )
+ υqtK
i
t+1
)α (
eA2tmi,dt
)1−α
. (2.24)
The loan monitoring is assumed to be proportional to the labor supplied to the banking sector
by farmer i and A2t is the productivity disturbance similar to the one in the production sector.
Since capital stock require a substantial monitoring effort to conﬁrm its physical condition, its
inferiority to bonds for collateral purposes is expressed by υ (Goodfriend andMcCallum, 2007).
The complete intertemporal farmers’s maximization problem (with a presence of the bank-
ing sector) may be written as
max
nit,m
i
t,n
i,d
t ,m
i,d
t ,P
i
t ,K
i
t+1,B
i
t+1
Eit
∞∑
k=0
βk
[
φlog(C it+k) + (1− φ) log
(
1− nit+k −mit+k
)]
. (2.25)
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subject to the budget constraint (Eq. 2.22) and production constraint (Eq. 2.23).
Before solving the optimization problem, from Eq. (2.24) we know that
C it =
V F
1− rr
(
bit+1 + υqtK
i
t+1
)α (
eA2tmi,dt
)1−α
, (2.26)
where bit+1 = B
i
t+1/(P
A
t (1+ r
B
t )). Additionally, by imposing market clearing we know that the
good produced by farmer i is equal to its demand
Y it =
(
P it
PAt
)−θ
CAt , (2.27)
where CAt is the aggregate consumption level that each individual takes as given.
Let the Lagrange multipliers be λt and ξt for the budget and production constraints respec-
tively. By including Eq. (2.26) and Eq. (2.27) into the maximization problem and assuming
market symmetry (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007), the ﬁrst order conditions provide
−(1− φ)
1− nit −mit
+ λitwt = 0, (2.28)
−λitwt + ξiteA1t(1− η)
(
Kit
eA1tnit
)η
= 0, (2.29)
(
φ
C it
− λit
)
C it(1− α)
mit
− λitwt = 0, (2.30)
CAt
(
P it
PAt
)−θ (
(1− θ)λit
PAt
+
θξit
P it
)
= 0, (2.31)
(
φ
C itλt
− 1
)
Ωitυqt − qt + β(1− δ)Eit
(
λit+1
λit
qt+1
)
+ βηEit
(
ξit+1
λit
(
eA1t+1nit+1
Kit+1
)1−η)
= 0,
(2.32)(
φ
C itλ
i
t
− 1
)
Ωit − 1 + βEit
(
λit+1
λit
PAt
PAt+1
(1 + rBt )
)
= 0, (2.33)
where Ωit is the partial derivative of the deposit constraint C
i
t =
V Lit
(1−rr)PAt )
with respect to
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collateral
Ωit =
αC it
bit+1 + υqtK
i
t+1
. (2.34)
Appendix 2.B The inﬂuence of heterogeneous agents
Throughout the following derivation, we assume that each agent belongs to one of the two
groups, i.e. i = τ ∈ {RE,BRE}. By superscript A we will refer to the aggregate values.
Appendix 2.B.1 The heterogeneous IS curve
Let us ﬁrst introduce a benevolent ﬁnancial institution that helps farmers in hedging the risk
associated with the Calvo lottery (Shi, 1999; Mankiw and Reis, 2007). In each period it col-
lects all the income from the market and then redistribute it evenly across farmers. Given this
property and assuming cashless limit, the agents’ budget constraint becomes
wt(n
i
t+m
i
t)+qt (1− δ)Kit+
Y it P
i
t
PAt
+
Bit
PAt
+I ir,t = wt(n
i,d
t +m
i,d
t )+C
i
t+qtK
i
t+1+
Bt+1
PAt (1 + r
B
t )
+I ip,t,
(2.35)
where I ir,t and I
i
r,t are the real receipts from and payments to the insurance agency. Each
agent maximizes her expected utility over an inﬁnite horizon, subject to Eq. (2.35) instead
of (Eq. 2.22).
We know that the average real income (denoted by Ψτt ) and the average marginal banking
cost χτt obtained by rational and boundedly rational agents are
ΨREt =
1
γPAt
∫ γ
0
P itY
i
t di and Ψ
BRE
t =
1
(1− γ)PAt
∫ 1
γ
P itY
i
t di, (2.36)
χREt =
1
γ
∫ γ
0
χitdi and χ
BRE
t =
1
1− γ
∫ 1
γ
χitdi. (2.37)
From the above equations it is clear that we may view the aggregate production and aggregate
real marginal banking cost as a weighted average of their components, i.e. Y At = γY
RE
t + (1−
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γ)Y BREt and χ
A
t = γχ
RE
t + (1− γ)χBREt .
Following Branch and McGough (2009), if an agent is of type τ , then her real receipts from
and payments to the insurance agency are I ir,t = Ψ
τ
t and I
i
p,t = Y
i
t P
i
t /P
A
t . By market clearing
and axiom A2 the steady states of consumption and production are equal at individual and group
levels. By imposing market symmetry, the budget constraint (Eq. 2.35) yields
Cˆτt = Ψˆ
τ
t +
Bτt /P
A
t
Y¯ At
− B
τ
t+1/(P
A
t (1 + r¯
B
t ))
Y¯ At
+
qt(1− δ)Kτ
Y¯ At
− qtK
τ
t+1
Y¯ At
, (2.38)
where the bars indicate the steady state levels. Bond and capital market clearing require that
αBREt = −(1− α)BBREt and αKREt = −(1− α)KBREt . After multiplying Eq. (2.38) by γ for
rational and by (1− γ) for boundedly rational agents and summing up, we arrive at
Yˆ At = γΨˆ
RE
t + (1− γ)ΨˆBREt . (2.39)
From Eq. (2.4), (2.37) and (2.38) we have
Ψˆτt = E
τ
t Ψˆ
τ
t+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
Eτt χ˜
τ
t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜τt −
(
rˆIBt − Eτt πt+1
)
. (2.40)
Iterating this equation forward and substituting into Eq. (2.39) we ﬁnally get
Yˆ At = E¯tYˆ
A
t+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
E¯tχ˜
A
t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜At −
(
rˆIBt − E¯tπt+1
)
+
+
(
γΨˆRE∞ + (1− γ)ΨˆBRE∞
)
− E¯t
(
γΨˆRE∞ + (1− γ)ΨˆBRE∞
)
,
(2.41)
with E¯t = γEREt + (1− γ)EBREt and Ψˆτ∞ = limk→∞Eτt Ψˆτt+k. In fact, Eq. (2.41) is of exactly
the same form as in Branch and McGough (2009) but with a banking sector present. Axiom 7
indicates that agents predict their limiting wealth identically, which makes
(
γΨˆRE∞ + (1− γ)ΨˆBRE∞
)
= E¯t
(
γΨˆRE∞ + (1− γ)ΨˆBRE∞
)
. (2.42)
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Subtracting the log deviations of the potential product from both sides, we ﬁnally arrive at
the heterogeneous IS curve with a present banking sector
xt = E¯txt+1 +
(
1− rr
V
)
E¯tχ˜
A
t+1 −
(
1− rr
V
+ 1
)
χ˜At −
[
rˆIBt − E¯tπt+1
]
+ ut, (2.43)
where xt = Yˆ At − Yˆ f,At is the output gap measure, the expectation operator is the weighted
average of the group expectations E¯t = γEREt +(1− γ)EBREt and ut is a disturbance term that
depends only on exogenous productivity shocks.
Appendix 2.B.2 The heterogeneous Phillips curve
It is important to note that when farmers may hedge against the Calvo risk their production level
would be 0 in equilibrium as a result of the free-riding problem. Therefore, following Branch
and McGough (2009), we assume that farmers make their pricing decisions as if there was no
insuring agency.
Let us take the log approximation of Eq. (2.7)
logP τt − logPAt = (1− ωβ)ϕˆτt + ωβEτt πt+1 + ωβEτt logP τt+1/PAt+1. (2.44)
Branch and McGough (2009) show that the Calvo lottery implies aggregate inﬂation to
follow
πt =
1− ω
ω
(
γ logPREt /P
A
t + (1− γ) logPBREt /PAt
)
. (2.45)
As long as the pricing decisions are homogeneous within each group τ , by multiplying
Eq. (2.44) by γ for rational and by (1 − γ) for boundedly rational agents and adding up, after
some algebra we arrive at the ﬁnal aggregate heterogeneous Phillips curve
πt = βE¯tπt+1 + κϕ
A
t , (2.46)
where κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)
ω
.
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Finally, noting that the aggregate marginal production cost is the aggregate output gap mea-
sure, the heterogeneous new Keynesian Phillips curve amended for the banking sector may be
viewed as
πt = βE¯tπt+1 + κxt, (2.47)
where E¯t = γEREt + (1− γ)EBREt .
Appendix 2.B.3 The heterogeneous banking sector curve
Taking the steady state log deviations of Eq. (2.10) and iterating forward we get for each group
of agents
χ˜τt =
(
1− rr
V
)−1 [
−υEτt
∞∑
j=0
χ˜τt+j +
(
1− rr
V
)
χ˜τ∞ − (xτ∞ − xτt )
]
, (2.48)
where χˆτ∞ = limk→∞E
τ
t χˆ
τ
t+k and x
τ
∞ = limk→∞E
τ
t x
τ
t+k.
Given Eq. (2.37) and (2.48), we get
χ˜At = γχ˜
RE
t + (1− γ)χ˜BREt
=
(
1− rr
V
)−1 [
−υ
(
γEREt
∞∑
k=0
χ˜REt+k + (1− γ)EBREt
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k=0
χ˜BREt+k
)
+ xt
+
(
1− rr
V
)(
γχ˜RE∞ + (1− γ)χ˜BRE∞
)− (γxRE∞ + (1− γ)xBRE∞ )]
= E¯tχ˜
A
t+1 −
υV
1− rr χ˜
A
t −
(
1− rr
V
)−1 (
E¯txt+1 − xt
)
+
[(
γχ˜RE∞ + (1− γ)χ˜BRE∞
)− E¯t (γχ˜RE∞ + (1− γ)χ˜BRE∞ )]
−
(
1− rr
V
)−1 [(
γxRE∞ + (1− γ)xBRE∞
)− E¯t (γxRE∞ + (1− γ)xBRE∞ )] .
(2.49)
The last two lines disappear due to Axiom 7, which gives
(
γχ˜RE∞ + (1− γ)χ˜BRE∞
)
= E¯t
(
γχ˜RE∞ + (1− γ)χ˜BRE∞
)
(2.50)
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(
γxRE∞ + (1− γ)xBRE∞
)
= E¯t
(
γxRE∞ + (1− γ)xBRE∞
)
(2.51)
so that the ﬁnal banking curve equation may be written as Eq. (2.14).
Appendix 2.C Model dynamics
The condensed model can be viewed as⎛⎜⎝ B 0
0 I3
⎞⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝ yt+1
yt
⎞⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎝ F −C
I3 0
⎞⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝ yt
yt−1
⎞⎟⎠ , (2.52)
where y = (x, π, χ˜)′ and
B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
γ − ρx γ − ρπ γ(1−rr)V
0 βγ 0
−γ 0 γ(1−rr)
V
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (2.53)
F =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 (1−rr)
V
+ 1
−κ 1 0
−1 0 υ + (1−rr)
V
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (2.54)
C =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1− γ)μ2 (1− γ)μ2 (1−γ)μ2(1−rr)
V
0 β(1− γ)μ2 0
−(1− γ)μ2 0 (1−γ)μ2(1−rr)
V
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (2.55)
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Chapter 3
Nonlinear Granger Causality - Guidelines
for Multivariate Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of Granger causality over four decades ago (Granger, 1969), the body
of literature on this topic has grown substantially, becoming standard methodology not only
among economists and econometricians, but also ﬁnding followers in physics or even biology
(Guo et al., 2010). Not surprisingly, it alleviated an ongoing discussion on the nature and
validity of the concept, pointing out its methodological limitations. Although, the spectrum
of arguments against the idea of Granger causality is very broad, the main line of criticism
follows from the very simple nature of the dependence relations in the economy, which Granger
causality originally assumes (Cartwright, 2007). The scope of this chapter is to contribute to
the discussion allowing for a more complex structural setting in the nonparametric Granger
causality testing.
Imagine a strictly stationary bivariate process {(Xt, Yt)}. We say that {Xt} is a Granger
cause of {Yt} if past and current values of X contain additional information on future values
of Y that is not contained in past and current Y -values alone. If we denote the information
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contained in past observations Xs and Ys, s ≤ t, by FX,t and FY,t, respectively, and let ‘∼’
denote equivalence in distribution, the formal deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 3.1.1. For a strictly stationary bivariate time series process {(Xt, Yt)}, t ∈ Z, {Xt}
is a Granger cause of {Yt} if, for some k ≥ 1,
(Yt+1, . . . , Yt+k)|(FX,t,FY,t) ∼ (Yt+1, . . . , Yt+k)|FY,t.
Clearly, such a deﬁnition is very simplistic and seems to be inappropriate to apply in com-
plex environments. An obvious shortcoming is the fact that the vectors of interests are assumed
to be univariate, making the whole problem detached from reality. In other words, this method-
ology does not allow to control for every possible source of variation of every kind [...] as
argued by (Cartwright, 2007). An advantage of such a general deﬁnition is, however, that it
does not assume any parametric relations between the time series and instead focuses on the
conditional distributions only1.
The most commonly used nonparametric test for the above hypothesis testing (Def. 3.1.1)
is the one proposed by Hiemstra and Jones (1994). Its main advantage lies in a very clear and
intuitive reasoning together with a strong asymptotic theory, derived even for a multivariate
setting2 (Bai et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the test can severely over-reject if the null is satisﬁed
(Diks and Panchenko, 2005). Therefore, Diks and Panchenko (2006) (hereafter DP) proposed
a new test statistic which corrects for this shortcoming but, as it turns out, because of the large
kernel estimator bias the DP test lacks consistency in the multivariate setting.
The goal of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, in order to reduce the kernel estimator
bias we apply the data sharpening method (Hall and Minnotte, 2002) and we derive the asymp-
totic properties for the sharpened DP test in a multivariate setting. Secondly, we investigate its
1This brings additional modeling ﬂexibility and does not bind us to the linear autoregressive model as originally
proposed by Granger (1969).
2Throughout the chapter, we will refer to a multivariate setting by a situation where vector {Xt} is allowed
to be multidimensional and {Xt} is univariate, i.e. {Xt} = {X1,t, X2,t..., Xm,t}, m ≥ 1. In principle, the
dimensions of {Xt} vector might describe its corresponding lags, i.e. X1,t = Xt−1, X2,t = Xt−2 etc, so that by
the bivariate case we refer to the situation where {Xt} is univariate.
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performance both numerically and empirically on the US grain market. We chose this speciﬁc
market due to its straightforward causal relationship, where the price of each grain is inﬂu-
enced not only by the other grains, but to a large extent the whole market is driven by weather
forecasts. Therefore, it serves as an almost ideal environment to test our new methodology in
practice.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the asymptotic properties of the
original DP test and shows why it lacks consistency in the multivariate setting. In Section 3.3
we replace the standard kernel density estimator by its sharpened form and we show that the
new test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed. We conﬁrm the theoretical results by
computer simulations. In Section 3.4 we apply the new test to the US grain market. Section 3.5
summarizes and concludes.
3.2 Asymptotic properties of the DP test
In testing for Granger non-causality, the aim is to detect evidence against the null hypothesis
H0 : {Xt} is not Granger causing {Yt},
with Granger causality deﬁned according to Def. 3.1.1. We limit ourselves to tests for detecting
Granger causality for k = 1, which is the case considered most often in practice. Under the
null hypothesis Yt+1 is conditionally independent of Xt, Xt−1, . . ., given Yt, Yt−1, . . .. In a non-
parametric setting, conditioning on the inﬁnite past is impossible without a model restriction,
such as an assumption that the order of the process is ﬁnite. Therefore, in practice conditional
independence is tested using ﬁnite lags lX and lY , i.e.
Yt+1|(X lXt ;Y lYt ) ∼ Yt+1|Y lYt ,
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where X lXt = (Xt−lX+1, . . . , Xt) and Y
lY
t = (Yt−lY +1, . . . , Yt). For a strictly stationary bivari-
ate time series {(Xt, Yt)} this is a statement about the distribution of the lX+lY +1-dimensional
vector Wt = (X
lX
t , Y
lY
t , Zt), where Zt = Yt+1. To keep the notation simple, and to bring about
the fact that the null hypothesis is a statement about the invariant distribution of Wt, we of-
ten drop the time index and just write W = (X, Y, Z), where the latter is a random vector
with the distribution of (X lXt , Y
lY
t , Yt+1). Nevertheless, Denker and Keller (1983) and Diks and
Panchenko (2006) show that the reasoning holds for weakly-dependent Wt provided that the
covariance between the local density estimators is taken into account in the asymptotic variance
of the test statistic.
For now, let us consider the simplest setting, where lX = lY = 1 so that W = (X, Y, Z)
denotes a three-variate random variable, distributed as Wt = (Xt, Yt, Yt+1). (Throughout the
chapter we assume that W is a continuous random variable.) The DP test restates the null
hypothesis in terms of the joint probability distribution fX,Y,Z(X, Y, Z) and its marginals, i.e.
q ≡ E [fX,Y,Z(X, Y, Z)fY (Y )− fX,Y (X, Y )fY,Z(Y, Z)] = 0. (3.1)
Given a simple square kernel density estimator
fˆW (Wi) =
(2ε)−dW
n− 1
∑
j,j =i
I
(‖Wi −Wj‖
ε
)
, (3.2)
where ε is a bandwidth, ‖.‖ is the maximum norm and I(.) is the indicator function taking
values 1 for any argument within the unit circle, one readily ﬁnds a natural estimator of q being
given as
Tn(ε) =
(n− 1)
n(n− 2)
∑
i
(f̂X,Y,Z(Xi, Yi, Zi)f̂Y (Yi)− f̂X,Y (Xi, Yi)f̂Y,Z(Yi, Zi)). (3.3)
The asymptotic behavior of Tn(ε) follows directly from the reasoning originally designed
for the MSE (Mean Squared Error) optimal bandwidth selection under the shrinking condi-
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tions, developed by Powell and Stoker (1996). The test statistic has a corresponding third order
U-statistic representation with a kernel given by K˜(Wi,Wj,Wk). Let us denote K˜1(w1) =
E[K˜(w1,W2,W3)] and K˜2(w1, w2) = E[K˜(w1, w2,W3)], and assume that the rates of conver-
gence of the pointwise bias as well as the second moment kernel expansions depend on the
bandwidth size in the following way (in fact these are the conditions imposed by Powell and
Stoker (1996))
K˜1(wi, ε)− lim
ε→0
K˜1(wi, ε) = s(wi)ε
α + s∗(wi, ε), α > 0, (3.4)
E
[
(K˜2(W1,W2))
2
]
= q2ε
−γ + q∗2(ε), γ > 0, (3.5)
E
[
(K˜(W1,W2,W3))
2
]
= q3ε
−δ + q∗3(ε), δ > 0, (3.6)
where the remainder terms are negligible, i.e. E‖s∗(Wi, ε)‖2 = o(ε2α), (q∗2(ε))2 = o(ε−γ) and
(q∗3(ε))
2 = o(ε−δ). Parameters α, γ and δ follow directly from the speciﬁcation of the kernel
function K˜ and might be derived analytically. In fact, it might be veriﬁed that α is of the same
magnitude as the local kernel estimator bias and Diks and Panchenko (2006) show that two
remaining parameters depend on the dimensionality of the system as γ = dx + dy + dz and
δ = dx + 2dy + dz.
Having pointed that out, the MSE of the test statistic might be expressed as
MSE[Tn(ε)] = (E[s(Wi)])
2 ε2α+
9
n
C0ε
α+
9
n
Var
[
lim
ε→0
K˜1(Wi, ε)
]
+
18
n2
q2ε
−γ+
6
n3
q3ε
−δ, (3.7)
where C0 = 2Cov
[
limε→0 K˜1(Wi, ε), s(Wi)
]
. In order to guarantee asymptotic normality of
Tn(ε) all the ε-dependent terms in Eq. (3.7) have to be o(n−1). Given the bandwidth shrinking
condition, i.e. εn ≡ Cn−β , one may ﬁnd that this implies
√
n
Tn(εn)− q
σ
d−→N (0, 1) iff 1
2α
< β <
1
dx + dy + dz
, (3.8)
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with σ2 being the asymptotic variance of
√
n(Tn(εn)− q).
Clearly, given the standard kernel density estimator with bias of order 2 and the basic model
speciﬁcation with dx = dy = dz = 1, the test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed
for any positive constant C and β ∈ (1/4, 1/3). Given suitable mixing conditions (see Denker
and Keller (1983)) and provided that covariances between local density estimators are taken
into account, the result holds also for the weakly dependent time series (Diks and Panchenko,
2006).
3.2.1 The dimensionality problem
Let us now consider what happens if we increase the dimensionality by one. For clarity pur-
poses, imagine that we would like to condition the causal relationship on one additional variable,
denoted by Q, so that the null hypothesis of conditional independence becomes3
Yt+1|(X lXt ;Y lYt , QlQt ) ∼ Yt+1|(Y lYt , QlQt ).
Let us keep lX = lY = lQ = 1. Following the reasoning from the previous section, one
may ﬁnd that the asymptotic normality condition requires β to be in range between 1/(2α) and
1/(dx + dy + dz + dq). Given the same standard kernel density estimator with the local bias of
order α = 2 and dx = dy = dz = dq = 1, one observes that if we increase the dimensionality
of the original problem by any number v ≥ 1, there is no feasible β-region which would endow
Tn(εn) with asymptotic normality.
The associated problem results from a too large expected pointwise kernel estimator bias,
i.e. E[s(Wi)]. By increasing the vector space, we decrease the estimator precision, which seems
to play a crucial role in the MSE of the test statistic.
One may relate this problem to the so-called curse of dimensionality. As suggested by
Scott (1992), in statistics the problem is a consequence of sparsity of data in larger dimensions.
3In practice, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd an explicit representation of Q variable. However, one may think of the
increased dimensionality problem as conditioning on more than one lag, for instance Qt = Xt−1.
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Imagine, for instance, a uniform sample over the [−1, 1]d hypercube, where d is the total number
of dimensions. Given arbitrary small region of radius μ < 1, it might be shown that as d → ∞
the number of points within [−μ, μ]d tends to 0. Straightforward implication suggests that in
ﬁnite higher dimensional spaces, the smoothing parameter should be larger in order to capture
similar number of points. Nevertheless, by increasing the bandwidth window we decrease the
precision of the estimator, violating the consistency of the test statistic in this case.
There are several methods which could decrease the dimensionality problem. Scott (1992)
suggests principal components method, projection pursuit or informative components analysis.
These solutions, however, put additional boundaries on the underlying structure of the data. For
instance, they might be of a great advantage when dealing with 100-dimensional spaces where
one could assume that the data structure falls into a 20-dimensional manifold. In our example
it is very likely, however, that the minimum number of independent manifolds is larger than
3 so that the dimension reduction does not necessary have to improve the test performance.
Moreover, as argued by Cartwright (2007), we do not want to decrease the complexity of the
environment.
Another solution is a precision improvement, or in other words, reduction of the estimator
bias. Since it does not assume any particular underlying data structure, it is of greater advantage
in our setting.
3.3 Data sharpening as a bias reduction method
The intuition behind Data Sharpening (DS) is to slightly perturb the original data set by a
sharpening function ψp(.) in order to obtain the desirable properties of the density estimator fˆ
(here p is the order of bias reduction). Hall and Minnotte (2002) show that the ‘sharpened’ fˆ has
smaller bias with variance being of the same order as original fˆ . The idea of the perturbation
is to tighten the data set, i.e. concentrate points where they were already dense and thin them
where they were originally sparse. The explicit form of the sharpening function depends then
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on the order of the bias reduction we would like to get but the technique might be in principle
applied to obtain arbitrary low levels of bias reduction (Hall and Minnotte, 2002).
There are several advantages of DS among the bias reduction techniques. Firstly, as men-
tioned before, it allows for very high levels of bias reduction. Since testing for Granger causality
is widely recognized for its practical purposes, the universality of a method is of a great impor-
tance. Secondly, as we conﬁrm in our study, it does not affect the kernel function directly,
which leaves other asymptotic properties of the MSE of the test statistic untouched (see other
ε-dependent terms in Eq. (3.7)). Thirdly, it is easy and straightforward to implement, even in a
multivariate setting.
With respect to Eq. (3.2), let us consider a sharpened form of the estimator
fˆ sW (Wi) =
ε−dW
n
∑
j
Kmulti
(
Wi − ψp(Wj)
ε
)
, (3.9)
where Kmulti(W ) = (2π)−dW /2 exp(−1/2W TW ) is the standard multivariate Gaussian kernel,
as described in Wand and Jones (1995) and Silverman (1998).4
We obtain the sharpened form of the test statistic, T sn(εn), by substituting the sharpened
estimators into Eq. (3.3). As we show in Appendix 3.A, the pointwise bias is of order o(εp)
with other properties of the kernel K˜ being the same. This in fact makes the bias of T sn(εn)
(from Eq. (3.4)) being α = p with parameters γ and δ from Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6) unchanged.
This reasoning might be summarized in the following corollary, which is a generalization of the
theorem in Diks and Panchenko (2006) and proposition in Hall and Minnotte (2002)
Corollary 3.3.1. For any sufﬁciently smooth, continuous and inﬁnitely differentiable density,
there exist a sharpening function ψp(.), where p is the order of bias reduction, for which one may
ﬁnd a sequence of bandwidths εn = Cn−β withC > 0 and β ∈ (1/(2p), 1/D), whereD < ∞ is
the total dimensionality of the problem, which guarantees that for a weakly-dependent process
4In principle, our reasoning holds for any sufﬁciently smooth, symmetric and multiplicative probability density
as a kernel function. Square kernel, as originally applied by Diks and Panchenko (2006), proves not to be smooth
enough which led us to the standard Gaussian kernel.
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the sharpened test statistic T sn satisﬁes:
√
n
(T sn(εn)− q)
Sn
d−→N(0, 1),
where S2n is an autocorrelation consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance of
√
n(T sn(εn)−
q).
The proof of Corollary 3.3.1 can be found in Appendix 3.A.
In order to illustrate its practical application, let us consider the same dimensionality prob-
lem as described in Section 3.2.1. The original kernel estimator bias of order o(ε2), which
was effectively blocking the consistency of the test, might be reduced to o(ε4) by applying the
sharpening function of the form
ψ4(W ) = I + h
2κ2
2
fˆ ′(W )
fˆ(W )
, (3.10)
where I is the identity function, h is the sharpening bandwidth, κ2 is the second moment of the
kernel and fˆ ′ denotes the ﬁrst derivative of the density estimator.5 For the sake of clarity, the
detailed derivations and expressions might be found in the Appendix 3.B. Clearly, it is possible
now to ﬁnd a range for β-values which would guarantee asymptotic normality; in this case it is
β ∈ (1/8, 1/4).
There are several other methods of kernel bias reduction. The literature distinguishes inter
alia among higher order kernels (Granovsky and Mller, 1991), variable bandwidth estimators
(Abramson, 1982), variable location estimators (Samiuddin and El-Sayyad, 1990) or paramet-
ric transformation methods (Abramson, 1984). Under sufﬁcient smoothness of the underlying
density, they all reduce the bias from o(ε2) to o(ε4) as the sample size increases. Although
it is likely that they might be also successfully applied in our setting, their properties do not
guarantee a clear-cut asymptotic theory for the test statistic. Therefore, we leave this exercise
5We employ the Nadaraya-Watson estimator as a plug-in estimator for sharpening function as suggested by
Choi and Hall (1999). This, in fact, makes the optimal sharpening bandwidth h dependent on εn.
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for future consideration.
3.3.1 Bandwidth selection
The optimal bandwidth, denoted by ε∗, corresponds to the smallest MSE of the test statistic,
T sn(εn). Following the Diks and Panchenko (2006) methodology, this implies that the sum of
dominating squared terms in Eq. (3.7) is minimized, so that under the bandwidth shrinking
condition
ε∗ = C∗n
−2
2α+γ , (3.11)
with
C∗ =
(
18γq2
2αE[s(W )]2
) 1
2α+γ
. (3.12)
One may readily observe that the general formula for the optimal bandwidth is similar to the
one derived in the Diks and Panchenko (2006). DS changes the pointwise bias of the estimator
density estimator, intuitively affecting both the rate of convergence, i.e. parameter α, and the
leading bias term, i.e. s(wi).
In order to get more insight into the effects of DS on the optimal bandwidth selection in the
DP setting, it is worthwhile to test it in a similar environment as Diks and Panchenko (2006)
proposed. Therefore, we consider here an interdependent multivariate ARCH process, however
for the sake of presentational purposes, extended to the 3-variate setting and representing the
dimensionality problem discussed in the previous section. Consider the ARCH process without
instantaneous dependence
Qt ∼ N
(
0, c+ aQ2t−1
)
Xt ∼ N
(
0, c+ aY 2t−1
)
Yt ∼ N
(
0, c+ aQ2t−1
)
.
(3.13)
It is clear that the process satisﬁes the null that {Xt} is not Granger causing {Yt}, corrected
for the presence of {Qt}. Parameters c and a are chosen in order to guarantee stationarity and
ergodicity, i.e. c > 0 and 0 < a < 1.
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Because of the complexity of the problem, in order to get more insight into the magnitude of
the optimal constant C∗, and optimal bandwidth value ε∗, we rely on Monte Carlo simulations.
We perform 1000 simulations of process from Eq. (3.13) with a = 0.4 and c = 1 for different
sample sizes. We extract values for qˆ2 and E[s(W )] using standard kernel methods for density
and derivative estimation, described in Wand and Jones (1995) and Silverman (1998). The
results are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Optimal constants and bandwidth values for the T sn(εn) test of the 3-variate process
from Eq. (3.13) for different sample sizes under the bandwidth shrinking condition. The values
represent the mean over 1000 simulations.
sample size (n) 50 100 200 500 1000
C∗ 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.97 0.98
ε∗ 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.31
The reported optimal bandwidths are smaller than those from Diks and Panchenko (2006).
This is a straightforward result of the DS method. Given that the sharpened estimate has lower
bias, the test does not have to include such a wide range of points in order to yield similar
properties. This in fact guarantees asymptotic normality of the sharpened test statistic under
smaller bandwidth values.
3.3.2 Performance of the DS in Granger causality setting
Given the optimal bandwidth values, we may turn to the assessment of the performance of the
DS-augmented DP test. Again we rely here on Monte Carlo simulations. Since process from
Eq. (3.13) matches the basic properties of the observed ﬁnancial time series (like conditional
heteroskedasticity), we use it as an underlying behavior for the simulations for our test size
assessment. For the test power assessment we use the same process, however, we switch the
causality between {Xt} and {Yt} so that, even conditioning on {Qt}, the null hypothesis of no
Granger causality is violated.
The results from 1000 simulations for various time series lengths are summarized by the
size-size and power-size plots shown in Fig. 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Size-size and power-size plots of the T sn(εn) test of 3-variate process from Eq. (3.13)
for different sample sizes under the bandwidth shrinking condition aggregated over 1000 simu-
lations.
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(a) Size-size plot
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(b) Power-size plot
One may readily observe that the test demonstrates larger power on larger samples. For 5%
signiﬁcance level, it ranges from 0.05 for n = 50 (no power) to 0.82 for n = 500 (high power).
A simple rule of thumb may suggest that the test yields satisfactory results for samples of length
500 and larger. Interestingly, for the same signiﬁcance levels and sample sizes, the sharpened
DP test offers better power than its original counterpart. In fact, the standard DP test yields
power of 0.8 for samples of 1000-2000 length.
At the same time the test tends to be rather conservative for larger nominal p-values, i.e. it
under-rejects when the null is satisﬁed. However, for relatively small signiﬁcance levels the
size-size plot suggests that the larger the sample size, the closer the size is to the ideal rejection
probability.
One may view DS as an almost ideal tool for bias reduction. We observe, however, a price
for the increased precision of the pointwise estimators. For each point in the distribution the
algorithm calculates its sharpened form. This in fact shows up as an additional loop in the
procedure, increasing the computational time from O(n2) to O(n3). For relatively short time
series it may not seem as a problem but for n larger than a couple of thousand, computational
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time might be a bottle neck of the analysis. Therefore, for larger data sets, we recommend using
DS together with multicore or cloud computing.
3.4 Nonlinear Granger causality in the US grain market
In order to show a practical application of the sharpened DP test, we choose the US grain market
as it offers an intuitive and straightforward environment for our hypothesis testing. There is a
common agreement among professionals that any causal relation between prices of different
crops has to be corrected for the weather forecasts at that particular moment (see for instance
Popp et al. (2003) and Carreck and Christian (1997)). This conditioning variable suits as a
perfect example of Q variable, from the 3-variate example in previous sections.
We consider corn, beans and wheat as being most representative of the US grain market.
We consider prices of the 1-month ahead rolling future contracts, traded in USD at the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBoT). The weather variable is approximated by the rolling monthly futures
on Heating Degree Days (HDD), averaged over Philadelphia, New York, Portland, Chicago
and Cincinnati. Daily time series comprise the period from 09/01/2010 till 03/06/2013 making
together 633 observations. The data have been obtained from Bloomberg.
We take all variables in logs and evaluate their statistical properties to check whether the
time series are stationary. The results are presented in Table 3.2.
Looking at the raw data, only prices of corn prove to be stationary at the 5% signiﬁcance
level. Therefore, in order to assess Granger causality in the market we focus on ﬁrst differences
of all the variables, i.e. log returns.
In the analysis we consider pairwise relations and complete system separately. In the former
we take into account the direct relations between two grains only and in the latter we look at the
model with all grains included. Since in the system setting, Q variable is two dimensional, by
Q1 we refer to the conditioning on grain and Q2 to conditioning on weather.
To underpin the results, we relate them with the standard linear Granger causality setting, as
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Table 3.2: Unit root tests of the log prices on US grain market in period 09/01/2010 till
03/06/2013 for raw data and for ﬁrst differences. Test types comprise the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) and Phillips-Perron test (PP) as described in Fuller (1995) and Phillips and
Perron (1988), respectively. In both tests the null assumes non-stationarity. CV denotes the
Critical Value for a given test speciﬁcation.
Raw data First diff.
Variable Test type Trend 5% CV Test stat. Unit root Test stat. Unit root
Corn ADF no -2.86 -3.585 no -24.574 no
PP no -2.86 -3.591 no -24.568 no
ADF yes -3.41 -3.469 no -24.611 no
PP yes -3.41 -3.493 no -24.605 no
Bean ADF no -2.86 -2.666 yes -24.504 no
PP no -2.86 -2.668 yes -24.496 no
ADF yes -3.41 -2.564 yes -24.523 no
PP yes -3.41 -2.575 yes -24.516 no
Wheat ADF no -2.86 -2.299 yes -24.905 no
PP no -2.86 -2.288 yes -24.913 no
ADF yes -3.41 -2.272 yes -24.890 no
PP yes -3.41 -2.261 yes -24.898 no
HDD ADF no -2.86 -1.247 yes -21.707 no
PP no -2.86 -1.547 yes -22.048 no
ADF yes -3.41 -1.409 yes -21.690 no
PP yes -3.41 -1.739 yes -22.032 no
proposed by Granger (1969). We also investigate the causality among the VAR-ﬁltered residu-
als, making sure that discovered causality effects are the results of nonlinearities. We study the
explicit role of the weather variable by comparing our results with the original DP test, i.e. with-
out a conditioning variable. In the analysis we assume the lag of each conditioning variable to
be 1, as suggested by the Bayesian Information Criterion from the VAR speciﬁcation. The op-
timal bandwidth value for the original DP test is equal 1.27 and for the sharpened test it is 0.33.
Before running the tests, we standardize the data by either standard normal or uniform marginal
transformations. The results for the pairwise relations are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 and
for the complete system in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Graphical illustration of the results can be found
in Appendix 3.C in Tables 3.C.1 through 3.C.4.
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One may readily observe that the US grain market does not show much linear Granger
causality. The only exception is the possible impact of beans on corn prices in all settings.
After VAR ﬁltering this relation disappears, however, as expected.
Interestingly, our results suggest that the relations between US grain prices exhibit a lot of
nonlinearities. Looking at the basic pairwise setting, there are strong causal linkages between
corn and wheat. If we, however, condition on weather forecasts, some of the relations vanish, in
particular in the uniform transformation setting. Moreover, we observe that after conditioning,
some new causal relations emerge between corn and beans, which additionally are purely non-
linear in nature. It suggests that weather forecasts have a dual role in the grain market. They do
not only drive many of the causal relations themselves but they also mask some of the others in
the bivariate setting. From our pairwise results it is clear that weather is masking the corn-beans
whereas is driving wheat-corn Granger causality.
In the basic system setting the corn-wheat causal relation is preserved, being signiﬁcant
also after linear ﬁltering. The corn-beans inﬂuence is also visible in the uniform transformation
setting, conﬁrming the pairwise results. After conditioning on weather forecasts, however, we
observe the emergence of the Granger causal relation in the beans-wheat market. Interestingly,
the multivariate setting exhibits many regularities from the pairwise study, nevertheless, because
of the complexity of the environment, we see new nonlinear relations between all the grains.
Prices of corn are Granger causing those of wheat and beans, whereas prices of beans are also
inﬂuencing those of wheat, conditioning on the weather forecasts.6
A straightforward explanation of our results could be that the nonlinear causal relation
emerge from bigger to smaller markets. Corn is the most heavily traded grain on the CBoT,
followed by beans and wheat. Intuitively, bigger markets should affect those of smaller size
as they are deeper and more liquid (Sari et al., 2012). This reasoning is fact in line with our
previous ﬁnding on the dual role of the weather forecasts in grain market. Since the majority of
6Interestingly, conditioning on weather forecast does not fully remove the bias in the corn-wheat relation, as
in the pairwise nonlinear test (raw data normal adjustment) and in the system nonlinear tests (raw data normal
and uniform adjustments). This, in fact suggests that there can exist additional factors which could inﬂuence the
corn-wheat price relation, being a potential topic for further investigation.
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shocks in the grain market are weather-related, they serve as a common factor and are displayed
in all the markets, mitigating the effects of the grain-speciﬁc shocks. Correcting for the weather
stance allows, therefore, to reveal causal relations between grain-speciﬁc shocks, which spread
from larger to smaller markets.
3.5 Conclusions and discussion
This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the validity of the Granger causality con-
cept, allowing it to be applied in more complex environments. We show that the Granger causal-
ity test proposed by Diks and Panchenko (2006) lacks consistency in a multivariate setting. The
problems arise as a consequence of a too large pointwise estimator bias, which decreases the
precision of the tests statistic and affects its asymptotic properties. In order to bring back its
desirable properties we propose a sharpened form of the test statistic, which under mild regular-
ity conditions is again asymptotically normal. In fact, we conﬁrm that the sharpening function
reduces the original bias of the estimator without any consequences for its further properties, as
originally suggested by Hall and Minnotte (2002). We assess properties of the sharpened test
numerically, demonstrating that its power is larger than that of the basic DP test.
In order to show the practical side of our study, we apply the test to the US grain market
as, because of its weather-dependent structure, it serves as an ideal environment to assess our
methodology. We consider Granger causality between corn, beans and wheat, conditioning
on the weather forecasts, approximated by the future contracts on Heating Degree Days. Our
results suggest that the US grain market exhibits many nonlinear relations. We discover a dual
role of the weather forecasts. Firstly, they seem to drive the causal relation from wheat to
corn, in the pairwise setting as they serve as a common factor. Secondly, they are masking the
causal relations from corn to beans and from beans to wheat in the system setting. Correcting
for the common factor, we reveal the true nonlinear Granger casual relations in the US grain
market, suggesting that the causality spreads from bigger, i.e. deeper and more liquid, to smaller
56
3.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
markets.
Our results might have important further implications for the food market analysis. As
suggested by Gilbert (2010), future contracts are the major transition channel through which
macro variables affect food prices. Understanding possible nonlinear economic dynamics in
these markets is therefore of a great signiﬁcance, as it may prevent possible bubbles and instant
food price rises, as the ones observed between 2007 and 2008.
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Appendix 3.A Asymptotic properties of the sharpened test
statistic (Corollary 3.3.1)
We closely follow here the reasoning developed in Diks and Panchenko (2006), however, for
the Gaussian kernel and sharpened estimator, as proposed in Hall and Minnotte (2002). We
analyze here the case of a random sample as the dependency results follow from the reasoning
in Denker and Keller (1983) and Diks and Panchenko (2006). In particular, redeﬁning condi-
tions in Eq. (3.4)-(3.6) for sharpened Gaussian kernel estimators and provided that covariances
between local density estimators are taken into account, the asymptotic results hold for weakly
dependent time series (see Diks and Panchenko (2006)).
By symmetrization with respect to three different indices i, j, k, for a given ε the sharpened
test statistic (Eq. 3.3 with sharpened estimators) might be rewritten in the form of the third order
U-statistic as
T sn(ε) =
1
n3
∑
i,j,k
K˜s(Wi,Wj,Wk) (3.14)
with Wi = (X
lX
i , Y
lY
i , Zi), i = 1, . . . , n and sharpened form of the kernel being
K˜s(Wi,Wj,Wk) =
ε−dX−2dY −dZ
6
[(
GXY Zik G
Y
ij −GXYik GY Zij
)
+
(
GXY Zij G
Y
ik −GXYij GY Zik
)
+
(
GXY Zjk G
Y
ji −GXYjk GY Zji
)
+
(
GXY Zji G
Y
jk −GXYji GY Zjk
)
+
(
GXY Zki G
Y
kj −GXYki GY Zkj
)
+
(
GXY Zkj G
Y
ki −GXYkj GY Zki
)]
.
(3.15)
where GWi,j is the sharpened form of the multivariate kernel density, i.e.
GWi,j = Kmulti
(
Wi − ψp(Wj)
ε
)
. (3.16)
We assume that the density is smooth enough and inﬁnitely differentiable so that it is possi-
58
APPENDIX 3.A. ASYMPTOTICS OF THE SHARPENED TEST (COROLLARY 3.3.1)
ble to ﬁnd any sharpening function which would guarantee bias reduction of order p, i.e.
EWj [G
W
i ]−GWi = εpRp(Wi) + o(εp), (3.17)
where Rp(Wi) is the leading bias term associated with εp evaluated at point Wi.
Let us deﬁne K˜s1 and K˜
s
2 as in Conditions in Eq. (3.4)-(3.6). The bias of products of es-
timated densities, i.e. s(wi), follows from the properties of the local estimator bias (see the
previous section) and identities such as E[f̂V f̂W ] = E[(fV + (f̂V − fV ))(fW + (f̂W − fW ))] =
fV fW + fVE[f̂W − fW ] + fWE[f̂V − fV ] + o(εp). Therefore, the local bias of the T sn(ε) might
be rewritten as proportional to
K˜s1(wi, ε)− lim
ε→0
K˜s1(wi, ε) = ε
p (fY (yi)Rp(xi, yi, zi)− fX,Y (xi, yi)Rp(yi, zi)
+ fX,Y,Z(xi, yi, zi)Rp(yi)− fY,Z(yi, zi)Rp(xi, yi)) + o(εp).
(3.18)
Taking into account Condition in Eq. (3.4), one may ﬁnd that it holds with α = p and s(wi)
being equal the term in the brackets.
Looking at the Condition in Eq. (3.5), taking the expectations over Wk for each of the
contributions to the kernel function K˜s, one ﬁnds that the dominant terms are proportional to
ε−dX−2dY −dZGXY Zij G
Y
ik and ε
−dX−2dY −dZGXY Zji G
Y
jk, for which we have
EWk
[
ε−dX−2dY −dZGXY Zij G
Y
ik
]
= ε−dX−dY −dZGXY Zij fY (Yi) + o(ε
−dX−dY −dZ ), (3.19)
and
EWk
[
ε−dX−2dY −dZGXY Zji G
Y
jk
]
= ε−dX−dY −dZGXY Zji fY (Yj) + o(ε
−dX−dY −dZ ). (3.20)
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Since all the terms are vanishing ε slower, we can rewrite that E
[(
K˜s2(wi, wj)
)2]
is equal
1
36
E
[(
ε−dX−dY −dZEWk
[
GXY Zij G
Y
ik
])2]
+ o(ε−dX−dY −dZ )
=
ε−2dX−2dY −2dZ
36
E
[(
GXY Zij fY (Yi)
)2]
+ o(ε−dX−dY −dZ )
=
ε−dX−dY −dZ
36
E
[
(fX,Y,Z(Xi, Yi, Zi)) fY (Yi)
2
]
+ o(ε−dX−dY −dZ ),
(3.21)
where we exploited the fact that GXY Zij G
Y
ik G
XY Z
ji G
Y
jk are asymptotically perfectly correlated as
ε tends to 0 sufﬁciently slowly as n → ∞. This conﬁrms that the γ parameter from the original
Diks and Panchenko (2006) methodology is unaffected by the DS, being equal dX + dY + dZ
with
q2 =
1
36
E
[
(fX,Y,Z(Xi, Yi, Zi)) fY (Yi)
2
]
. (3.22)
Since the variance of K˜s is limited by εdX+2dY +dZ as the sample size increases, condition
from Eq. (3.6) holds for δ = dX + 2dY + dZ , again being the same as in Diks and Panchenko
(2006). This brings us to the conclusion that DS decreased the local bias of T sn(ε) only, leaving
the further MSE asymptotic properties of the test statistic unchanged (see Eq. (3.7)).
Appendix 3.B Application of bias reduction
For practical purposes, let us assume that the H = diag(ε, ε, ..., ε) is a dW × dW bandwidth
matrix so that the local density estimator of dW -variate random vector from Eq. (3.2) becomes
fˆW (Wi) =
ε−dW
n
∑
j
KH(Wi −Wj), (3.23)
where KH(Wi −Wj) = K(H−1(Wi −Wj)) = Kmulti((Wi −Wj)/ε).
Assume also that the density function is inﬁnitely differentiable and let f ′ be the vector of
ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of f , f ′′ be the matrix of second-order partial derivatives of f , f (3)
be the cube of third-order partial derivatives of f , f (4) be the 4-dimensional matrix of fourth-
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order partial derivatives of f etc, with all the entries being piecewise continuous and square
integrable. For presentational purposes, let us also use
∫
as a shorthand for
∫ · · · ∫
R
dW
and dW
as a shorthand for dW1 · · · dWdW . By IdW we denote also the dW × dW identity matrix.
Let us consider the case study example from the chapter, where we extend the basic analysis
to the 3-variate causality testing, i.e. Yt+1|(X lXt ;Y lYt , QlQt ) ∼ Yt+1|(Y lYt , QlQt ). As it is shown
in the text, the standard DP test lacks consistency because of the too large pointwise estimator
bias. The original bias of the standard kernel density estimator at point Wi might be computed
from the second order Taylor expansion around the estimation point (Wand and Jones, 1995)
E
[
fˆW (Wi)
]
=
ε−dW
n
∑
j
E [KH(Wi −Wj)] = ε
−dW
n
∑
j
∫ ∞
−∞
KH(Wi −W )f(W )dW
= ε−dW
∫ ∞
−∞
KH(Wi −W )f(W )dW =
∫ ∞
−∞
Kmulti(s)f(W − εs)ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Kmulti(s)
{
f(Wi)− εsTf ′(Wi) + ε
2
2
sTf ′′(Wi)s+ o(ε4)
}
ds
= f(Wi) +
ε2
2
κ2tr {f ′′(Wi)}+ o(ε4) = f(Wi) + o
(
ε2
)
,
(3.24)
where we exploited the fact that
∫
sKmulti(s)ds = 0dW and
∫
ssTKmulti(s)ds = κ2IdW .
The dominant term in the local estimator bias (R2) is driven by 1/2κ2tr {f ′′(Wi)}, which
is of order o(ε2). The idea of DS is to eliminate this term by applying appropriate sharpening
function. It can be best illustrated by calculating the expected value of the sharpened esti-
mator where the DS function is given by Eq. (3.10) with the sharpening bandwidth h being
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ε-dependent
E
[
fˆ sW (Wi)
]
=
ε−dW
n
∑
j
E [KH(Wi − ψ4(Wj))] = ε
−dW
n
∑
j
∫ ∞
−∞
KH(Wi − ψ4(Wj))dF (W )
= ε−dW
∫ ∞
−∞
KH (Wi − ψ4(W )) dF (W ) = ε−dW
∫ ∞
−∞
KH (Wi − V ) dF (ψ−14 (V ))
= ε−dW
∫ ∞
−∞
KH (Wi − V ) f(ψ−14 (V ))
∣∣∣∣∂ψ−14 (V )∂V
∣∣∣∣ dV
= ε−dW
∫ ∞
−∞
KH (Wi − V )
{
f(V )− ε
2
2
κ2tr{f ′′(V )}+ ε
4
4
k22U(V ) + o(ε
6)
}
dV
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Kmulti(s)
{
f(Wi)− εsTf ′(Wi) + ε
2
2
sTf ′′(Wi)s− ε
2
2
κ2tr{f ′′(Wi)}
+
ε3
2
κ2tr{sTf (3)(Wi)} − ε
4
4
κ2tr{sTf (4)(Wi)s}+ ε
4
4
k22U(Wi)
}
ds+ o(ε6)
= f(Wi) + ε
4R4(Wi) + o(ε
6),
(3.25)
where
U(V ) =
f ′(V )Tf ′(V )f ′(V )Tf ′(V )
f(V )3
− 5f
′(V )Tf ′′(V )f ′(V )
2f(V )2
− 2f
′(V )T (B1(f ′′(V ))− f ′′(V )) f ′(V )
2f(V )2
+
tr{f ′′(V )Tf ′′(V )} −∑ |B2(f ′′(V ))|
f(V )
+
tr{f ′(V )Tf (3)(V )}
f(V )
,
(3.26)
and
R4(Wi) =
1
4
(
κ22U(Wi)− κ4tr{f (4)(Wi)}
)
. (3.27)
Matrix transformation B1(.) puts the trace of the argument on each of the diagonal entries and
B2(.) takes 2x2 submatrix around the diagonal of the argument.
Clearly, the original bias of order o(ε2) has decreased to the order o(ε4)without any effect on
the kernel function Kmulti, leaving the further properties of Eq. (3.3) the same as in the original
reasoning from Diks and Panchenko (2006). Therefore one may calculate optimal bandwidth
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values, which endow the test statistic with asymptotic normality, for the 3-variate setting from
Eq. (3.11) by plugging in the estimates for s(wi) and q2 as
s(wi) = fY,Q(yi, qi)R4(xi, yi, zi, qi)− fX,Y,Q(xi, yi, qi)R4(yi, zi, qi)
+ fX,Y,Z,Q(xi, yi, zi, qi)R4(yi, qi)− fY,Z,Q(yi, zi, qi)R4(xi, yi, qi),
(3.28)
and
q2 =
1
36
E
[
(fX,Y,Z,Q(Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi)) fY,Q(Yi, Qi)
2
]
. (3.29)
In fact, bias reduction from o(ε2) to o(ε4) allows to include up to 4 additional variables. Any
additional conditioning variable would again violate the consistency of the test, requiring more
appropriate sharpening function.
Appendix 3.C Illustration of the empirical results
(See Tables 3.C.1 through 3.C.4 on the next pages.)
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Table 3.C.1: Causality results for the pairwise relations of the log returns on the US grain mar-
ket, without conditioning on Weather (HDD). Single, double and triple arrows denote p-value
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Period: 09/01/2010-03/06/2013. Nonlinear tests
are performed on standardized data, assuming (N)ormal or (U)niform transformation. Number
of lags is lX = lY = 1 from the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Linear Granger Causality
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (N)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (U)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
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Table 3.C.2: Causality results for the pairwise relations of the log returns on the US grain
market, with conditioning on Weather (HDD). Single, double and triple arrows denote p-value
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Period: 09/01/2010-03/06/2013. Nonlinear tests
are performed on standardized data, assuming (N)ormal or (U)niform transformation. Number
of lags is lX = lY = lQ = 1 from the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Linear Granger Causality
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (N)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (U)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
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Table 3.C.3: Causality results for the system setting of the log returns on the US grain market,
without conditioning on Weather (HDD). Single, double and triple arrows denote p-value sta-
tistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Period: 09/01/2010-03/06/2013. Nonlinear tests are
performed on standardized data, assuming (N)ormal or (U)niform transformation. Number of
lags is lX = lY = lQ1 = 1 from the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Linear Granger Causality
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (N)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (U)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
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Table 3.C.4: Causality results for the system setting of the log returns on the US grain market,
with conditioning on Weather (HDD). Single, double and triple arrows denote p-value statis-
tical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Period: 09/01/2010-03/06/2013. Nonlinear tests are
performed on standardized data, assuming (N)ormal or (U)niform transformation. Number of
lags is lX = lY = lQ1 = lQ2 = 1 from the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Linear Granger Causality
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (N)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
Nonlinear Granger Causality (U)
Corn
Wheat Beans
Corn
Wheat Beans
Raw data VAR residuals
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Chapter 4
Exploring Nonlinearities in Financial
Systemic Risk
4.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 crisis shed new light on the complexity within the ﬁnancial sector. The linkages
and risk exposures between various institutions proved to be of great signiﬁcance in transmit-
ting distress across the whole ﬁnancial system. Additionally, during systemic events the malaise
spreads across the ﬁnancial world rapidly through indirect channels, like price effects or liquid-
ity spirals (Brunnermeier, 2009). In effect, market values of various ﬁnancial assets tend to
move closer together, drifting away from their fundamentals. In particular, one observes high
regularities in their tail co-movements (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011).
Because of its strong adverse effects on the real economy, great attention has been paid to
measuring and monitoring systemic risk, i.e. risk of disruption in the entire ﬁnancial system,
and individual risk exposures. The majority of econometric approaches in these ﬁelds focus
on co-risk measures, where the risk of the ﬁnancial system is assessed in relation to the risk of
individual institutions. The intuition behind these models lies in negative externalities which
one institution imposes on the others and on the system as a whole. As argued by Adrian
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and Brunnermeier (2011), these externalities are a consequence of excessive risk taking and
leverage. Given, for instance, that one institution is facing a liquidity shock, it liquidates its
assets at ﬁre-sale prices as given, affecting borrowing constraints of others and actually causing
the ﬁre-sale prices. A wonderful summary of research in this ﬁeld can be found in Acharya
(2009), Acharya et al. (2010) or Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
A commonly used econometric approach, in the growing body of literature on this topic, is
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR), attributed to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). It is built
around the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR), which determines the maximum loss on returns
within the γ-percentile conﬁdence interval (Kupiec, 2002). CoVaR assesses VaRγ of one insti-
tution conditional on distress in the other. In particular, if the former represents the system, one
may associate CoVaR with a systemic risk measure.
A clear shortcoming of such an approach lies in its susceptibility to model misspeciﬁcation.
Imagine that returns come from an unknown probability distribution F , with density f . Assume
now that f is steeper or nonlinear around its VaRγ . Clearly, standard parametric approaches
oversee this irregularity so that even a small variation in VaRγ might affect co-risk results. In
this chapter we develop a methodology which corrects for this shortcoming, contributing to the
discussion on nonlinear economic dynamics in systemic risk.
The existence of nonlinearities in the ﬁeld has been already recognized. Huang et al. (2010)
suggest that “a bank’s contribution to the systemic risk is roughly linear in its default probability
and highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation”. This is supported by
empirical observations of the ﬁnancial markets described by He and Krishnamurthy (2012). In
fact, He and Krishnamurthy (2012) built a theoretical model which matches nonlinear dynam-
ics across different economic variables, including systemic risk. XiaoHua and Shiying (2012)
investigated the topic from the neural network perspective and designed an early warning mech-
anism accordingly. This chapter aims to propose a formal approach to assess the relevance of
nonlinearities in driving systemic events.
We build our approach around the intuition of CoVaR. In particular, we focus on the Granger
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causal effect that distress in one institution may lead to distress in the other or in the whole
system, where distress is deﬁned by being near VaRγ .
There are two main novelties in our methodology. The ﬁrst one is the notion of causal-
ity. The basic CoVaR notion does not distinguish between direct causal and common factor
effects. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) treat this as a virtue rather than a problem, arguing
that common factor effects are of more importance when dealing with systemic risk, which can
be expected to be particularly true for the herding behavior (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). One
may, however, want to study the causal relations explicitly. Imagine for instance a group of
the biggest ﬁnancial institutions. Since they do not only trade with each other but also serve
as clearing houses or liquidity backstops for smaller parties, they are central to the ﬁnancial
system. Now, imagine that one of them is in trouble. It affects all the banks that are exposed
to its risk, but since it is relatively large, its distress might alone translate into problems in the
entire ﬁnancial system. The causal kind of reasoning seems therefore particularly appealing for
policy makers and central bankers, who in fact might want to focus on preventing this individual
causal relation.
Another justiﬁcation for considering causality in individual and systemic risk lies in its pos-
sible applications to networks and contagion analysis (see for instance Chinazzi and Fagiolo
(2013)). Looking at any pair of institutions, the possible risk effects of one on another do
not have to be bilaterally equal (as they are assumed to be in a non-causal setting). For in-
stance, a lender has a different kind of risk exposure to a creditor than the other way around.
Causality captures that phenomenon explicitly, allowing for a more detailed analysis on network
spillovers, cascades and shock propagation.
In our study we employ the general causality of Granger type, i.e. a nonparametric version
of the concept originally proposed by Granger (1969), as it is intuitive and does not bring many
model restrictions. It has been also successfully applied as a network mapping tool in ﬁnancial
analysis (Gao and Ren, 2013).
The second novelty lies in the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial distress. In our study we assume that an
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institution is in trouble when it is around its VaRγ . Practically speaking, our deﬁnition captures
the majority of events which fall below VaRγ together with some of the events above it. The
reason why we allow for some variation around VaRγ lies in its possible nonlinear structure,
whose role we want to study explicitly. We recognize that our deﬁnition might not capture some
of the extreme values from the left tail of the distribution, being potentially susceptible to black
swans (Taleb, 2010). Our analysis shows, however, that the optimal region around VaRγ is very
slowly decreasing with the sample size, somehow hampering the risk of neglecting the extreme
events. Additionally, our setup might be naturally extended to a more general setting, including
all the events below VaRγ . This, however, is behind the scope of this chapter and we leave it
for further investigation.
In our analysis we consider two scenarios of potential Granger causality. In the ﬁrst setting
we investigate the role of individual institutions in blocking the recovery of the system which is
already under distress. In the second scenario we measure the contribution of individual institu-
tions to the systemic problems. The second setting is more similar to the standard understanding
of systemic risk (Acharya, 2009) and might be useful in ex ante applications. The ﬁrst scenario
might be perceived either as a kind of a robustness check or a policy relevant tool for ex post
actions. Indeed, if the system is already in trouble one may want to determine which of its parts
are hampering its recovery. In fact, we could think of these two scenarios from a perspective of
a doctor who either prescribes precautionary drugs or is trying to heal an already sick patient.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we explain the methodology of Con-
ditional Value-at-Risk-Nonlinear Granger Causality (or NCoVaR for simplicity). We evaluate
the asymptotic properties of the test statistic and we conﬁrm them numerically in Section 4.3.
In Section 4.4 we apply our approach to the euro zone ﬁnancial sector and evaluate which in-
stitutions got the most signiﬁcant impact on the systemic risk in years 2000-2012. Section 4.5
concludes.
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4.2 Methodology of NCoVaR
Let us ﬁrst bring some intuition behind the Conditional Value-at-Risk and Granger causality
separately and then use this to build CoVaR-NGraCo (Conditional Value-at-Risk-Nonlinear
Granger Causality) or NCoVaR for simplicity. In the standard setting we consider two insti-
tutions, i and j, whose returns on assets are given by X i and Xj , respectively. Talking about
systemic risk, we set j to be some aggregate variable so that we investigate the relationship
between institution i and the system as a whole. Following the original CoVaR literature, let us
deﬁneVaRγ as the left γ-quantile of the unconditional returns of a given institution. (In practice
γ is chosen from {0.01, 0.05, 0.1}.) For institution i we have therefore
P (X i ≤ VaRiγ) = γ, (4.1)
or equivalently
VaRiγ = inf{xi : FXi(xi) ≥ γ}, (4.2)
where FXi is the cumulative distribution function of X i. (For institution j, the notation is anal-
ogous throughout the chapter.) The intuition behind CoVaR is to evaluate VaRγ of institution
j conditional on some event associated with institution i. In particular, Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011) consider two conditioning events, i.e. institution i is at its VaRiγ or at its median
(VaRiγ=0.5 = Median
i). By comparing the difference between the two, it is possible to estimate
the risk contribution of institution i onto j, denoted by ΔCoVaR.
In our study we follow a similar reasoning as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), however, we
add a (discrete) time dimension. For any period t, let us deﬁne the future returns’ information
set by GX it , and the past and/or current returns’ information set by FX it . Following Granger
(1969), we say that returns of institution i are Granger causing those of institution j if FX it
contains additional information on GXjt which is not already contained in FXjt alone. We
formulate the deﬁnition of conditional Granger causality analogously, i.e. we say that returns
of institution i are Granger causing those of institution j if, conditional on some past or current
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events of those institutions (denoted by A(FX it) and B(FXjt ), respectively), FX it contains
additional information on GXjt which is not already contained in FXjt alone.
Given the intuition behind the CoVaR and general Granger causality, we may now turn
to NCoVaR. Similarly to ΔCoVaR, we test the difference in Granger causal risk effects from
institution i on j, between two conditioning events, i.e. when institution i is and/or was in
trouble (or around its VaRiγ) and when it is and/or was around the median of its returns. An
advantage of allowing institutions to be around (and not exactly at) their VaRγ or median levels
is that we could thereof account for possible nonlinearities in corresponding distributions -
something the original methodology could not capture. In particular, we consider a μ-radius
ball (μ > 0) centered at VaRγ or the median. (The following reasoning holds for G and F
being multivariate, provided that VaRγ and the medians are taken over the marginals.) We also
allow for conditioning on the past and/or current realizations of Xjt . To formalize this we give
the following deﬁnition of NCoVaR.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1. Given any stationary bivariate process {(X it , Xjt )}, we say that {X it} is a
nonlinear CoVaR Granger cause of {Xjt } if
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ∣∣‖FX it − VaRiγ‖ ≤ μ,B(FXjt )) =
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ∣∣‖FX it −Mediani‖ ≤ μ,B(FXjt )) ,
where μ > 0, ‖.‖ is the Euclidian distance measure, G denotes a set of future realizations andF
denotes a set of past and/or current realizations of the corresponding variables and B(.) reﬂects
some event over the argument.
In this study, we consider two possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst, we assume that institution
j is already in distress, so that potential Granger causal risk effects from institution i do not
only induce even higher losses on j but also can clog its recovery. The second scenario is more
similar to the traditional risk analysis, where future troubles in institution j come directly from
the past problems of institution j. One may thereof reformulate Def. 4.2.1 in the form of two
possible scenarios, which we investigate in detail below.
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Scenario 1. Given any stationary bivariate process {(X it , Xjt )}, we say that {X it} is a nonlinear
CoVaR Granger cause of {Xjt } in tail if
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ∣∣‖FX it − VaRiγ‖ ≤ μ, ‖FXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ) =
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ∣∣‖FX it −Mediani‖ ≤ μ, ‖FXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ) ,
where μ > 0, ‖.‖ is the Euclidian distance measure, G denotes a set of future realizations and
F denotes a set of past and/or current realizations of the corresponding variables.
Scenario 2. Given any stationary bivariate process {(X it , Xjt )}, we say that {X it} is a nonlinear
CoVaR Granger cause of {Xjt } in median if
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ|‖FX it − VaRiγ‖ ≤ μ, ‖FXjt −Medianj‖ ≤ μ) =
P
(‖GXjt − VaRjγ‖ ≤ μ|‖FX it −Mediani‖ ≤ μ, ‖FXjt −Medianj‖ ≤ μ) ,
where μ > 0, ‖.‖ is the Euclidian distance measure, G denotes a set of future realizations and
F denotes a set of past and/or current realizations of the corresponding variables.
In practice it is impossible to condition on the inﬁnite sets of future or past realizations of
variables of interest. Therefore, we reformulate G and F as ﬁnite sets of future periods or lags,
respectively. We limit ourselves to the canonical setting where GXjt = Xjt+1, as it is most
commonly used in practical Granger causality testing, however, our reasoning holds for any
GXjt = Xjt+k, 1 ≤ k < ∞. Similarly, we replace FX it and FXjt by X it,li = {X it−li+1, . . . , X it}
and Xjt,lj = {Xjt−lj+1, . . . , Xjt }, where li ≥ 1 and lj ≥ 1 denote the number of lags of a
corresponding variable.
In Granger causality testing, the goal is to ﬁnd evidence against the null hypothesis of no
causality, which according to Def. 4.2.1 is represented by equivalence in conditional probability.
We assume that process {(X it , Xjt )} is strictly stationary. In that case, the null hypothesis is a
statement about the invariant distribution evaluated at conditional VaRγ levels of the (li + lj +
1) -dimensional vector Wt = (Zt, X it,li , X
j
t,lj
), where we substitute Zt = X
j
t+1. (For clarity
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purposes and to bring forward the fact that we consider the invariant distribution of Wt, we
drop the time index, so that W = (Z,X i, Xj).) Formally, the null hypothesis from Scenarios 1
and 2 can be rewritten as
fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ|xiγ, xj∗
)
= fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ|xim, xj∗
)
, (4.3)
where zγ = VaRZγ , x
i
γ = VaR
i
γ , x
i
m = Median
i and ∗ distinguishes between Scenario 1 and 2
as xjγ = VaR
j
γ or x
j
m = Median
j , respectively. It is helpful to restate the problem in terms of
ratios of joint densities evaluated at given quantiles, as under the null the density of Z evaluated
around its VaRγ level and conditional on speciﬁc events in X i and Xj is equal to the same
density conditional on the different set of events in X i and Xj . Therefore, the joint probability
density function, together with its marginals must satisfy
fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗
)
fXi,Xj
(
xiγ, x
j
∗
) = fZ,Xi,Xj (zγ, xim, xj∗)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) . (4.4)
Since Eq. (4.4) holds for any quantile of the vector (Z,X i, Xj) in the support of Z,X i, Xj ,
Eq. (4.4) might be equivalently rewritten as
fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗
)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) = fXi,Xj (xiγ, xj∗)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) fZ,Xi,Xj (zγ, xim, xj∗)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) . (4.5)
Analogously to Baeck and Brock (1992) or Hiemstra and Jones (1994), a natural methodology
to assess Eq. (4.5) comes from the test for conditional independence. However, as showed
by Diks and Panchenko (2005) and Diks and Panchenko (2006), these tests can severely over-
reject in Granger causal setting, because its dependence on the conditional variance. Diks and
Panchenko (2006) propose to add a positive weight function g(zγ, xim, x
j
∗) and, given that the
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null should hold in the support of the joint densities, it might be equivalently written as
τg ≡
(
fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗
)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
)
− fXi,Xj
(
xiγ, x
j
∗
)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) fZ,Xi,Xj (zγ, xim, xj∗)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
) ) g(zγ, xim, xj∗) = 0.
(4.6)
Diks and Panchenko (2006) discuss several possibilities of choosing g(zγ, xim, x
j
∗). In this study
we focus on g(zγ, xim, x
j
∗) = fXi,Xj (x
i
m, x
j
∗)
2, as the estimator of τg has a corresponding U-
statistic representation, bringing the desired asymptotic normality properties for weakly depen-
dent data. Substituting into Eq. (4.6), one ﬁnds that
τ = fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗
)
fXi,Xj
(
xim, x
j
∗
)− fXi,Xj (xiγ, xj∗) fZ,Xi,Xj (zγ, xim, xj∗) . (4.7)
To evaluate the data-driven representation of τ , we rely on kernel methods. In particular, we
consider the local density estimator
fˆW (w) =
ε−dW
n
n∑
k=1
K
(
w − wk
ε
)
, (4.8)
where n is the sample size, ε is the bandwidth parameter (similar to μ from the Def. 4.2.1), d
reﬂects the dimensionality of a given vectorW andK(.) is a bounded Borel function RdW → R
satisfying
∫
|K(t)|dt < ∞,
∫
K(t)dt = 1 and |tK(t)| → 0 as |t| → ∞. (4.9)
In practice, K(.) is often chosen to be a probability density function (Wand and Jones, 1995).
In order to guarantee the consistency of the pointwise density estimators, we assume that the
bandwidth parameter ε comes from the sequence εn, which is slowly decreasing with the sample
size, i.e.
εn → 0 and nεn → ∞ as n → ∞. (4.10)
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Parzen (1962) shows that under conditions (4.9) and (4.10) and provided that f is continuous at
w, the estimate of density f at a given point w is consistent.
Given a given bandwidth ε, a natural estimator for τ is
Tn(ε) = C
n∑
k=1
n∑
p=1
[
K
(
(zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗)
T − (zk, xik, xjk)T
ε
)
K
(
(xim, x
j
∗)
T − (xip, xjp)T
ε
)
− K
(
(xiγ, x
j
∗)
T − (xik, xjk)T
ε
)
K
(
(zγ , x
i
m, x
j
∗)
T − (zp, xip, xjp)T
ε
)]
,
(4.11)
where ε is the bandwidth and
C =
ε−dZ−2dXi−2dXj
n2
. (4.12)
(We sum over two indices as it allows to calculate the variance of Tn(ε) explicitly.) The asymp-
totic distribution of the test statistic can be derived from the behavior of the properties of the
second order U-statistic, as described by Serﬂing (1980) and van der Vaart (1998).
Theorem 4.2.1. Under the conditions described by Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10), for a given set of
VaRγ levels and given bandwidth parameter sequence εn, test statistic Tn(εn) satisﬁes:
√
n
(Tn(εn)− τ)
Sn
d−→N (0, 1),
where Sn is a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the asymptotic
standard deviation of
√
n(Tn(εn)− τ).
The proof of Theorem 4.2.1 can be found in Appendix 4.A. As argued by Diks and Panchenko
(2006), although the test statistic is not positive deﬁnite, the one-sided version of the test, i.e. re-
jecting on larger values, turns out to yield better performance.
In this study we choose γ to be 0.05 as it is the most commonly applied VaR signiﬁcance
level. We calculate VaRγ from the empirical quantile function (Jones, 1992). Following the
literature on nonparametric Granger causality testing (Hiemstra and Jones, 1994; Diks and
Panchenko, 2006) we take the square kernel function.1 The square kernel form of the estimator
1The asymptotic properties of the test statistic are, however, robust to any kernel speciﬁcation, provided that it
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in Eq. (4.8), can be rewritten as
fˆSQW (w) =
(2ε)−dW
n− 1
n∑
k=1
I(‖w − wk‖ < ε), (4.13)
where I(‖w − wk‖ < ε) is the indicator function taking values 1 for any ‖w − wk‖ < ε and
zero otherwise, and ‖.‖ is the supremum norm over all the dimensions.
4.2.1 Optimal bandwidth
Although the asymptotic normality of the test statistic holds for an arbitrary decreasing sequence
of bandwidths as long as it satisﬁes condition from Eq. (4.10), it inﬂuences the power of the test
to a great extent (Silverman, 1998). Therefore, in order to improve the performance of the test,
we calculate the optimal size of the bandwidth explicitly. Following Wand and Jones (1995)
and Silverman (1998), the optimal bandwidth minimizes the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of
Tn(εn), which may be decomposed into the sum of variance and squared bias of Tn(εn). In
our inference it is worthwhile to point out that the optimal bandwidth values of Tn(εn) do not
violate the consistency properties of any of the density estimators.
Corollary 4.2.1. Under the conditions given by Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10), the MSE-optimal se-
quence of bandwidths of Tn(εn) guarantees consistency of any of the pointwise density estima-
tors contributing to Tn(εn).
The proof of Corollary 4.2.1 is given in Appendix 4.B. In fact, the MSE optimum rate
of convergence of the bandwidth of Tn(εn) is slightly faster than that of individual density
estimators, but still much slower than n−1. This is caused by the increased variance of a product
of two estimators compared to their individual variances. Therefore, in order to balance this
effect in the MSE, the sequence of optimal bandwidths of Tn(εn) should decrease at a slightly
faster rate as n → ∞, but never as fast as n−1. In testing for systemic risk this proves to be of
satisﬁes conditions (4.9) and (4.10).
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large importance as with a bandwidth parameter decreasing just slightly with the sample size
we are still able to capture the majority of returns which are left to VaRγ .
In evaluating the optimal bandwidth value we rely on Monte Carlo methods. Correcting
for the weak dependency, we apply the autocorrelation consistent estimator for the variance of
Tn(ε), as proposed in Newey and West (1987). It might be veriﬁed that for a given bandwidth
ε, the bias of Tn(ε) may be calculated from the Taylor expansion around any point as
E[Tn(ε)]− τ = 1
2
κ2ε
2
[
fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zr, x
i
r, x
j
∗
)∇2fXi,Xj (xis, xj∗)
+ fXi,Xj
(
xis, x
j
∗
)∇2fZ,Xi,Xj (zr, xir, xj∗)
− fXi,Xj
(
xir, x
j
∗
)∇2fZ,Xi,Xj (zr, xis, xj∗)
− fZ,Xi,Xj
(
zr, x
i
s, x
j
∗
)∇2fXi,Xj (xir, xj∗)]+ o(ε2),
(4.14)
where κ2 is the second moment of the kernel and∇2fW (w) is the trace of the second derivative
of density evaluated at pointw. Up to the error of order o(ε2), Eq. (4.14) has a plug-in estimator,
which can be easily calculated using kernel methods (Wand and Jones, 1995).
4.3 Numerical simulations
To give an example of the optimal bandwidth value, we perform a numerical experiment on the
same bivariate process as considered by Jeong et al. (2012), i.e.
xit = 1 +
1
2
xit−1 + r1,t
xjt =
1
2
xjt−1 + c
(
xit−1
)2
+ r2,t,
(4.15)
where r1,t and r2,t independent standard normal variables. The biggest advantage of the process
in Eq. (4.15) is its tuning parameter on Granger causality, c. Clearly, if c = 0 the model
corresponds to the hypothetical scenario of no Granger causality from X it to X
j
t . The larger
the parameter c becomes, the stronger the Granger causal effect, which we thus may control for
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Figure 4.1: MSE of the test statistic for bandwidth values in the range [0.3, 1.5] and for different
sample sizes, aggregated over 1000 simulations.
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(a) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 1
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(b) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 2
explicitly.
We perform 1000 simulations of normalized data of process given by Eq. (4.15) for different
sample sizes and evaluate the MSE of the test statistic for different bandwidth values within the
range [0.3, 1.5].2 For practical reasons, we take lags of order 1 for both variables. The results
for two scenarios of Granger causality are presented in Fig. 4.1 and the optimal bandwidths are
reported in Table 4.1.
It is straightforward to notice the differences of the MSE curves between two settings.
Firstly, for the same sample size and ε, Scenario 2 demonstrates larger MSE than in Scenario
1. Secondly, in Scenario 1 the MSE curve becomes ﬂatter, whereas in Scenario 2 the visible
U-shape is preserved as the sample size increases. These, in fact, are direct consequences of
the curvature of the true distribution around particular quantiles. Scenario 1 is driven by the tail
dependence, where the curvature is relatively ﬂat. On the contrary, Scenario 2 represents the
relation between the tail and the median, where the distribution is typically more bell-shaped
or simply steeper. This, in fact, shows up in the steepness and in the relative size of the MSE
curve. As expected, the minimum of the MSE curves is decreasing with the sample size in both
2We apply the standard score normalization.
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scenarios (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Optimal bandwidth values for test statistic evaluated for the process given by
Eq. (4.15) for different sample sizes and for two scenarios. The values represent means over
1000 simulations.
n = 100 n = 200 n = 500 n = 1000
ε∗ (Sc.1) 0.74 0.66 0.6 0.52
ε∗ (Sc.2) 0.68 0.64 0.48 0.44
The reported optimal bandwidth values represent the radius around theVaRγ which is being
considered in the NCoVaR. One may readily observe that Scenario 1 has slightly larger optimal
bandwidths than Scenario 2. We may view this as a result of scarcity of data in tails compared
with that around the median. Extracting information from tails requires, on average, slightly
larger windows in comparison to the region near the median (Caers and Maes, 1998).
Because the MSE of the test statistics might be calculated explicitly, bootstrapping optimal
bandwidths is a powerful technique which might be applied to any data set without assuming an
underlying process structure. We recognize, however, that it might take a lot of computational
time. For very large samples we suggest taking bins of 0.02 or 0.05 in order to make it compu-
tationally less demanding. Our simulations conﬁrm that the power of the test is preserved in the
range [ε∗ − 0.05, ε∗ + 0.05].
4.3.1 Performance of the NCoVaR test
We perform two experiments to evaluate the practical side of the test. In both we rely on Monte
Carlo methods on the example of the process in Eq. (4.15).3 In the ﬁrst one, we assess the
distribution of the test statistic under the null, evaluated for different sample sizes for 500 runs.
In the second experiment, we estimate the power of the test. Given that the null hypothesis
is violated (c > 0), we estimate rejection rates for different nominal signiﬁcance levels. We
3One may expect that the numerical size distortions and power of the NCoVaR test would depend on the exact
process speciﬁcation. Eq. (4.15) offers a simple testing environment, which has been already applied in the quantile
testing literature (Jeong et al., 2012). We therefore leave the assessment of the NCoVaR numerical performance
on other processes for future investigation.
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Figure 4.2: Size-size diagram of the NCoVaR test for the process from Eq. (4.15) for different
sample sizes over 500 simulations.
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(a) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 1
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(b) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 2
summarize the results from both experiments in the size-size plots and size-adjusted power
diagrams. The former plots the actual against nominal cumulative rejection rates under the null,
showing the size distortions. The latter shows the power of the test corrected for the possible
size bias, plotting the observed cumulative rejection rates under the alternative (actual power)
against observed rejection rates under the null (actual size). Ideally, the power function should
be 1 for any signiﬁcance level larger than 0, however, in practice we would like to observe
an increase in the slope at the origin as the sample size grows. Fig. 4.2 shows the size-size
diagrams whereas the size-adjusted power plots are presented in Figs 4.3-4.5.
Fig. 4.2 suggests that the nominal size distortions are larger in Scenario 2 than in Scenario
1. Additionally, the size-size curves are ﬂatter in Scenario 1 whereas they are more wavy in
Scenario 2. In fact, this is similar to the pattern observed in the MSE (see Fig. 4.1) and might
be largely attributed to the curvature of the true probability density function around particular
quantiles.
One can readily observe from Figs 4.3-4.5 that the size-adjusted power of the test increases
with the sample size and with the strength of Granger causality. Nevertheless, there are two
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main patterns emerging from the numerical analysis which deserve to be pointed out.
Firstly, for relatively smaller size the power of the test is higher for Scenario 1 than for Sce-
nario 2. This is again the result of model dynamics, where the underlying relation on variable j,
i.e. (Xjt+1 ≈ VaRjγ|Xjt ≈ Medianj) is more rare to observe on the process given by Eq. (4.15).
Practically speaking, as the sample size gets larger this effect is hampered.
Secondly, the size-adjusted power is almost negligible for very small Granger causality
and short time series. Clearly, one should blame the relative scarcity of observations around
quantiles for this discomfort. In order to apply the test to shorter data sets, we propose two
solutions to overcome this issue. The ﬁrst comprises different kernel speciﬁcations. The square
kernel takes into account only observations which are ε-close to the quantile, leaving out many
possibly informative data points. Replacing the kernel by a smoother one, like Gaussian or
logistic, should therefore correct for this effect. The second possible solution lies in improving
the precision of the density estimators. In the standard kernel estimators (like square kernel
estimators applied here) the bias is of order ε2 (Wand and Jones, 1995). Making the bias smaller
should decrease the disinformative effect of the observations around a given quantile so that
keeping the sample size ﬁxed we get relatively better representation of the true Granger causal
relation, which translates into improved test performance. One may consider Data Sharpening
(DS) as being potentially attractive bias reduction method in our setting. Following Hall and
Minnotte (2002), the idea behind DS is to slightly perturb the original data set in order to
obtain desirable estimator properties (here it is the reduced bias). Diks and Wolski (2013) show
that, besides reducing the estimator bias, DS does not affect other asymptotic properties of the
test statistic in a similar Granger causality setting. Therefore, it seems to be a straightforward
extension to NCoVaR for shorter samples.
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Figure 4.3: Size-adjusted power for the NCoVaR test for the process given by Eq. (4.15) for
c = 0.05 for different sample sizes over 500 simulations.
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(a) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 1
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Figure 4.4: Size-adjusted power for the NCoVaR test for the process given by Eq. (4.15) for
c = 0.25 for different sample sizes over 500 simulations.
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(a) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 1
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Figure 4.5: Size-adjusted power for the NCoVaR test for the process given by Eq. (4.15) for
c = 0.4 for different sample sizes over 500 simulations.
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(a) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 1
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(b) Null hypothesis as in Sc. 2
4.4 Assessing ﬁnancial systemic risk
In our analysis we focus on the NCoVaR of individual institutions on the overall systemic risk.
Therefore, we set j to represent the system variable and i individual ﬁnancial institutions.
We approximate the returns on assets by equity returns and take into account ﬁnancial in-
stitutions publicly traded within the euro zone. In order to make the analysis more transparent
we focus on companies which constitute the Euro STOXX Financial Index in years 2000-2012.
Our sample thus covers the Great Recession in Europe (2008-12), the ﬁnancial crisis (2007-
2009) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). In total we collect daily equity returns for 48
companies (3 ﬁnancial, 13 insurance, 23 banks and 9 real estate) and one aggregate index. For
each variable we have 3390 observations. The list of companies, together with the country of
origin and their sector can be found in Appendix 4.C. The data have been obtained from the
DataStream.
All time series are stationary at the 1% signiﬁcance level, according to both the Phillips-
Perron and Augmented Dickey-Fuller speciﬁcations (Phillips and Perron, 1988; Fuller, 1995).
We run the pairwise tests against the null of no NCoVaR between each company and system
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Figure 4.6: NCoVaR between euro area individual ﬁnancial companies and system variable for
raw data.
SOC
STOXX
ALL
ASS
AXA
PAS
ROM
ESP
SAN
COM
DEU
ERS
AEG
ING
KBC
KLE
MED
NAT
POH
UNI
VIE
WEN
WER
(a) Euro area NCoVaR in Sc. 1
ERS
STOXX
AEG
AGE
BIR
SON
POP
ACK
ICA
IMM
UNI
WER
INT
(b) Euro area NCoVaR in Sc. 2
variable. In order to make sure that all the Granger causal relations are nonlinear, we run the
same test speciﬁcation on VAR-ﬁltered residuals also. In each run the number of lags is taken
according to the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion of the VAR speciﬁcation, and the optimal
bandwidth value is approximated by bootstrap. As a robustness check, we also correct for
possible causality in second moments, as suggested in Francis et al. (2010), by running NCoVaR
test on residuals from Dynamics Conditional Correlation GARCH model (Engle, 2002).
The detailed results can be found in Appendix 4.C (Tables 4.C.2, 4.C.3 and 4.C.3), however,
for presentational clarity we refer to the star-graphs, which show the NCoVaR between each
company and the system as a whole. The center of the star-graph represents the system variable
and the satellite nodes correspond to individual institutions. The width of the arrows represents
the inverse of the statistical signiﬁcance level of NCoVaR (the stronger the NCoVaR effect, the
wider (and darker) the arrow). Fig. 4.6 shows the results for the raw returns, Fig. 4.7 depicts the
VAR-ﬁltered returns and Fig. 4.8 refers to the GARCH residuals. Considering that at least one
NCoVaR relation denotes a systemically important institution, our analysis suggests that out of
48 companies 33 might be so described. The group consists of 3 ﬁnancial services companies,
87
CHAPTER 4. EXPLORING NONLINEARITIES IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMIC RISK
Figure 4.7: NCoVaR between euro area individual ﬁnancial companies and system variable for
VAR-ﬁltered data.
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Figure 4.8: NCoVaR between euro area individual ﬁnancial companies and system variable for
GARCH-ﬁltered data.
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6 insurance ﬁrms, 19 banks and 5 real estate companies. In fact, all of the ﬁnancial services
companies in our sample prove to be systemically important.
There are two main patterns emerging from our analysis. Firstly, there are fewer systemi-
cally risky institutions in Scenario 2. Secondly, NCoVaR in Scenario 1 is on average stronger
than in Scenario 2. These ﬁndings hold for the original as well as the VAR- and GARCH-ﬁltered
data. Interestingly, our study suggests that only a few ﬁnancial institutions pose a serious ex ante
threat to the systemic risk in the euro area, whereas, given that the system is already in trouble,
there are more institutions which hamper its recovery. This result conﬁrms a common view in
the literature on macroprudential supervision (Acharya, 2009) that the relative preventive costs
are smaller than those after the crisis has already erupted.
The analysis conﬁrms the nonlinear structure of the institutional contribution to the systemic
risk. Filtering out the linear relations and second moment spillover effects does not remove
the co-risk relations among individual companies and system as a whole. Interestingly, after
ﬁltering we observe some new co-risk relations emerging. To illustrate this better let us consider
ACK (Ackermans & Van Haaren). The raw returns do not show any NCoVaR, however, after
linear ﬁltering it poses a very strong threat to the system’s recovery (see Table 4.C.3 in Appendix
4.C which shows a test statistic of order 6.351 in Scenario 1) and after GARCH ﬁltering it has
a weak ex ante effect on the system’s risk (test statistic of order 1.329 in Scenario 2). One
may speculate that there are some strong purely nonlinear and second moment co-risk effects
from ACK on the system variable, which are being partly offset by their linear equivalents. In
other words, under normal circumstances ACK does not seem to be an important systemic risk
contributor. However, in abnormal times, like a crisis, it reveals its systemic importance.
There is one more ﬁnding which we believe is worth pointing out. We confront our re-
sults with the ofﬁcial list of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), published by the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2011.4 The FSB recognizes 11 G-SIBs in the euro area.
Our sample covers 8 of them, i.e. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBV), Banco Santander
4The G-SIBs list is being frequently updated. In our comparison we consider the most recent version of the
list, published on November 11th, 2013.
89
CHAPTER 4. EXPLORING NONLINEARITIES IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMIC RISK
(SAN), BNP Paribas (BNP), Commerzbank (COM), Deutsche Bank (DEU), Societe Generale
(SOC), UniCredit (Uni) and ING Bank (ING), as a part of the ING Groep. For all of them we
conﬁrm their G-SIB status in at least one NCoVaR setting.
4.5 Conclusions and discussion
Conditional Value-at-Risk-Nonlinear Granger Causality, or NCoVaR, is a new methodology of
assessing co-risk relations, designed to capture the possible nonlinear Granger causal effects.
Our approach distinguishes between two possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst one, we test what is the
role of individual institutions in hampering the recovery of others, given that they are already
in distress. In the second scenario, we assess the contribution of individuals to the others’
troubles. We derive the regular asymptotic properties of the NCoVaR test for both scenarios
and we conﬁrm them numerically.
We apply our methodology to assess the systemic importance of ﬁnancial institutions in the
euro area. Our ﬁndings suggest that (i) only a few ﬁnancial institutions pose a serious ex ante
threat to the systemic risk, whereas, given that the system is already in trouble, there are more
institutions which hamper its recovery and (ii) there are intriguing nonlinear structures in its
systemic risk proﬁle.
Our study suggests that the most systemically risky institution in our sample is UNI (Uni-
Credit), an Italian bank. In all settings it demonstrates a very strong NCoVaR relation to the
system. In 2011 it was recognized by the FSB as G-SIB. This analysis conﬁrms its systemical
importance, also revealing its nonlinear nature. Interestingly, there are two more companies
which demonstrate very strong NCoVaR in 5 out of 6 settings, i.e. ERS (Erste Group Bank),
an Austrian bank, and AEG (Aegon), a Dutch insurer. Only the latter was recognized by the
FSB to be potentially systemically important, with no ofﬁcial view on the former. However, the
former was recognized as a systemically important bank for the Austrian ﬁnancial sector (von
Kruechten et al., 2009). Our results point to potential systemic importance of Erste Group Bank
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in the entire euro area.
NCoVaR might be of great use for macroprudential policy, however, it has to be tested
on other samples and in other periods. It reveals some intriguing phenomena in the co-risk
relations. In order to understand these better, a tempting idea is to investigate the underlying
nonlinear structures analytically in models of the aggregate economy. Such settings would
allow to capture not only the contribution of individual institutions to systemic risk but also how
individual companies are affected by aggregate disturbances. One may also apply NCoVaR as
a mapping tool and bring the risk analysis to the network level.
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Appendix 4.A Asymptotic properties of test statistic (Theo-
rem 4.2.1)
We ﬁrst deal with the properties for the independent sample and consider the dependency later.
By symmetrization with respect to two indices, the test statistic in Eq. (4.11) has a corresponding
U-statistic representation of the form
Tn(εn) ≡ Tn(ε) = 1(n
2
) n∑
k=1
∑
p≤k
K˜(Wk,Wp), (4.16)
with Wk = (Zk, X ik,li , X
j
k,lj
), k = 1, . . . , n and kernel given by
K˜(Wk,Wp) =
ε−dZ−2dXi−2dXj (n− 1)
2n
[
Kk(zγ, x
i
γ, x
j
∗)Kp(x
i
m, x
j
∗)
− Kk(xiγ, xj∗)Kp(zγ, xim, xj∗) +Kp(zγ, xiγ, xj∗)Kk(xim, xj∗)
− Kp(xiγ, xj∗)Kk(zγ, xim, xj∗)
]
,
where for clarity we denote Kk(w) = K((w − wk)/ε) and dZ , dXi and dXj are general rep-
resentations of the dimensionality of G and F operators for particular variables. It is worth to
remind here that subscript n in the test statistic refers to its sequence.
The asymptotic properties of the sequence of test statistic can be derived by the projection
method (van der Vaart, 1998). From the Ha´yek’s projection lemma we know that the projection
of Tn(ε)− τ on the set of all function of the form
∑n
k=1 κk(Wk) is given by
Tˆn(ε) =
n∑
k=1
E[(Tn(ε)− τ)|Wk] = 2
n
n∑
k=1
K˜1(wk), (4.17)
where
K˜1(wk) = EWp
[
K˜(wk,Wp))
]
− τ. (4.18)
Projection Tˆn(ε) is mean zero sequence with variance 4/nVar(K˜1(W1)). By the Central
Limit Theorem, one may verify that
√
nTˆn(ε) converges in distribution to the normal law with
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mean 0 and variance given by 4Var(K˜1(W1)).
Provided that Var(Tˆn(ε)) → Var(Tn(ε)) as n → ∞, by Slutsky’s lemma, we now observe
that for a given ε and given quantiles of any independent ﬁnite-variance process (Zt, X it,li , X
j
t,lj
),
the sequence
√
n
(
Tn(ε)− τ − Tˆn(ε)
)
converges in probability to zero as n → ∞. What
follows, the sequence
√
n (Tn(ε)− τ) converges in distribution to N (0, σ2), where
σ2 = 4ζ1, (4.19)
with ζ1 = Cov
(
K˜(W1,W2), K˜(W1,W
′
2)
)
= Var(K˜1(W1)).
Appendix 4.A.1 Dependence
Following the reasoning from Denker and Keller (1983), the above asymptotic normality prop-
erties of the test statistic, Tn(ε), hold for a weakly dependent process if we take into account
the covariance between estimators of particular vectors in the asymptotic variance σ2,
σ2 = 4
[
ζ1 + 2
n∑
t=2
Cov
(
K˜1(W1), K˜1(Wt)
)]
. (4.20)
According to the kernel speciﬁcation, the estimator for K˜1(Wk) is given by
Kˆ1(Wk) =
(2ε)−dZ−2dXi−2dXj
n
n∑
p=1
K˜(Wk,Wp).
The Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of σ2
is
S2n =
B∑
b=1
Rbωb, (4.21)
where B is equal to the ﬂoor of n1/4, Rb is the sample covariance function of Kˆ1(Wb) given by
Rb =
1
n− b
n−b∑
a=1
(Kˆ1(Wa)− Tn(ε))(Kˆ1(Wa+b)− Tn(ε)), (4.22)
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and ωb is the weight function of the form
ωb =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1, if b = 12− 2(b−1)
τ
, if b > 1.
(4.23)
For any ﬁnite-variance process (Zt, X it,li , X
j
t,lj
), it follows from Denker and Keller (1983) that
√
n
(Tn(ε)− τ)
Sn
d−→N (0, 1), (4.24)
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.1.
Appendix 4.B Optimal bandwidth sequence (Corollary 4.2.1)
For a given bandwidth ε, the MSE of the test statistic might be rewritten as as sum of variance
and squared bias (Wand and Jones, 1995), i.e.
MSE[Tn(ε)] = Var(Tn(ε)) + Bias(Tn(ε))2, (4.25)
where Bias(Tn(ε)) can be calculated explicitly from the Taylor expansion as in Eq. (4.14) and
variance of the test statistic might be represented as 4S2n/n from Appendix 4.A.1. Asymptotic
covariance terms tend to zero as n → ∞ so that under the null one might ﬁnd that the asymptotic
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variance of Tn(ε) might be decomposed into
Var(Tn(ε)) = Var(fˆZ,Xi,Xj
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]2
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∗
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(
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]2
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]2 + o(1).
One may ﬁnd that the variance and bias of the individual density estimators are o(n−1ε−dW )
and o(ε−2), respectively (Silverman, 1998). Therefore, the dominant terms in the asymptotic
variance are of order o(n−1ε−dZ−dXi−dXj−4).
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions of the MSE of of individual density estimators, one ﬁnds
that the optimum rate of convergence of bandwidth parameter is n−1/(dW+4). Doing the same
for our test statistic, we ﬁnd that this rate is n−1/(dZ+dXi+dXj ). Therefore, for any ﬁnite dimen-
sion, the MSE-optimal rate of convergence of the test statistic’s bandwidth is slightly faster than
those of individual density estimators but never as fast as n−1 which would violate condition
imposed by Eq. (4.10). Provided that the optimum rate of convergence of the individual estima-
tors is sufﬁcient for the consistency (Silverman, 1998), the optimum rate of Tn(εn) guarantees
consistency as well.
Appendix 4.C Data description and results
The Euro STOXX Financials Index consists originally of 61 entities. However, only 48 of them
cover years 2000-2012 (see Table 4.C.1). For all of them we collect daily equity prices and
calculate their log returns accordingly. Data comes from the DataStream and covers period
01/01/2000 till 12/31/2012.
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Table 4.C.1: List of all entities used in the empirical analysis.
Company name/Index Symbol Sector Country
1 Euro STOXX Financials STOXX Aggregate Aggregate
2 Ackermans & Van Haaren ACK Financial Services BE
3 Aegon AEG Insurance NL
4 Ageas AGE Insurance NL
5 Allianz ALL Insurance DE
6 Assicurazioni Generali ASS Insurance IT
7 AXA AXA Insurance FR
8 Bank Of Ireland BIR Banks IR
9 Bankinter BAN Banks ES
10 Banca Monte Dei Paschi PAS Banks IT
11 Banca Popolare Di Milano MIL Banks IT
12 Banca Popolare Di Sondrio SON Banks IT
13 Banca Popolare Emilia Romagna ROM Banks IT
14 BBV Argentaria BBV Banks ES
15 Banco Comr. Portugues POR Banks PT
16 Banco Espirito Santo ESS Banks PT
17 Banco Popolare POP Banks IT
18 Banco Popular Espanol ESP Banks ES
19 Banco Santander SAN Banks ES
20 BNP Paribas BNP Banks FR
21 CNP Assurances CNP Insurance FR
22 Coﬁnimmo COF Real Estate BE
23 Commerzbank COM Banks DE
24 Corio COR Real Estate NL
25 Deutsche Bank DEU Banks DE
26 Erste Group Bank ERS Banks AT
27 Fonciere Des Regions FON Real Estate FR
28 Gecina GEC Real Estate FR
29 GBL New GBL Financial Services BE
30 Societe Generale SOC Banks FR
31 Hannover Ruck. HAN Insurance DE
32 ICADE ICA Real Estate FR
33 Immoﬁnanz IMM Real Estate AT
34 ING Groep ING Insurance NL
35 Intesa Sanpaolo INT Banks IT
36 KBC Group KBC Banks BE
37 Klepierre KLE Real Estate FR
38 Mapfre MAP Insurance ES
39 Mediobanca MED Banks IT
40 Muenchener Ruck. MUE Insurance DE
41 Natixis NAT Banks FR
42 Pohjola Pankki POH Banks FI
43 Sampo SAM Insurance FI
44 SCOR SCO Insurance FR
45 Unibail-Rodamco ROD Real Estate FR
46 UniCredit UNI Banks IT
47 Vienna Insurance Group VIE Insurance AT
48 Wendel WEN Financial Services FR
49 Wereldhave WER Real Estate NL
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Table 4.C.2: NCoVaR from institution i on the system risk in two scenarios in period 01/01/2000
till 12/31/2012 for raw returns. Lags determines the optimal number of lags from the VAR
speciﬁcation using the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion. Optimal epsilon values calculated
from bootstrap. T-val represents the test statistic of NCoVaR from Eq.(4.11). (*),(**), (***)
denotes one-sided p-value statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Institution i System variable Lags Opt. ε T-val Lags Opt. ε T-val
1 ACK STOXX 1 0.54 0.913 1 0.44 1.329*
2 AEG STOXX 1 0.28 6.359*** 1 0.4 2.855***
3 AGE STOXX 4 0.6 0.213 4 0.6 3.516***
4 ALL STOXX 1 0.38 1.45 1 0.2 -6.365
5 ASS STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.22 -6.359
6 AXA STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -3.035
7 BIR STOXX 2 0.6 0.585 2 0.6 2.611***
8 BAN STOXX 1 0.38 -1.262 1 0.22 -3.446
9 PAS STOXX 1 0.32 6.351*** 1 0.2 -4.382
10 MIL STOXX 1 0.24 -6.369 1 0.2 -4.477
11 SON STOXX 1 0.3 -3.854 1 0.3 4.448***
12 ROM STOXX 1 0.48 1.571* 1 0.26 -5.833
13 BBV STOXX 1 0.38 -1.081 1 0.2 -6.361
14 POR STOXX 1 0.26 -6.351 1 0.3 -5.378
15 ESS STOXX 1 0.26 -6.357 1 0.2 -5.44
16 POP STOXX 1 0.32 -1.551 1 0.26 5.359***
17 ESP STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.364
18 SAN STOXX 1 0.2 6.351*** 1 0.42 0.673
19 BNP STOXX 1 0.34 -1.947 1 0.2 -3.121
20 CNP STOXX 1 0.3 0.78 1 0.2 -6.367
21 COF STOXX 1 0.2 -6.351 1 0.2 -6.365
22 COM STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.36
23 COR STOXX 1 0.58 0.411 1 0.22 -6.375
24 DEU STOXX 1 0.24 6.352*** 1 0.24 -6.371
25 ERS STOXX 1 0.38 1.576* 1 0.26 3.295***
26 FON STOXX 1 0.26 -6.357 1 0.32 0.052
27 GEC STOXX 1 0.24 -6.362 1 0.32 -0.389
28 GBL STOXX 1 0.3 -6.359 1 0.42 0.088
29 SOC STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.22 -6.364
30 HAN STOXX 1 0.32 -0.645 1 0.2 -3.911
31 ICA STOXX 1 0.24 -1.474 1 0.34 3.846***
32 IMM STOXX 2 0.6 -0.316 2 0.6 2.684***
33 ING STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.22 -3.734
34 INT STOXX 1 0.28 -2.919 1 0.28 4.994***
35 KBC STOXX 1 0.26 6.352*** 1 0.2 -6.359
36 KLE STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.52 -0.315
37 MAP STOXX 1 0.26 -0.444 1 0.22 -6.371
38 MED STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.361
39 MUE STOXX 1 0.28 -6.351 1 0.2 -6.357
40 NAT STOXX 1 0.26 1.417* 1 0.28 -4.937
41 POH STOXX 1 0.28 6.352*** 1 0.24 -3.925
42 SAM STOXX 1 0.6 -0.026 1 0.28 -4.666
43 SCO STOXX 1 0.32 -2.487 1 0.2 -6.365
44 ROD STOXX 1 0.52 0.239 1 0.24 -6.377
45 UNI STOXX 1 0.28 6.352*** 1 0.3 5.886***
46 VIE STOXX 1 0.32 3.747*** 1 0.2 -6.362
47 WEN STOXX 1 0.24 4.733*** 1 0.22 -6.364
48 WER STOXX 1 0.3 3.34*** 1 0.44 1.572*
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Table 4.C.3: NCoVaR from institution i on the system risk in two scenarios in period 01/01/2000
till 12/31/2012 for VAR-ﬁltered returns. Lags determines the optimal number of lags from the
VAR speciﬁcation using the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion. Optimal epsilon values cal-
culated from bootstrap. T-val represents the test statistic of NCoVaR from Eq.(4.11). (*),(**),
(***) denotes one-sided p-value statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Institution i System variable Lags Opt. ε T-val Lags Opt. ε T-val
1 ACK STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.44 1.417*
2 AEG STOXX 1 0.24 6.355*** 1 0.2 -6.36
3 AGE STOXX 1 0.38 0.983 1 0.24 5.506***
4 ALL STOXX 1 0.36 0.247 1 0.2 -6.363
5 ASS STOXX 1 0.3 -2.589 1 0.22 -6.361
6 AXA STOXX 1 0.32 6.353*** 1 0.2 -6.358
7 BIR STOXX 1 0.22 -6.362 1 0.32 4.329***
8 BAN STOXX 1 0.28 -2.625 1 0.2 -6.36
9 PAS STOXX 1 0.34 6.35*** 1 0.3 5.469***
10 MIL STOXX 1 0.34 -5.756 1 0.2 -3.407
11 SON STOXX 1 0.36 4.458*** 1 0.2 -5.44
12 ROM STOXX 1 0.34 2.491*** 1 0.22 -5.627
13 BBV STOXX 1 0.2 6.35*** 1 0.2 -6.36
14 POR STOXX 1 0.32 -6.36 1 0.24 -6.336
15 ESS STOXX 1 0.36 1.998*** 1 0.24 5.202***
16 POP STOXX 1 0.34 -3.085 1 0.3 4.667***
17 ESP STOXX 1 0.36 2.102** 1 0.26 -6.375
18 SAN STOXX 1 0.2 6.351*** 1 0.44 -0.077
19 BNP STOXX 1 0.22 6.35*** 1 0.2 -6.356
20 CNP STOXX 1 0.34 -0.525 1 0.2 -6.374
21 COF STOXX 1 0.34 -2.344 1 0.2 -6.363
22 COM STOXX 1 0.4 3.693*** 1 0.2 -6.354
23 COR STOXX 1 0.6 0.627 1 0.24 -6.38
24 DEU STOXX 1 0.32 6.355*** 1 0.22 -6.366
25 ERS STOXX 1 0.36 0.493 1 0.34 1.903**
26 FON STOXX 1 0.3 -6.355 1 0.3 0.633
27 GEC STOXX 1 0.34 4.518*** 1 0.46 -0.53
28 GBL STOXX 1 0.26 -2.699 1 0.38 3.204***
29 SOC STOXX 1 0.2 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.36
30 HAN STOXX 1 0.32 -6.35 1 0.2 -2.984
31 ICA STOXX 1 0.32 0.502 1 0.32 4.231***
32 IMM STOXX 1 0.58 0.962 1 0.32 4.231***
33 ING STOXX 1 0.26 6.35*** 1 0.24 -6.363
34 INT STOXX 1 0.34 -4.345 1 0.28 3.23***
35 KBC STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.358
36 KLE STOXX 1 0.36 2.593*** 1 0.36 3.947***
37 MAP STOXX 1 0.48 1.519* 1 0.2 -6.364
38 MED STOXX 1 0.2 6.35*** 1 0.2 -6.364
39 MUE STOXX 1 0.24 -6.35 1 0.2 -6.354
40 NAT STOXX 1 0.28 1.093 1 0.3 -4.97
41 POH STOXX 1 0.32 6.353*** 1 0.44 0.314
42 SAM STOXX 1 0.52 -0.857 1 0.2 -6.362
43 SCO STOXX 1 0.32 0.759 1 0.2 -6.364
44 ROD STOXX 1 0.5 -0.401 1 0.24 -6.38
45 UNI STOXX 1 0.3 6.351*** 1 0.28 5.673***
46 VIE STOXX 1 0.34 0.611 1 0.3 2.273***
47 WEN STOXX 1 0.26 6.368*** 1 0.2 -6.359
48 WER STOXX 1 0.32 -2.424 1 0.22 -6.37
APPENDIX 4.C. DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS
Table 4.C.3: NCoVaR from institution i on the system risk in two scenarios in period 01/01/2000
till 12/31/2012 for GARCH-ﬁltered returns. Lags determines the number of lags used in the test.
Optimal epsilon values calculated from bootstrap. T-val represents the test statistic of NCoVaR
from Eq.(4.11). (*),(**), (***) denotes one-sided p-value statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Institution i System variable Lags Opt. ε T-val Lags Opt. ε T-val
1 ACK STOXX 1 0.54 0.913 1 0.44 1.329*
2 AEG STOXX 1 0.28 6.359*** 1 0.4 2.855***
3 AGE STOXX 1 0.25 6.362*** 1 0.23 -4.646
4 ALL STOXX 1 0.38 1.45* 1 0.21 -6.366
5 ASS STOXX 1 0.23 6.351*** 1 0.21 -6.359
6 AXA STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -3.035
7 BIR STOXX 1 0.25 -4.733 1 0.21 5.319***
8 BAN STOXX 1 0.38 -1.262 1 0.23 -3.61
9 PAS STOXX 1 0.32 6.351*** 1 0.2 -4.382
10 MIL STOXX 1 0.24 -6.369 1 0.21 -4.477
11 SON STOXX 1 0.3 -3.854 1 0.31 4.083***
12 ROM STOXX 1 0.27 6.351*** 1 0.27 -5.883
13 BBV STOXX 1 0.25 6.352*** 1 0.21 -6.362
14 POR STOXX 1 0.26 -6.351 1 0.3 -5.378
15 ESS STOXX 1 0.26 -6.357 1 0.21 -5.771
16 POP STOXX 1 0.29 -4.344 1 0.27 4.958***
17 ESP STOXX 1 0.27 6.351*** 1 0.21 -6.364
18 SAN STOXX 1 0.21 6.351*** 1 0.43 0.418
19 BNP STOXX 1 0.34 -1.947 1 0.2 -3.121
20 CNP STOXX 1 0.31 0.531 1 0.21 -6.37
21 COF STOXX 1 0.2 -6.351 1 0.21 -6.365
22 COM STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.36
23 COR STOXX 1 0.25 2.84*** 1 0.21 -6.371
24 DEU STOXX 1 0.23 6.352*** 1 0.23 -6.37
25 ERS STOXX 1 0.38 1.576* 1 0.27 3.141***
26 FON STOXX 1 0.26 -6.357 1 0.32 0.052
27 GEC STOXX 1 0.24 -6.362 1 0.33 -0.46
28 GBL STOXX 1 0.3 -6.359 1 0.42 0.088
29 SOC STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.22 -6.364
30 HAN STOXX 1 0.27 -3.068 1 0.2 -3.911
31 ICA STOXX 1 0.25 -3.335 1 0.34 3.846***
32 IMM STOXX 1 0.22 -6.361 1 0.35 4.183***
33 ING STOXX 1 0.26 6.351*** 1 0.22 -3.734
34 INT STOXX 1 0.26 6.352*** 1 0.2 -6.359
35 KBC STOXX 1 0.24 6.351*** 1 0.52 -0.315
36 KLE STOXX 1 0.26 -0.444 1 0.22 -6.371
37 MAP STOXX 1 0.25 1.432* 1 0.28 4.994***
38 MED STOXX 1 0.27 6.351*** 1 0.2 -6.361
39 MUE STOXX 1 0.29 -6.351 1 0.2 -6.357
40 NAT STOXX 1 0.27 0.34 1 0.28 -4.937
41 POH STOXX 1 0.29 6.352*** 1 0.24 -3.925
42 SAM STOXX 1 0.59 -0.147 1 0.2 -6.362
43 SCO STOXX 1 0.32 -2.487 1 0.2 -6.365
44 ROD STOXX 1 0.52 0.239 1 0.23 -6.375
45 UNI STOXX 1 0.28 6.352*** 1 0.3 5.886***
46 VIE STOXX 1 0.32 3.747*** 1 0.2 -6.362
47 WEN STOXX 1 0.25 4.869*** 1 0.22 -6.364
48 WER STOXX 1 0.25 6.352*** 1 0.45 1.411*

Chapter 5
Do Safe Havens Make Asset Markets
Safer?
5.1 Introduction
Over the past half-decade, since the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis, asset prices and capital
ﬂows have gyrated and their movements have differed strongly across different groups of coun-
tries. In particular, some countries (let us call them “safe havens”) experienced strong inﬂows
into sovereign bond markets while others found their most liquid markets drying up. Has the
presence of these safe haven ﬂows changed the resilience of the global ﬁnancial network that
was buffeted by repeated shocks since 2007? In this chapter we present some stylized facts on
the role of safe havens in spreading or containing contagion.
A rapidly expanding literature has documented contagion across asset prices and, in particu-
lar, between sovereign and bank debt. Several authors have provided evidence of cross-country
contagion in long-term sovereign bond yields (Basurto et al., 2010; Gilmore et al., 2010) or
sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads (Caporin et al., 2012) for euro area countries
or a broader sample of European countries, the US, and Japan. While there is some concern
that strong sovereign-sovereign correlations simply reﬂect correlations in fundamental ﬁnan-
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cial factors, especially short-term interest rates (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2007), Mody (2009)
has shown that 2007 was a turning point in sovereign-sovereign correlations with increasing
differentiation according to credit risk. In addition to sovereign-sovereign correlations, several
authors have also documented sovereign-bank contagion. After bank bailout episodes and ﬁnan-
cial rescue packages in the euro area, the correlation between bank and sovereign CDS spreads
increased signiﬁcantly (Acharya et al., 2011), and bank and sovereign CDS spreads’ sensitiv-
ity to a global risk factor became more similar (Ejsing and Lemke, 2011). Also outside these
ﬁnancial rescue episodes, Merton et al. (2013) show rising correlations between sovereign and
bank CDS spreads. By estimating correlations, this literature has essentially mapped the shape
of the network of asset prices, whether around periods of stress or over longer time spans. To
our knowledge, the literature has not yet analyzed how this network’s shape affects contagion
once a shock enters this network.
Several authors have shown network measures to be signiﬁcant correlates of banking system
and general ﬁnancial system stress. Minoiu et al. (2013) found rising interconnectedness (mea-
sured as clustering coefﬁcients and degree centrality) in the global network of cross-border
banking exposures from the BIS locational statistics to be signiﬁcant predictors of systemic
banking crises. So were degree and betweenness centrality in a bank-level network of syndi-
cated loans (Caballero, 2012). At the same time, increased connectivity in the same network
fostered trade (Hale et al., 2013). While the previous papers related mainly to the pre-crisis
period, Chinazzi et al. (2013) found that degree centrality in a network of cross-country debt
and equity exposures was a signiﬁcant predictor of the drop growth and stock market volatility
during the crisis. The measures these authors used were country-level measures of a country’s
position in the network. While these are useful to predict crises or trade in any particular coun-
try, they do not explain the dynamics of contagion from a crisis. In contrast, here we do not
attempt to predict a crisis or any other shock but, contingent on a shock occurring somewhere,
we trace how contagion travels through global asset prices.
Blending elements of the literatures on asset price contagion and exposure networks, we
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examine how the shape of the global network of asset price co-movements has been conducive
(or not) to the spread of contagion. We hone in on a particular group of countries with unique
characteristics, the safe haven countries, and their role in amplifying or slowing the spread
of contagion across borders and asset classes. In particular, we ﬁnd important differences in
sovereign-bank feedback loops between safe haven and non-safe haven countries. This dis-
tinction comes out more clearly in our sample than in those of previous authors because we
deliberately expand it to include many emerging markets (50 sovereigns) and individual banks
(331 banks). To achieve this larger sample, we rely on sovereign bond yields and bank equity
prices, which in many countries are more liquid than CDS spreads. By using individual bank
data, we are able to distinguish sovereign-bank correlations between more and less systemic
banks which are too big to fail to different degrees.
The existing literature on safe havens has deﬁned safe haven assets as hedges of returns
on reference portfolios during times of ﬁnancial stress or rising risk aversion. This literature
has examined exchange rates (Beck and Rahbari, 2008; Habib and Stracca, 2012; Ranaldo and
So¨derlind, 2010), gold (Baur andMcDermott, 2010), or sovereign bonds (Hartmann et al., 2004)
as hedges against stock market risk. To our knowledge, the literature has not deﬁned safe haven
status based on the potential for sovereign bonds to serve as hedges against individual banking
risk. Since ours is a network of sovereign bond yields and individual bank equity returns, we
prefer a deﬁnition of safe havens relevant to our data instead of one that is exogenous to our
data set. However, our deﬁnition, as we show below, does not deviate more from common usage
than other deﬁnitions in the literature or deﬁnitions used by ﬁnancial market participants.
Our deﬁnition of a safe haven country explicitly treats sovereign bonds as possible safe
haven assets when banks (not the stock market more generally) are under stress: safe havens
are those countries where bank equity prices and sovereign bond yields move strongly in tan-
dem. If bank equity prices and sovereign bond yields were purely driven by country-level credit
risk, one would have expected the opposite: if credit risk rises, sovereign bond yields increase
and bank equity prices fall. In contrast, where credit risk is of negligible concern, i.e. in safe
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havens, expectations about future growth and monetary policy become predominant: an im-
proving growth outlook raises bank equity prices and the expectation of tightening monetary
policy which, in turn, puts pressure on sovereign bond yields.
Hence, by deﬁnition, safe havens are countries without sovereign-bank feedback loops that
amplify shocks to both banks and sovereigns. For example, contagion from a global shock
that simultaneously raises bond yields and reduces bank equity prices in a safe haven could
trigger the expectation of a monetary policy response in the safe haven that would raise bank
equity prices and reduce sovereign bond yields. In contrast, outside safe havens, a similar
shock could trigger concerns about credit risk and set in motion self-fulﬁlling bank-sovereign
feedback loops. It turns out, however, that in our network, this benign property of safe havens is
offset by a less benign one. In particular, safe havens tend to have stronger sovereign-sovereign
and stronger bank-bank correlations than non-safe havens. As a result, if a shock arrives in safe
havens, they can propagate shocks to other countries faster than non-safe havens. Which of the
two effects dominates depends on the nature of the shock and the nature of the broader network.
In our sample, we ﬁnd that, on balance, safe havens amplify shocks (although to varying degrees
depending on the shock).
In the next section, we describe our data, followed by our deﬁnition of safe havens and
their properties in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the global network structure of sovereign
bond yields and bank equity returns. In Sections 5.5 and 5.6, we document some stylized
facts of feedback loops in shock propagation. In Section 5.7, we examine the role of the two
characteristics of safe havens in amplifying or dampening shock propagation. Several of these
facts raise intriguing questions, summarized in Section 5.8, that are left for further research.
5.2 Data
We use daily changes in 5-year bond yields of 50 sovereigns and daily log changes in bank eq-
uity prices of 331 individual banks using Bloomberg data.1 Because of limited data availability
1The results are broadly robust to including the smaller sample using 10-year bond yields.
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in the 1990s, the time span for our network of global bank equity prices and sovereign bond
yields comprises 2000-2013. The full sample is divided into four subsamples: years 2000-2006
(Great Moderation), 2007-2009 (Subprime Crisis), 2010-2012 (Sovereign Debt Crisis), 2013
(Emerging Markets (EM) Stress).2 We adjust the daily data for time zones and exchange rate
changes.
For each bank-bank, sovereign-sovereign, and bank-sovereign pair, we calculate bilateral
Pearson correlation coefﬁcients between bank equity price log changes and sovereign bond
yield changes over each of our four subperiods. Ideally, we would have used measures that
explicitly incorporate causality, e.g . Granger (1969) causality or spillover coefﬁcients as in
Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), but the estimations necessary to derive these measures would typ-
ically have constrained our sample size. Therefore, here we begin by focusing on simple cor-
relations.3 To eliminate spurious correlations, we set the correlations between sovereigns and
banks outside their countries to zero.4
We call our network G(V,E) a representation of a set of nodes V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, con-
nected by a set of edges E ⊂ V × V . For now, the strength of the edge between two adjacent
nodes is determined by our Pearson correlation coefﬁcient. Formally, we may represent a net-
work G in a matrix form, denote it by An×n, where all diagonal elements are equal to zero,
i.e. the relation between the same assets is irrelevant, and elements aij represent the correlation
between assets i and j. Since we use time adjusted data, matrix A is not symmetric, making
the network directed, i.e. aij = aji for some i and j. Formally, if we denote the number of
sovereigns by ns and number of banking sectors by nb, one may rewrite the complete network
as a block matrixB(ns+nb)×(ns+nb), where two diagonal blocks represent the individual networks
2The majority of the euro zone countries provide sovereign bond yields ranging back to 1994. Therefore, we
consider this as a special case and we devote Box 1 to analyze the situation in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) individually over the years 1994-2012.
3In principle, shocks can of course also jump from equity and bank stock prices to interbank money markets or
foreign exchange markets. We will consider these asset classes in future research.
4While this does mean that, e.g. the correlation between the Greek sovereign bond yield and a French bank’s
equity price is eliminated by assumption, it also avoids many spurious correlations, e.g. between the Finnish
sovereign and Argentinian banks. Here, to avoid the many spurious correlations at the cost of eliminating some
valid ones, we remove all sovereign-bank correlations except those within each country.
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and the remaining blocks are zeros except for the case when the sovereign and banks refer to
the same country.
Fig. 5.1 shows the distribution of correlations over our four subperiods. The bulk of them are
inside the 95% conﬁdence interval [−0.2,+0.2] for Pearson correlation coefﬁcients and, hence,
statistically insigniﬁcant. This is especially the case for bank-sovereign correlations where less
than one-ﬁfth of the correlations are statistically signiﬁcantly negative or positive. Sovereign-
sovereign correlations are stronger than bank-bank and, even more so, bank-sovereign correla-
tions (the distribution of sovereign correlations is further to the right and has fatter tails than
that of bank-bank or bank-sovereign correlations). In addition, even if not visible in Fig. 5.1,
within-country bank-bank correlations are stronger than cross-country bank-bank correlations.
Negative correlations between sovereigns and other sovereigns or banks and other banks are
rare. Negative correlations among sovereigns are conﬁned to a few country pairs.5
In aggregate, correlations strengthened in 2007-09 but by 2013 had fallen back to pre-crisis
levels (the right tail of all three distributions moved sharply out in 2007-09 but has since moved
back inwards). The number of strong bank-sovereign correlations has shrunk even below pre-
crisis levels.
The global ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis triggered increasing cluster-
ing of sovereign and bank asset prices. Fig. 5.2 shows the distribution of clustering coefﬁcients
(loosely speaking, the share of “friends” that are also “friends” with each other) for bank eq-
uity prices (Fagiolo, 2007). The distribution shifted sharply to the right as banks equity prices
became strongly correlated globally in 2007-09 and regionally in 2010-12. Since then, there
has been some reversion towards 2000-06 norms. Similarly, clustering of sovereign bond yields
increased sharply in 2007-09 and even more so in 2010-12. The rightward shift of the distribu-
5In 2000-06, they include the US against 14 EU countries and Switzerland. In 2007-09, they include Japan
against several advance and emerging market commodity producers (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico,
Brazil, South Africa, Turkey), the US against Switzerland, and Colombia against several Asian and European
emerging markets (China, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Slovakia, Ukraine). In 2010-12, there is only one neg-
ative correlation, between Japan and the US. In 2013, negative correlations are between the US and large emerging
markets (Brazil, Turkey, Hungary, Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa) and/or commodity pro-
ducers (Australia, New Zealand, Norway) and global ﬁnancial centers (Japan, Switzerland, UK).
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of correlations at the sovereign, bank and sovereign-bank levels.
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tion 2007-09 reﬂects a stronger clustering especially in Asia whereas the rightward shift of the
distribution in 2010-12 reﬂects especially a stronger clustering in Europe.
5.3 Deﬁning safe havens
We distinguish between “safe havens” and “non-safe havens” on the basis of their correlation
between sovereign bond yields and bank equity prices. For advanced countries, including the
US, the positive correlation between sovereign bond yields and prices of riskier assets has been
documented by Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) and Pandl (2013). In contrast, for emerging mar-
kets, Drainville et al. (2011) show a negative correlation between bond yields and bank equity
prices and speculate that this reﬂects strongly correlated risk premia of EM assets.
Here, we also base our deﬁnition on the correlation between sovereign bond yields as po-
tentially the safe assets, and individual bank equity returns as the riskier assets. Speciﬁcally,
we deﬁne countries as “safe havens” if daily changes of sovereign bond yields and bank equity
prices are signiﬁcantly positively correlated (correlation > 0.2). The rationale is as follows.
Long term sovereign bond yields can be broadly decomposed into two components: (i)
expectations of average future short-term interest rates and (ii) a premium that investors require
for bearing the (e.g., credit, liquidity) risk of a long-term bond investment. The expectations
component (i) is driven by inﬂation expectations and expectations of future real rates of return,
which depend on future economic growth. The risk premium component (ii) is determined
by the degree of uncertainty about these future developments and by the degree of investors’
risk aversion. Similarly, bank equity prices can be decomposed into a component that reﬂects
expectations of future proﬁtability and a risk premium.
During a downturn, a pessimistic economic outlook drives down bank equity prices; the
expectation of a loosening monetary policy response drives down sovereign bond yields. This
is our expectations component (i). Separately, rising risk aversion during a downturn induces
investors to turn away from riskier assets to safer ones. This reduces yields on safe assets and
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of clustering coefﬁcients for bank equity price correlations and
sovereign bond yield correlations. Source: Fagiolo (2007).
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raises yields (i.e. reduces prices) of riskier assets. This is our risk premium component (ii).
In safe haven countries, sovereign bonds are considered safe assets. Hence, both effects
generate a positive correlation between bank equity prices and sovereign bond yields.
In contrast, in non-safe haven countries, sovereign bonds are not considered a “safe asset”
to which investors will turn when risk aversion rises. As global risk aversion rises, therefore,
investors will move out of both sovereign bonds and bank equity, sovereign bond yields will rise
while bank equity prices fall, and, for a given economic outlook, a negative correlation between
sovereign bond yields and bank equity prices will emerge. Since expectations about economic
outlook and risk aversion drive the correlation between sovereign bond yields and bank equity
prices into opposite directions, the sign of overall correlation is ambiguous.
Safe havens thus deﬁned vary over time (Table 5.1). Japan, Germany, Finland and the
United States have been considered safe havens throughout our sample period. But some euro
area countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain lost their safe haven
status during the European crisis. Other countries gained safe haven status as the global ﬁnancial
crisis unfolded, including some commodity exporting countries such as Canada and Australia.
As European economies are crawling out of recession against the backdrop of public and pri-
vate deleveraging and as emerging markets are slowing down, many European economies and
oil producers with close trade and ﬁnancial links to emerging markets lost their safe haven sta-
tus, including Australia, Canada, the UK, and Switzerland. How does our deﬁnition compare
with other deﬁnitions of safe havens? Fig. 5.3 shows our list of safe havens against two other
deﬁnitions:
• countries with AAA ratings from S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s (similar to deﬁnition used in
the International Monetary Fund (2012));
• “negative-beta” countries whose sovereign bond yields are negatively correlated with
global (here, S&P500) equity prices, a commonly used deﬁnition among ﬁnancial market
analysts.
In particular, Luxembourg, Singapore, and some Northern European countries are not identiﬁed
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Table 5.1: “Safe havens”: positive co-movement between sovereign yields and bank equity.
2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013
Austria 0 1 0 0
Australia 0 1 1 0
Belgium 1 1 0 0
Canada 0 1 1 0
Denmark 0 0 1 0
Finland 0 1 1 1
France 1 1 0 0
Germany 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 0 0
Japan 1 1 1 1
Norway 0 1 0 0
Netherlands 1 0 0 0
Portugal 0 1 0 0
Spain 1 1 0 0
Sweden 1 1 1 0
Switzerland 1 1 1 0
UK 1 1 1 0
US 1 1 1 1
as safe havens by our deﬁnition even though they are either AAA-rated or can be considered
“negative beta” countries. Note that all these countries have ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. Our
expectations channel that distinguishes safe havens from others, and which works through ex-
pected monetary policy changes, would therefore be not expected to be strong.
5.4 Mapping the network of sovereign bond yields and bank
equity
For visual clarity, we can only show a subset of all the pairwise links. As discussed above,
sovereign-sovereign correlations tend to be much higher than bank-bank correlations and bank-
sovereign correlations tend to be the weakest. To make sure that at least some links in each data
set are represented, we select the strongest 10 percent of sovereign-sovereign, bank-bank, and
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Figure 5.3: Safe havens by three deﬁnitions.
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bank-sovereign links.6
Fig. 5.A.1 shows the characteristics of sovereign-sovereign interconnectedness. Pre-crisis
(2000-06), Singapore and, less directly, Korea were the main “bridges” between Emerging
Asian and European sovereign bond yields. Since the crisis, sovereign bond yields in Emerging
Asia have been drawn into the group of advanced country sovereign bond yield correlations.
European sovereign bond yields remain the most closely intertwined, despite some recent
weakening of links with some of the periphery. In contrast, correlations with North American
sovereign bond yields have weakened since the pre-crisis period.
Fig. 5.A.2 shows the characteristics of bank-bank interconnectedness. Pre-crisis (2000-06),
there were few strong bank-bank correlations and they were conﬁned to individual regions,
Europe in particular, or individual countries. The global ﬁnancial crisis (2007-09) tightened
these disparate pre-crisis groups into one knot of cross-border correlations between bank equity
returns. One Singaporean bank tied this tight global cluster to Asian-Paciﬁc banks. Since
then (2010-12) only the European cluster remains tightly intertwined (see also Box 1 for euro
area countries) whereas other countries’ bank equity prices have drifted out of the dense global
cluster.
In our sample, bank links across countries are signiﬁcantly smaller than bank links within a
country. There are only a few strong cross-border correlations outside Europe: in Asia-Paciﬁc
(Singapore and Australia) and North America (Canada and the US).
During the European crisis (2010-12), Asian and Latin American banks decoupled from
banks in other advanced economies. In Asia, two cross-country bank clusters remained strong:
one including individual Australian, Singaporean, Korean, and Malaysian banks and another
including banks in Hong Kong and China. In Europe, banks in Greece and Cyprus separated
from the main European cluster.
In Figs 5.A.3-5.A.5, for individual country groups, we parse the network for cross-country
chains of correlations between banks and sovereigns.
6Due to space constraints, we only show the networks up to 2010-12. However, networks for 2013 do not
materially differ from those for 2010-12.
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• Emerging Asia:7 Signiﬁcant (negative) correlations between sovereign bond yields and
bank equity prices were present within each country. In contrast to these within-country
correlations, cross-country correlations between sovereign bond markets and banking sec-
tor were relatively weak prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis. This suggests that sovereign-
bank feedback loops have played an important role in propagating shocks in emerg-
ing Asian economies domestically (despite the size and relative impact compare to the
European countries) whereas cross-country contagion through either sovereign or bank-
ing channels was more muted. At the height of the global ﬁnancial crisis (2007-09),
sovereign-bank linkages strengthened in almost all the emerging Asian economies: shocks
from European banks were tramsmitted through Singapore to other Asian banks which
further propagated them to Asian sovereigns. During the subsequent euro area crisis
(2010-12), sovereign-bank links weakened again whereas bank-bank links tightened, es-
pecially with European banks. Singaporean banks have continued to be the cross-continental
“bridge”, affecting directly Thailand, China, Malaysia, and indirectly India and Indone-
sia. In contrast, Philippine and (some) Korean banks decoupled from the rest.
• Emerging Europe: Like emerging Asian countries, Turkey, Poland and Hungary (less
in magnitude than the other two) bank equity prices were highly correlated with their
own countries’ sovereign bond yields. During the global ﬁnancial crisis (2007-09), both
sovereign-bank links and cross-country banking sector linkages strengthened, contribut-
ing to stronger contagion. Stress in Turkey’s tightly-linked banking sector could poten-
tially affect both sovereigns and banks in Poland and Hungary through the banking chan-
nel. During the subsequent European crisis (2010-12), Turkey decoupled from Poland
and Hungary which remain together in a tightly interconnected cluster. Turkey and Ro-
mania developed into two highly correlated within-country groups.
• GIIPS and Cyprus: Unlike in emerging Asian and European countries, sovereign-bank in-
terconnections were weak prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis. During the global ﬁnancial
7Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, China, India.
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crisis (2007-09), Spanish and Italian banks began to be highly correlated with core Euro-
pean banks whereas the Greek and Cypriot banks formed a separate group of strong bank-
bank correlation. Sovereign-bank linkages remained quite weak, however. As the Euro-
pean crisis deepened (2010-12), aside from higher interconnectedness of global banks,
sovereign-bank inter-linkages also strengthened. Take Spain for example. Stress in bank
6 would have ﬁrst affected Spain’s sovereign which then could have propagated it most
strongly to banks 2, 4 and 7 which, in turn, are highly correlated with Austrian and Ital-
ian banks, etc. Similar contagion chains can be drawn for Belgium, Portugal, Italy and
Austria. Greece and Cyprus remained decoupled from the other European banks and
sovereigns during this period.
Box 1. Clustering and declustering of the euro zone community in sovereign bond yields.
Since data is available from 1994, we construct a time line of the evolution of the network
of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign bond yields in 12 EMU and later euro
area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain). We can detect a changing core community in Europe
over time. By a community, we understand a part of the global network where the inter-
connectedness is relatively higher than to the rest of the network. In order to distinguish
communities we apply the random-walk algorithm developed by Rosvall and Bergstrom
(2007).
In 1994-1996 the core of the EMU: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands, built a separate cluster, visibly distinct from all remaining countries. In 1997-1999,
Italy and Spain joined the core EMU cluster, and Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Finland joined
it in 2000-2006. As might be expected from its late membership in the euro area in 2009,
Slovakia did not join the community.
In 2010-2012 the core cluster partly dissolved. Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Portugal
separated completely, whereas Italy and Spain joined a common cluster.
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Box Figure 1: The evolution of the clustering structure in the sovereign bond yields within the euro zone
network. Source: Graph prepared by the software delivered by the courtesy of Rosvall and Bergstrom (2007).
Note: GIIPS countries are shown in red. Lines refer to clusters. For instance in 2000-2006 all the countries
except for Slovakia joined one big cluster of sovereigns.
5.5 Modeling shock propagation
To investigate how shocks are propagated in this network we adapt a standard model from the
disease spreading literature, developed by Jammazi and Aloui (2012). Every period each node
propagates the cumulative shock it has received to all adjacent nodes. The impact of the shock
is weighted by the strength of the link between the nodes. To keep it simple, we make two
simplifying assumptions in our use of Jammazi and Aloui (2012). Firstly, we assume that nodes
are neutral, i.e. our nodes cannot stop shock propagation, so that the propagation depends on the
network structure only. Secondly, we do not put any boundaries on nodes’ absorptive capacity,
i.e. our nodes cannot slow down shock propagation, as it could hamper the actual cascade effect
observed in ﬁnancial markets. The details of the shock propagation mechanism are described
in Appendix 5.B.
Our shock propagation exercise inherently assumes some degree of causality: a shock is
“triggered” in one country and “passed on” to others. While the correlations themselves are
agnostic on the direction of causality, we posit that causality is unlikely to run from small
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entities to large entities. For example, the 93 percent correlation between changes of the 5-
year sovereign bond yields of Ireland and Germany in 2010-12 is more likely to reﬂect the
Irish sovereign bond market responding to shocks in Germany than vice versa. To capture
this discrepancy when the source market is much smaller than the destination market, we scale
the correlation between the two entities down proportionately to the relative size: We weight
each correlation by the relative size of the source’s and destination’s total assets (for banks)
or government debt (for sovereigns), capping the weight at one. (In future research, we aim
to determine the direction of causality of the correlation in a less ad hoc manner, e.g. by
using Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) spillover coefﬁcients or including Granger (1969) causality
measures.)
We simulate two types of shocks, one in each of our markets: a sovereign bond yield shock
and a bank equity price shock. The initial shock is assumed to be a 1 percent increase in
either sovereign bond yields or in daily bank equity prices. For example, in the ﬁrst step, the
source country’s sovereign bond yield is increased by 1 percent. All the adjacent countries’
(destinations’) sovereign bond yields are then impacted by their (weighted) correlations with
the source country sovereign bond yield. Also, the local banks’ equity prices are affected by
their correlation with their home sovereign bond yield. In the second step, the destination
countries themselves become the countries of origins of the next round of shocks: each of them
propagates the shock they received in the previous round to all their partner countries. The
mechanism repeats step after step and in each step we calculate the cumulative effects of shock
propagation in all the countries. We simulate shocks in three subsets of countries: a random
shock in any country of the network, a simultaneous shock in all the GIIPS countries (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), or a simultaneous shock in all the Fragile Five countries
(Indonesia, India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa).
Two more caveats are in order. Firstly, by assumption, there is nothing in our experiment
that stops shock propagation; in practice, of course, policy steps would (and did) contain shock
propagation. Of course, these policy interventions are also implicit in our estimated correla-
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tions. Nevertheless, for now we interpret our results as counterfactuals that may have occurred,
had modest additional shocks happened and/or had there been no additional policy measures.
Secondly, our experiment does not say anything about the speed of contagion from shocks.
Since almost all sovereigns bond yields and all bank equity prices have at least some corre-
lation (even if small) and we do not exclude any by assumption. Therefore, the network is
complete, i.e. a shock in any one part of the network will immediately travel to all other parts
of the network. Instead of speed of contagion, our results are indicative of the size of the impact
and the ampliﬁcation over time of an initial shock on each country and on average. Although
the steps have no time dimension, they show the path along which a shock travels around the
network. Therefore, in our results below, we retain the notion of distinct steps for illustrative
purposes.
5.6 Feedback loops in shock propagation
Feedback loops, even along the relatively weak sovereign-bank correlations in our data set,
spread a shock from one asset class into another, where it can then proliferate and return to the
initial asset class. We test the effect of feedback loops in sovereign bond contagion by com-
paring shock propagation under two scenarios: the actual network of sovereign-sovereign and
bank-sovereign correlations and a counterfactual network where we assume all bank-sovereign
links are zero, i.e. a counterfactual network in which feedback loops are not possible. In our
counterfactual network without bank-sovereign links, a sovereign bond yield shock would not
travel into the banking system at all and vice versa.
5.6.1 Sovereign bond yield shock
Fig. 5.4 shows the results of a sovereign bond shock in the GIIPS, the Fragile Five, or any
country. Each line displays the average impact on sovereign bond yields of a 1 percent bond
yield shock in any country (bottom panel), the GIIPS (top right panel), or the Fragile Five (top
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left panel). We measure the impact relative to the impact under a baseline scenario: the baseline
scenario is one where we assume all bank-sovereign feedback loops are zero. On average,
feedback loops have ampliﬁed the impact of sovereign bond yield shocks (all curves are above
1). However, the strength of feedback loops varies across countries and over time depending on
the source of the shock.8
On average, the ampliﬁcation of feedback loops in 2013 is broadly similar for sovereign
bond yield shocks in the Fragile Five and in the GIIPS (the curves in the top left chart are about
level with those in the top right chart). We speculate that a sovereign bond shock propagates
strongly in the highly interconnected sovereign bond yield network. It thus reaches countries
with strong bank-sovereign feedback loops quickly and strongly, independent of the source of
shocks. (This contrasts with a bank shock, see Section 5.6.2.) Not surprisingly, shocks in an
average single country propagate less fast than shocks originating in all of the GIIPS or Fragile
Five (the curve in the bottom chart is below those in the top right and top left charts).
For both Fragile Five and GIIPS sovereign shocks, the ampliﬁcation by feedback loops has
strengthened in 2013 compared with 2010-12 (the curve for 2013 is above that for 2010-12).
This reﬂects a strengthening of bank-sovereign correlations in both sets of countries over these
two periods. In the case of the GIIPS, for which earlier data are available, feedback loops are
now only little stronger than pre-crisis.9
The weak impact of feedback loops in the case of a GIIPS shock in 2010-12 raises the
possibility of an interesting interpretation. Shock propagation among asset prices may have
been short-circuited by policy interventions, of which there were many in Europe during 2010-
12. In 2013, when there were fewer policy actions targeted at dampening GIIPS shocks, a
similar GIIPS shock would have propagated more strongly.
This contrasts with a shock in any single country which triggers broadly unchanged feed-
8The statistical signiﬁcance of the differences in shock propagation between various settings and years depend
on the size of the initial shock and the number of steps the shock has traveled across the network. Therefore, for
presentational clarity, we do not report them in the main body of the text. The exercise aims to illustrate the general
patterns of shock propagation in different years with different network structures.
9Data is not available for India and Turkey from mid-/late-2001, for Indonesia from 2003, and for Brazil from
2007.
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Figure 5.4: Average impact of bond market shock on global sovereign bond yields, with feed-
back loops (in multiples of average impact of same shock on sovereign bond yields without
feedback loops).
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back loops. The correlation of the Fragile Five and GIIPS sovereign bond yields with their
banks’ equity prices (already well above the sample average) increased more than for the av-
erage country between 2010-12 and 2013. As a result, these correlations intensiﬁed feedback
loops from shocks originating from the GIIPS and Fragile Five.
Table 5.2 traces how feedback loops ampliﬁed sovereign bond yield shocks in the GIIPS or
the Fragile Five in 2010-12. A redder tone indicates greater ampliﬁcation by feedback loops.
For example, feedback loops would have intensiﬁed the impact of a sovereign bond yield shock
in the GIIPS initially (Step 1) more strongly (light orange) to the euro area core than the Nordics.
Over time, feedback loops would have also ampliﬁed contagion to the Nordics (light orange in
Step 2). In contrast, feedback loops would have strongly ampliﬁed contagion to the Nordics
from a sovereign bond yield shock in the Fragile Five, mainly because strong bank-bank correla-
tions with banks in the Fragile Five would have transmitted the shock to the Nordic sovereigns.
In the euro area periphery, where bank-bank correlations with Fragile Five were less strong,
feedback loops from a Fragile Five sovereign shock would have built more slowly over time.
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Table 5.2: Average strength of feedback loops after sovereign bond yield shock by region
in years 2010-12.
Sovereign bond yield shock in GIIPS Sovereign bond yield shock in Fragile Five
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Emerging Markets Emerging markets
Euro area core Euro area core
Euro area periphery Euro area periphery
Nordics Nordics
Adv. Asia-Paciﬁc Adv. Asia-Paciﬁc
Financial centers Financial centers
Note: Red = increase in sovereign bond yield in the highest quintile of each step; decline in bank equity
price in the lowest quintile of each step. Orange = increase in sovereign bond yield in the second highest
quintile of each step; decline in bank equity price in the second lowest quintile of each step. Yellow =
increase in sovereign bond yield in the third highest quintile of each step; decline in bank equity price in
the third lowest quintile of each step. Light blue = increase in sovereign bond yield in the second lowest
quintile of each step; decline in bank equity price in the second highest quintile of each step. Dark blue
= increase in sovereign bond yield in the lowest quintile of each step; decline in bank equity price in the
highest quintile of each step.
5.6.2 Bank equity price shock
We repeat the exercise but this time for a shock to bank equity prices in the GIIPS, the Fragile
Five, or any country (Fig. 5.5). In general, feedback loops matter less for the propagation of
bank shocks than for sovereign bond yield shocks (the scale of the vertical axis of Fig. 5.5
below is smaller than that of Fig. 5.4). This presumably reﬂects the fact that bank-sovereign
correlations are generally weaker than sovereign-sovereign correlations and hence dampen the
transmission of shocks from loosely interconnected bank equity prices to highly interconnected
sovereign bond yields.
There are some notable differences to the propagation of bond shocks that deserve high-
lighting. In 2013, feedback loops amplify bank shocks in the GIIPS more than Fragile Five
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Figure 5.5: Average impact of bank equity shock on bank equity prices, with feedback loops
(in multiples of average impact of same shock on bank equity prices without feedback loops).
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shocks. In contrast to the sovereign bond yield shock, the greatest shock propagation occurs
when the shock reaches the highly interconnected sovereign bond yield network. The entry
point for a bank shock into the sovereign bond network is through bank-sovereign correlations.
On average, bank-sovereign correlations in the GIIPS are twice as strong as those in the Fragile
Five.10 As a result, bank shocks originating in the GIIPS are transmitted more strongly than
bank shocks in the Fragile Five into the highly interconnected sovereign bond network. From
there, shocks spread rapidly.
Also in contrast to sovereign bond shocks, feedback loops amplify bank shocks in the GIIPS
or in any country more strongly now (2013) than they did at the height of the global ﬁnancial
crisis (2007-09). The reason for strengthening feedback loops after bank shocks is the shrinking
number of safe havens. At the height of the ﬁnancial crisis, bank equity price shocks in Italy and
Spain triggered a decline in yields (probably as a result of a monetary policy response to ﬁnan-
cial system disruptions) that generated benign spillovers in the sovereign-sovereign network. In
the next section, we explore the role of safe havens in more detail.
5.7 The role of safe havens in shock propagation
Our next exercise is focused on safe havens as deﬁned above. In our sample, safe havens
have two characteristics, one by deﬁnition and one by coincidence. Firstly, by our deﬁnition,
safe havens display strong positive correlations between sovereign bond yields and bank equity
prices. Secondly, by coincidence, they also display strong sovereign-sovereign and bank-bank
correlations. This is the case not only for strongly correlated European sovereign bonds but
also for non-European safe haven bonds. Even sovereign bond yields for non-European safe
havens are, on average, correlated 50 percent more strongly with other sovereign bond yields
than non-safe havens. In principle, the ﬁrst characteristic is stabilizing to the network, whereas
the second characteristic is destabilizing. A positive correlation between domestic banks and
10This difference is due both to stronger unweighted correlations and to higher weights (i.e. higher bank assets
relative to sovereign debt) in the GIIPS than in the Fragile Five.
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their sovereign (the ﬁrst characteristic) dampens the impact of a foreign shock that, by itself,
would spill over into a spike in sovereign bond yields and a drop in bank equity prices. A
strong positive correlation with other sovereigns and banks, however (the second characteristic)
generates strong transmission of any shock that arrives in a safe haven. Fig. 5.6 shows the
different distributions of sovereign-sovereign, bank-bank and bank-sovereign correlations for
safe havens and non-safe havens.
5.7.1 Sovereign bond yield shock
To distill the unique role of safe havens, we need to construct a “no-safe havens” counterfactual
network that we can compare against our actual network. For our “no-safe havens” counterfac-
tual network, we replace all the safe havens’ correlations with average correlations of non-safe
haven countries (for bank-sovereign links alone, or in a separate experiment for sovereign-
sovereign, bank-bank, and bank-sovereign links) as if they were the average non-safe haven
country. Then we repeat the shock propagation exercises and compare with the results for the
actual network.
Figs 5.7 and 5.8 show the role of safe havens in the propagation of sovereign bond shocks
in the Fragile Five and the GIIPS. We measure the impact of a shock in a network without safe
havens (one in which all safe haven correlations have been replaced with non-safe haven average
correlations (continuous line)) against a baseline of the actual network of correlations. A line
below 1 indicates that shocks propagate more strongly in a network with safe havens than in one
without safe havens: the destabilizing effect of safe havens’ ﬁrst characteristic predominates.
To distil separately the stabilizing effect of safe havens, we compare the same baseline of
actual correlations against another counterfactual (dotted line) in which only bank-sovereign
correlations of safe havens have been replaced with average non-safe haven correlations but all
sovereign-sovereign and bank-bank correlations remain actual correlations. A dotted line above
1 indicates that the bank-sovereign links of safe havens dampen the propagation of shocks. In
all our scenarios, shocks eventually propagate faster in networks with safe havens than without
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of bilateral correlations for safe havens and non-safe havens.
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Figure 5.7: Average impact of Fragile Five sovereign bond shock without safe havens (in multi-
ples of average impact of Fragile File bond market shock in the actual network of correlations).
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Note: The upper limit of the band indicates the impact when only bank-sovereign correlations are replaced for safe
havens by sample averages; the lower limit indicates the impact when all correlations for safe havens are replaced
by sample averages.
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Figure 5.8: Average impact of GIIPS sovereign bond shock without safe havens (in multiples
of average impact of GIIPS market shock in the actual network of correlations).
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safe havens (the continuous lines are eventually below 1). Not surprisingly, the larger group of
safe havens in 2010-12 than in 2013 results in stronger effects in 2010-12 than in 2013.
The stabilizing effects of safe havens take time to gather momentum after a sovereign bond
shock. A sovereign bond shock spreads rapidly and strongly across the highly interconnected
sovereign bond network. In contrast, the stabilizing bank-sovereign effect in safe havens only
operates once a shock hits either a safe haven banking system or a safe haven sovereign.
The stabilizing effect of safe havens depends on the origin of the shock. For example,
in 2010-12, the stabilizing effect emerged more strongly and faster if the shock originated in
the GIIPS than in the Fragile Five. Because GIIPS sovereign bond yields were on average one-
third more strongly correlated with safe haven sovereign bond yields than Fragile Five sovereign
bond yields, a sovereign shock originating in the GIIPS reached safe havens more strongly. This
also triggered stronger stabilizing bank-sovereign links in safe havens.
5.7.2 Bank equity price shock
In Fig. 5.9, we conduct the same experiment for a bank equity shock in the Fragile Five coun-
tries. Again, a continuous line below 1 indicates that the presence of safe havens ampliﬁes the
propagation of shocks. The stabilizing effect of safe havens is too small to be noticeable in the
chart because the origin of the shock (the Fragile Five) is weakly correlated with safe haven
banks or sovereigns. However, as the shock reaches into the sovereign bond yield network, it is
strongly ampliﬁed by the presence of safe havens.
In 2013, bank-bank correlations between Fragile Five banks and safe havens, on average,
doubled compared with 2010-12 whereas sovereign-sovereign correlation between Fragile Five
and safe havens halved. As a result, the stabilizing effects of safe havens were triggered more
strongly in the initial phases of shock propagation but were later superseded by the destabilizing
effects.
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Figure 5.9: Average impact of Fragile Five bank equity shock on bank equity prices without
safe havens (in multiples of average impact of Fragile File bank equity shock on bank equity
prices in the actual network of correlations).
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The upper limit of the band indicates the impact when only bank-sovereign correlations are replaced for safe
havens by sample averages; the lower limit indicates the impact when all correlations for safe havens are replaced
by sample averages.
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5.8 Conclusions and issues for further research
Our results thus far highlight a few stylized facts. We show how competing features of safe
havens (highly interconnected sovereign bond yields versus stabilizing bank-sovereign links)
combine to accelerate shock propagation in global bond and bank equity prices. We also show
how feedback loops amplify especially shocks in the highly interconnected sovereign bond
yield network. We speculate that these feedback loops may have been short-circuited by policy
measures to contain contagion from GIIPS sovereign bond stress during the euro area crisis of
2010-12.
Our results raise some intriguing follow-on questions for further research. Firstly, the role of
safe havens probably changes depending on their “neighborhood” in the network. Safe havens
in deeply interconnected Europe may well play a different role than safe havens in Asia. Sec-
ondly, although we speculate in some instances about policies, their role is not directly ad-
dressed in this chapter. It is likely that announced policies altered the shape of the correlation
network and drastically change shock propagation.
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Appendix 5.A Network graphs
Figure 5.A.1: Sovereign interconnectedness.
(a) Years 2000-2006
(b) Years 2007-2009
(c) Years 2010-2012
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Figure 5.A.2: Bank interconnectedness.
(a) Years 2000-2006
(b) Years 2007-2009
(c) Years 2010-2012
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Figure 5.A.3: Sovereign-bank correlations in Emerging Asia.
(a) Years 2000-2006
(b) Years 2007-2009
(c) Years 2010-2012
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Figure 5.A.4: Sovereign-bank correlations in Emerging Europe.
(a) Years 2000-2006
(b) Years 2007-2009
(c) Years 2010-2012
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Figure 5.A.5: Sovereign-bank correlations in GIIPS and Cyprus.
(a) Years 2000-2006
(b) Years 2007-2009
(c) Years 2010-2012
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Appendix 5.B Shock propagation mechanism
For illustration purposes, imagine a very simple network structure, consisting of 4 nodes con-
nected by links of weights -0.25 and 0.25 in the following way
Figure 5.B.6: System setup.
0
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0
B
0
C
0
D
-0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
-0.25
Before the shock, none of the nodes is affected so that all of them are 0. Imagine now, that
in step 1 node A is hit by a shock of magnitude one.
Figure 5.B.7: Shock in node A.
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-0.25
The node is now a source of the shock to the adjacent nodes B and C, propagating 25% of
its initial magnitude with an appropriate sign.
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Figure 5.B.8: Shock propagation (step 1).
1
A
-0.25
B
0.25
C
0
D
-0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
-0.25
In the second step, there are three sources of the shock, i.e. nodes A, B and C each, prop-
agating 25% of the initial shock accumulated. Node A would therefore propagate 0.25 to the
adjacent nodes B and C again. Node B would which would propagate 0.0625 to adjacent node
D, and node C would propagate 0.0625 to node A. At the end of the second step, the network
looks the following:
Figure 5.B.9: Shock propagation (step 2).
1.06
A
-0.5
B
0.5
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D
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-0.25
The process repeats itself for 10 steps. In each of them we calculate the cumulative shock
in each of the nodes.
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Summary
In this thesis we aim at exploring the captivating and highly nonlinear proﬁle of the modern
world and assess its relevance in monetary policy conduct and macroprudential supervision. In
particular, we focus on three different aspects of possible nonlinearities, i.e. as arising from (i)
heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations, (ii) probability distribution irregularities
and (iii) complex network structures in the globalized economy.
We propose formal practical tools for central bankers and ﬁnancial authorities to assess
nonlinear structures among various institutions and system as a whole. In times of very non-
standard policy actions, these tools might prove to be of great importance as they may reveal
existing nonlinear relations and dependencies which standard econometric models cannot cap-
ture.
Highlighting the detailed outcomes from individual chapters, in Chapter 2 we investigate the
possible irregularities arising from the presence of boundedly rational agents in the economy.
We show that, in the setting with an active banking sector and extrapolative heuristics, the range
of determinate policy instruments is narrowed. In fact this might have signiﬁcant consequences
for the real world. Pfajfar and Zakelj (2011) suggest that the fraction of extrapolative agents
might be as high as 30%, which is even larger than in our setting. Given the fact that the
estimated Taylor rule parameters vary usually in the region of (0,1) for the output gap weight
and of (1,2) for the inﬂation weight (Taylor, 1999; Woodford, 2003), this may suggest that the
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system is very close to indeterminacy, if not indeterminate already, which is the consequence of
ﬁnancial intermediation. This, in fact, is an interesting topic for further detailed investigation.
Chapters 3 and 4 propose formal methodologies to assess the inﬂuence of nonlinear causal
structures in time series. We correct for these nonlinearities by assuming no underlying param-
eter structure but we test for the equivalence in conditional probability distribution instead. A
clear advantage of such an approach lies in its generality. Chapter 3 reveals the intriguing re-
lationships in the US grain market. Besides highlighting the role of nonlinearities, we discover
a dual role of weather forecasts. Firstly, they seem to drive the causal relation from wheat to
corn in the pairwise setting as they serve as a common factor, i.e. they affect both variables at
the same time. Secondly, they are masking the causal relations from corn to beans and from
beans to wheat in the system setting. Correcting for the common factor, we reveal the nonlinear
Granger casual relations in the US grain market, suggesting that the causality runs from bigger,
i.e. deeper and more liquid, to smaller markets. Chapter 4 tests the co-risk relations in the euro
area ﬁnancial sector. The results suggest that (i) only a few ﬁnancial institutions pose a serious
ex ante threat to the systemic risk, whereas, given that the system is already in trouble, there are
more institutions which hamper its recovery and (ii) there are intriguing nonlinear structures in
the euro zone systemic risk proﬁle.
Chapter 5 treats nonlinearities from a network’s perspective. Interestingly, our model high-
lights a few stylized facts observed over the past decade. We show how competing features
of safe havens (highly interconnected sovereign bond yields versus stabilizing bank-sovereign
links) combine to accelerate shock propagation in global bond and bank equity prices. We also
show how feedback loops amplify shocks in the highly interconnected sovereign bond yield net-
work. We speculate that these feedback loops may have been short-circuited by policy measures
to contain contagion from GIIPS sovereign bond stress during the euro area crisis of 2010-12,
supporting the actions of the European Commission, ECB and IMF.
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A view to the future
The general conclusion arising from this thesis underpins the relevance of the nonlinear dynam-
ics in economics and econometrics. The complexity of the real world has proven to play an
important role in economic constructions since the very ﬁrst models. As pointed out by Blin-
der (2013), this complexity has increased substantially, being one of the core reasons for the
ﬁnancial malaise during the crisis in the years 2007-2009. Therefore, even though the role of a
model is to simplify the real world, it can cause severe consequences if it simpliﬁes the reality
by too much.
This thesis provides the tools and general directions on how to incorporate more complex
structures into the existing economic methodologies. One should never claim that the ideas
contained on these pages are ultimate as they arose as an answer to the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
With the technological advance and rapidly changing global environment, it is just a matter of
time that these tools would not be enough. The same as the telescopes evolved satisfying the
constantly rising curiosity about the mysteries of the deep universe, the methodologies describ-
ing complex and highly nonlinear economic structures should change in line with the advances
in their ﬁelds.
Even though it is not possible to predict the stance of economic modeling in ten years from
now, heterogeneous agents and network models constitute a very promising direction. With the
support from behavioral economics and natural sciences, they create a natural horizon for future
study of the main questions raised in this thesis.
The common conclusion, arising probably not only from this, but from many theses around
the world, is to ask the right questions. This ultimately drives a researcher towards right an-
swers, and right answers are likely to improve the world. But when a right questions is asked,
a researcher can apply the question-speciﬁc methodology and work therefore more efﬁciently.
This thesis advertises nonparametric statistics and econometrics, proposing novel approaches
of assessing the role of nonlinear dynamics in the ﬁnancial world. Although designed through
a prism of a policy maker, the advances of these pages can be viewed as question-speciﬁc
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methodologies so that to a large extent they rely on the ability to ask right questions.
The beginning of modern monetary policy, advertised in the Introduction, signalled the
importance of macroprudential supervision and regulation. Hopefully, it will also encourage
economists to look outside the box and to ask the right questions. For such researchers, the
ideas contained in this thesis offer a powerful set of tools on how to capture the complexity
around us.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In dit proefschrift willen we het boeiende en sterk niet-lineaire proﬁel van de moderne ﬁ-
nancie¨le wereld en zijn relevantie in het voeren van monetair beleid en macro-prudentieel
toezicht verkennen. In het bijzonder richten we ons op drie verschillende aspecten van mogelij-
ke niet-lineariteiten, te weten degenen die voortvloeien uit (i) heterogene en begrensd rationele
(boundedly rational) verwachtingen, (ii) kansverdeling onregelmatigheden en (iii) complexe
netwerkstructuren in de geglobaliseerde economie.
We opperen formele praktische instrumenten voor centrale bankiers en ﬁnancie¨le autoriteiten
ter beoordeling van niet-lineaire structuren tussen verschillende instellingen en het systeem als
geheel. In tijden van zeer niet-standaard beleidsmaatregelen, kunnen deze instrumenten van
groot belang blijken te zijn, aangezien zij aanwezige niet-lineaire relaties en afhankelijkheden
kunnen laten zien die standaard econometrische modellen niet kunnen vatten.
Aandacht gevend aan de gedetailleerde resultaten van afzonderlijke hoofdstukken, onder-
zoeken we in Hoofdstuk 2 de mogelijke onregelmatigheden die voortvloeien uit de aanwezigheid
van begrensd rationele agenten in de economie. We laten zien dat, in een omgeving met een
actieve bankensector en extrapolerende agenten, het bereik van gedetermineerde beleidsinstru-
menten wordt versmald. In feite kan dit aanzienlijke gevolgen voor de ree¨le wereld hebben.
Pfajfar en Zakelj (2011) suggereren dat de fractie van extrapolerende agenten zo groot als 30%
kan zijn, zelfs groter dan in ons model. Gezien het feit dat de geschatte Taylor-regel parameters
meestal in het interval (0, 1) varie¨ren voor het output-gap gewicht en (1, 2) voor het inﬂatie-
gewicht (Taylor, 1999; Woodford, 2003), kan dit erop wijzen dat het systeem zich zeer dicht bij
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onbepaaldheid bevindt, zo niet onbepaald is, ten gevolge van van ﬁnancie¨le bemiddeling. Dit is
een interessant onderwerp voor verder gedetailleerd onderzoek.
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 introduceren formele methoden ter beoordeling van de invloed van
niet-lineaire structuren in de tijdreeksanalyse. We corrigeren voor deze niet-lineariteiten door
aan te nemen dat er geen onderliggende parameter-structuur is, maar we toetsen in plaats daar-
van de gelijkwaardigheid in voorwaardelijke kansverdeling. Een duidelijk voordeel van een
dergelijke aanpak ligt in zijn algemeenheid en intuı¨tieve gevolgtrekking. Hoofdstuk 3 toont de
intrigerende relaties in de Amerikaanse graanmarkt aan. Naast het aantonen van de rol van niet-
lineariteiten, ontdekken we een dubbele rol van weersvoorspellingen. Ten eerste lijken zij in de
paarsgewijze toets de causale relatie van tarwe tot maı¨s te veroorzaken, waarin ze een gemeen-
schappelijke factor vormen. Ten tweede maskeren zij de causale relaties tussen maı¨s en bonen
en tussen bonen en tarwe in de multivariate context. Corrigerend voor de gemeenschappelijke
factor, onthullen we de niet-lineaire Granger causaliteitsrelaties in de Amerikaanse graanmarkt,
die suggereert dat de causaliteit loopt van grotere, namelijk diepere en meer liquide, tot kleinere
markten. Hoofdstuk 4 toetst de co-risico relaties in de ﬁnancie¨le sector binnen het eurogebied.
De resultaten suggereren dat (i) slechts een paar ﬁnancie¨le instellingen een ernstige ex ante
bedreiging voor de systeemrisico’s vormt, terwijl, aannemende dat het systeem al in de proble-
men is, er meer instellingen zijn die het herstel belemmeren en (ii) er intrigerende niet-lineaire
structuren zijn in het risicoproﬁel van de eurozone.
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt niet-lineariteiten vanuit het oogpunt van een netwerk. Interessant
is dat ons model wijst op een aantal gestileerde feiten die gedurende de afgelopen tien jaar
waargenomen zijn. We tonen aan hoe concurrerende kenmerken van veilige havens (sterk met
elkaar verbonden rente op staatsobligaties tegenover stabiliserende banksoevereine koppeling-
en) combineren om schokvoortplanting in wereldwijde obligatie- en bank aandelenkoersen te
versnellen. We laten ook zien hoe feedback loops schokken versterken in het sterk gekoppelde
netwerk van opbrengsten van overheidsobligaties. We speculeren dat deze feedback loops kort-
gesloten kunnen zijn geweest door middel van beleidsmaatregelen om besmetting van GIIPS
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staatsobligatie-stress tijdens de eurozone crisis van 2010-2012 te voorkomen, de acties van de
Europese Commissie, ECB en IMF ondersteunend.
Een blik op de toekomst
De algemene conclusie uit dit proefschrift ligt ten grondslag aan de relevantie van de niet-
lineaire dynamica in economie en ﬁnancie¨n. De complexiteit van de echte wereld heeft een be-
langrijke rol gespeeld in economische constructies sinds de allereerste modellen. Zoals Blinder
(2013) opmerkt is deze complexiteit substantieel toegenomen, en is het een van de hoofdrede-
nen voor de ﬁnancie¨le malaise gedurende de crisis in de jaren 2007-2009. Hoewel de rol van
een model is om de werkelijkheid te vereenvoudigen, kunnen de gevolgen groot zijn als een
model de werkelijkheid te veel vereenvoudigt.
Dit proefschrift verschaft middelen en algemene suggesties om complexere structuren in
bestaande economische methodologiee¨n te verwerken. We zullen echter niet beweren dat de
ideee¨n uiteengezet op deze bladzijden het laatste woord zijn, omdat ze als een antwoord zijn
gekomen op de recente ﬁnancie¨le crisis. Met technologische vooruitgang en een snel veran-
derende globale omgeving is het slechts een kwestie van tijd eer deze hulpmiddelen tekort schie-
ten. Net zoals telescopen zijn gee¨volueerd om aan de alsmaar toenemende nieuwsgierigheid
omtrent de mysteries van het diepe heelal tegemoet te komen, zullen de methodologiee¨n die
complexe en sterk niet-lineaire economische structuren beschrijven zich moeten aanpassen aan
de vooruitgang binnen hun onderzoeksvelden.
Hoewel het onmogelijk is om de stand van zaken in economisch modelleren over tien jaar te
voorspellen, vormen heterogene-agentmodellen en netwerkmodellen een veelbelovende richt-
ing. Met hulp van gedragseconomie en de natuurwetenschappen cree¨ren zij een natuurlijke
horizon voor toekomstige bestudering van de hoofdvragen die in dit proefschrift zijn gesteld.
De gebruikelijk conclusie, die waarschijnlijk niet alleen uit dit proefschrift kan worden
getrokken, maar uit vele proefschriften wereldwijd, is dat de juiste vragen gesteld moeten wor-
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den, en dat de juiste vragen de wereld kunnen verbeteren. Pas als de juiste vraag gesteld is
kan een onderzoeker vraag-speciﬁeke methodologie toepassen en aldus efﬁcie¨nter werken. Dit
proefschrift staat het gebruik van niet-parametrische statistiek en econometrie voor, en stelt ver-
schillende aanpakken voor het bepalen van de rol van niet-lineaire dynamica in de ﬁnancie¨le
wereld voor. Hoewel ontworpen vanuit de visie van een beleidsmaker, kunnen de vorderingen
die hier zijn beschreven worden gezien als vraag-speciﬁeke methodologiee¨n, zodat zij in grote
mate steunen op het vermogen om de juiste vragen te stellen.
Het begin van modern monetair beleid, waarvan de relevantie is aangegeven in de Inleiding
(Introduction), gaf het belang aan van macro-prudentie¨el toezicht en regulatie. Hopelijk zal
dit economen ook aanmoedigen om van de gebaande paden af te wijken en de juiste vragen te
stellen. Voor dergelijke onderzoekers bieden de ideee¨n uit dit proefschrift een rijke verzameling
hulpmiddelen om de complexiteit om ons heen te vatten.
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